Inside this issue:

**Featured Articles**

- **Infantry Battalion Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6):** This MCCLL report is the latest in a series that address infantry battalion operations in Afghanistan, in this case, based on lessons and observations from 2/6.

- **Recent Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) After Action Reports (AARs):** These reports provide insights into artillery battalion, aviation, counter-IED, and logistics battalion operations in Afghanistan. These AARs address:
  - 1st Battalion, 10th Marines operations
  - HMLA-269 and VMAQ-4 movements to OEF
  - The CJTF Paladin Weapons Intelligence Team
  - The Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Counter-IED Conference
  - Combat Logistics Battalion 7’s First 100 Days

- **Are We Continuing to Relearn the Same Lessons?** This article (reprinted with permission from the Marine Corps Gazette) highlights a number of lessons that Marines appear always to be relearning.

- **U.S. Army TACOM Support to the Marine Corps:** Several resources are available from the U.S. Army to assist Marines with their logistics issues. In addition, the 60th anniversary of PS Magazine is highlighted.

- **Electronic Warfare (EW) in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF):** This concept of operations for MAGTF EW from MCCDC addresses the Marine Corps methodology for EW battle management.

- **Operation Tomodachi AAR and Assessment:** This AAR from III Marine Expeditionary Force is based on after action comments (and surveys) of a wide range of participants in the major relief effort following the earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan.

**Irregular Warfare (IW) from a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Perspective:** The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has prepared a newsletter that compiles some of the latest literature on the role of SOF in IW.

**Building the “Capacity” of Host Nations:** The latest journal from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) addresses several factors to consider in helping host nations build up their security, economic, and governance capabilities.

**The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website:** Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find most interesting.

**2011 Security Cooperation Task Force (SCTF) Deployments:** AARs from the recent deployments of SCTF Southern Partnership Station 2011 and SCTF Africa Partnership Station 2011 are highlighted.

**News**

Three items are included this month: (1) the latest statistics on Marine suicides, (2) an assessment of the likelihood of stability arriving to the Middle East, and (3) the future Marine Corps force structure.

**Reading Lists and Book Review:** Three books are featured: (1) *The Arab Mind*, a carryover from the previous Commandant List, (2) *Crisis Leadership*, from the new Commandant list, and (3) a new book, *Captive*, by a journalist captured by the Taliban.

**Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts:** This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides “initial impressions” summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor.
Infantry Battalion Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines

2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) deployed to Afghanistan in early June 2010, conducting its relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6) and assuming responsibility for battlespace in the town of Marjeh in central Helmand Province. The 2/6 deployment occurred as the “clear,” “hold” and “build” efforts in the city were continuing under the widely-publicized operation referred to as Operation Moshtarak. 2/6 worked to build upon the successes achieved by 1/6, with progress being reflected in the gradual downward trend in the number of significant events in the town. During its first few months in theater, 2/6 continued conducting numerous clearing operations, since the battalion recognized that the perceptions of the local populace concerning the improving security situation would be a key component in determining the timing for the transition from the “clear” to the “hold” and, subsequently, to the “build” phase. The battalion’s partnering operations with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were designed not only to protect the local populace, but also to help establish the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Following the re-deployment of the battalion to Camp Lejeune, NC, program analysts from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed key leaders and staff members from the battalion and its line companies to collect their lessons and observations based on the deployment. The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, Infantry Battalion Operations in Afghanistan: Lessons and Observations from 2/6. A classified version of this report is also available and can be found on the MCCLL SIPR website at: http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil.

A complete set of FOUO and classified comments and observations are contained in the MCCLL reports. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Training and Leadership:** The battalion focused its training on the basic warfighting skills. Counterinsurgency (COIN) principles need to be fully understood down to the lowest levels, especially by squad and fire team leaders.

  ⇒ The success of the battalion’s COIN operations depended on the ability of junior officers and NCOs to be decision makers.

  ⇒ Small unit leader training should be designed to help these Marines learn independent thinking and allow them to make and learn from their mistakes.

  ⇒ Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) was praised for effectively preparing the battalion for deployment.

  ⇒ **Operations:** Fully understanding the area of operations (AO) was essential for accomplishing the mission. However, the operational and tactical situations varied significantly from village to village, even among those in close proximity to each other.

  ⇒ Battalion operations were “people centric.” Understanding this concept helped the battalion’s Marines to “buy in” to the rules of engagement (ROE) established by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and realize that they would be critical to successful COIN operations.

  ⇒ One of the First Sergeants interviewed during this collection offered a specific example in which the use of restraint by the battalion resulted in a turning point in the perception of the Marines by the local populace.

  ⇒ Rigorous partnership with the ANSF was also key to success and was viewed by the battalion as a mindset that began prior to deployment and had to be embraced at the lowest levels. All the command posts, down to the platoon level, were manned jointly by Marines and the ANSF.

  ⇒ Initially, the focus was on partnering with the Afghan National Army (ANA), but this focus later transitioned to partnering with the Afghan National Police (ANP). These police are generally from the local villages themselves and have primary responsibility for protecting the citizens in these communities.

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Capt Manuel Zepeda, Commanding Officer, Fox Company, 2/6, joins local Marjeh children at the groundbreaking ceremony for a new primary school site.

An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier patrols alongside Marines from Echo Company, 2/6, during a combat patrol through the northern section of the town of Marjeh in Helmand Province.

An infantryman with 2/6, who was wounded by an IED while on foot patrol in northern Marjeh, has his stitches checked by corpsmen at the Combined Aid Station aboard Camp Leatherneck. The nearby Wounded Warrior facility provides a location for Marines to recover before returning to their units.

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Return to the Table of Contents!
In an effort to provide guidance to units preparing for distinctive movements into the Afghanistan theater of operations, two aviation units have prepared after action reports (AARs) that address the unique aspects of their particular movements to OEF:

⇒ Marine Light Attack Squadron 269 (HMLA-269) deployed to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Dwyer in mid-May 2011 in response to a short notice deployment order that resulted in the squadron being unable to conduct a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) or send an advanced party (ADVON) into the theater prior to the main body’s arrival. In addition, the squadron moved into theater through an intermediate base to execute its reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I). In order to provide guidance to other units facing short-fuse deployment orders with multiple movements to their final destinations, the squadron has prepared an AAR on the HMLA-269 Movement to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11.1.

⇒ Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 (VMAQ-4) also deployed to OEF 11 in May 2011, but in this case conducted a trans-Atlantic (TRANSPLANT) movement. To provide information for comparable future movements, the squadron has prepared its AAR for TRANSPLANT Movement to OEF 11.1. The squadron highlights the fact that contingencies should be identified early on in order to have fallback strategies for responding to unexpected developments during the TRANSPLANT movement. It is also important that the squadron and external entities be working off of the same timeline. During the VMAQ-4 movement, deployment planners were not necessarily employing the same timeline so that all required milestones could be coordinated effectively.

Readers may also be interested in an AAR prepared by the battalion’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Detector Dog (IDD) Program Manager, entitled 1/10 IDD Handler Discussion and Overview. A number of recent infantry battalion AARs have provided observations and recommendations concerning the IDD program, but this is the first AAR that MCCLL has received that has been prepared by the IDD handlers themselves. This AAR includes numerous comments from the handlers on the successes and weaknesses of the program in order to assist future units in planning for deployments with their IDDs. Since these dogs are considered to be integral components of the overall counter-IED effort by providing a means of detection and standoff for dismounted units, the report includes a number of recommendations for structuring the program within a battalion so that it will serve as more effective tool in the IED fight.

From the 1/10 AAR:
“The artillery battalion contributes more than 24-hour, all-weather fire coverage to the ground combat element (GCE) mission and security line of operation. Its ability to conduct provisional missions, such as the economy of force at the Kajaki Dam... or partnership with Afghan National Security Forces... are examples of potential employments. The artillery battalion provides the GCE an additional command and control and security force capability to support GCE mission specific requirements across the full range of military operations.”

After Action Reports on Aviation Unit Movements to OEF

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After Action Report from a Weapons Intelligence Team

The Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin Southwest has the mission to support and advise units of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) on counter-IED activities and evidence exploitation at the squad through battalion levels. This is accomplished by mentoring and advising battalion staffs on IED defeat measures, enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), tactical site exploitation procedures, and biometric collections. Focused advising is also provided at the platoon and company levels by embedding directly on combat patrols, responding with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams on IED "calls," and assisting in counter-IED and site exploitation sustainment training. WIT members are also represented on infantry battalion counter-IED working groups. During the period from December 2010 to May 2011, the WIT provided direct support to Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) and RCT-8, participating in numerous patrols, IED events, and cache discoveries. Based on these experiences, the Team has prepared an extensive AAR that provides WIT Observations on Support Provided to Regimental Combat Teams 2 and 8.

The AAR identifies numerous friendly TTPs that have proven successful in counter-IED efforts by ground combat elements and logistics units operating throughout the RC (SW) area of operations. These TTPs are organized into the following sections: ■ observations and recommendations that address all four aspects of counter-IED initiatives (defeat the device, attack the network, train the force, and partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)), ■ best practices for patrolling, including planning and conducting both dismounted and mounted patrols, ■ a sample biometrics plan, and ■ sample informational requirements (IRs) for company-level intelligence cells (CLICs).

From the WIT, CJTR Paladin, AAR:
“Despite all of the equipment advances and specialized training associated with counter-IED, sound infantry principles remain the best tactic for avoiding and defeating IEDs. The best counter-IED patrols exhibit infantry fundamentals and then incorporate enablers and new gear into their plans. . . . Best practices should be reviewed and compared to the current practices of each unit operating in RC (SW). Practices which are applicable and are upgrades to current TTPs should be incorporated into the units’ standing operating procedures. . . .”

After Action Report from the RC (SW) Counter-IED Conference

In July 2011, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) hosted a Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Conference that was attended by personnel from six nations, each of the U.S. military services, special operations forces (SOF), and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The conference objective was to provide a venue for discussing C-IED issues from the battalion level up to the general officer staff level. The importance of integrating C-IED training into all aspects of mission training was emphasized during the conference, including the need to have leaders who are capable of adapting and retraining their units when the situation requires. Among the topics addressed during the conference were: ■ pre-deployment and in-theater training, ■ recommended methodology for C-IED training, ■ combat hunter principles, ■ electronic countermeasures training sets, ■ IED search team concepts, ■ unit “ownership” of training, ■ metal detector training, ■ tactical patience, ■ biometric enrollments, ■ robotics, and ■ evidence exploitation capabilities. The results of the conference have been documented in the RC (SW) C-IED Conference After Action Report. The report emphasizes the fact that “finding IEDs is not the mission. Mitigating the IED threat allows forces to maneuver and accomplish their assigned missions.”

After clearing by a route clearance platoon from CJTF Paladin, Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB-8) and soldiers from the 129th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion conduct a joint service combat logistics patrol to Forward Operating Base Saenz to resupply the 33d Georgia Light Infantry Battalion.

From the RC (SW) C-IED Conference AAR:
“Marines are aggressive by culture. They need to be instructed to maintain the offensive mindset while using tactical patience and moving at deliberate speed . . . Units need to plan operations that create a presence that overwhelms the insurgent’s ability to communicate and move among the populace. . . . Every evaluated operational event needs to include an evaluated C-IED task. . . .”
Are We Continuing to Relearn the Same Lessons?

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Fighting: Are We Relearning the Same Lessons?
By LtCol Don J. Thieme

“Recently there have been a great number of articles online and in various professional journals discussing tactical lessons for the fight in Afghanistan. Most of these lessons and tactics, techniques, and procedures are spot on and reveal the quickness with which junior Marines are adapting to the fight in Afghanistan and its local nuances. At the same time, in reading many of these I feel that as a warfighting organization, we are failing. Why are we relearning so many lessons that so many Marines have learned before? It is not my purpose to tell younger Marines, who are closer to the fight and with more combat experience than me, how to run their tactical operations. The purpose is to right the listing Marine Corps training program that makes everything a priority and strips the trust and confidence away from senior leaders in telling them what they must train to and how to do it in a training program that exceeds the hours available in which to train. Something has to be cut, and the best way to do that is to identify the basics and go from there. As I read through the latest after-action report to make the rounds, with copies of David Kilcullen’s Counterinsurgency (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010) and Girardet’s Afghanistan: The Soviet War (Palgrave MacMillan, 1986) sitting by my laptop, well-thumbed and stained from deployed use, I could not help but think that we are still relearning the same lessons. Here are 10 truths that can serve us all well as a basis for smart training and fighting. . .”

From LtCol Thieme’s “Fighting”:
“We have a force with more combat experience than just about any comparable force in the history of our Corps. We are at a tipping point in history in which the violent prosecution of effective tactics will, in fact, enable a more flexible strategy for the United States. Rather than relearning ‘stay off the road,’ we need to focus on sharing ‘this is what they did last week, and what we did to counter it and defeat them’. . .”

Return to the Table of Contents!
The Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) of the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) offers a wide variety of services designed to provide assistance to Soldiers and Marines on many supply, logistics and training matters. In an effort to assist Marines in accessing these services, the Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) has assigned a liaison officer (LnO) at LCMC to serve as the focal point for Marine Corps customer support in the areas of command and tactical vehicles, bridging equipment, material handling equipment, construction and engineering equipment, and petroleum and water distribution systems. POC information for the Marine Corps LnO is included in the poster to the right, a larger version of which can be downloaded by clicking on the image.

Another available resource from LCMC is its new quarterly newsletter, UTAP (Unit Training Assistance Program). The latest edition of the newsletter (for the Fourth Quarter, FY 2011) provides: ■ an informational video for the Standard Automotive Tool Set (SATS), ■ TACOM System training material that was added in the Third Quarter, FY 2011, ■ the role of the LCMC Customer Assistance Team, and ■ procedures for Marines to follow in order to access the UTAP website at: https://utap.army.mil.

Marines with AKO accounts may also be interested in accessing a very informative U.S. Army website on MRAP Safety Awareness. Return to the Table of Contents!

PS Magazine Turns 60!

One of the U.S. Army logistics publications with which many Marines are most familiar is PS Magazine (The Preventive Maintenance Monthly) produced by Redstone Arsenal. Although the magazine officially turned 60 in June, two of the principle characters have been around even longer. Master Sergeant Half-Mast McCanick and Corporal Connie Rodd first answered questions from mechanics during World War II in the earlier Army Motors Magazine. They took a break at the end of the war, but in June 1951 returned to duty at the beginning of the Korean War in the new publication, PS Magazine (although Connie had by then become a civilian employee). For the past 60 years, mechanics, supply clerks, armormers and a host of other Soldiers and Marines have used PS Magazine to remain up-to-date on changes in technical publications, repair parts national stock numbers, and maintenance and supply policy. You can read about the history of the publication in the Fort Leavenworth Lamp and view monthly issues of the magazine online going back as far as 1999.
Electronic Warfare in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

In response to the rapid evolution of technology on the modern battlefield, the Marine Corps has integrated electronic warfare (EW) at an increasingly fast pace into the arsenal available to commanders. As a result, there has been a general recognition that new concepts are needed by commanders throughout the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concerning the application of these EW capabilities. In response to this need, the Capabilities Development Directorate of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has recently published a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for MAGTF Electronic Warfare to facilitate the integration of airborne and ground EW capabilities and provide the MAGTF Commander with a coordinated capability to control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) “at the time and place of his choosing.”

The CONOPS describes the Marine Corps methodology of EW battle management (EWBM), which is a system and organizational architecture designed to create an environment in which individual platforms and payloads are synchronized in a collaborative manner and employed as a family of systems. This provides versatility and flexibility across all warfighting functions and maximizes the overall effects at all levels from squad leaders to the MAGTF commander. Although cyber operations have traditionally been separate, but complementary, to EW, these differences are increasingly blurred. Some cyber operations can be enabled by EW operations, such as the EW-delivery of computer network attacks.

From CONOPS for MAGTF EW:
“EW is defined as ‘military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy.’ The Marine Corps can no longer view the electro-magnetic spectrum as a static environment. Just as the Marine Corps has traditionally used the air, land and sea to close with and destroy the enemy, it must now look at the electromagnetic spectrum environment as an equally relevant ‘maneuver space.’”

Operation Tomodachi After Action Report and Assessment

Shortly after the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami struck the northeastern coast of Japan, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) began preparations for a collection effort to document the experiences of the Marine Corps forces that were tasked with assisting in this major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) effort, designated as Operation Tomodachi. The results of this collection will be available shortly and highlighted in a future monthly newsletter. In the meantime, a number of initial after action reports (AARs) and other lessons learned reports have been prepared that provide observations and recommendations to be considered in planning for similar relief efforts in the future. A search of the MCCLL website using the term, “Tomodachi,” shows that over twenty documents are currently in the database that address (to at least some extent) the U.S. military response to this disaster. One of the most recent has been prepared by the Deputy Current Operations Officer of Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), entitled Operation Tomodachi: After Action Report and Assessment. This AAR is based on after action comments and a survey of participants from the Japanese Self Defense Force, U.S. Joint Forces, U.S. civilian political military advisors, and representatives from the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The objective has been to focus on III MEF and 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) actions and overall effectiveness in providing support during the operation. Given that III MEF and 3d MEB have already responded to thirteen major natural disasters since 2004, the likelihood of their being tasked to support future HA/DR efforts is considered to be very likely.

From the Operation Tomodachi AAR:
“Complex emergencies, like those faced in Operation Tomodachi, are major humanitarian crises with multi-causal and unpredictable natures that require system-wide interactive, adaptive responses from diplomatic, military, political, humanitarian, public safety, societal, and economic dimensions. . . . 3d MEB, in particular, must maintain a highly adaptive ability to operate in this environment by establishing lasting relations and standing support capacity with experts in regional cultures, militaries, and both governmental and non-governmental humanitarian relief organizations.”
Irregular Warfare from a SOF Perspective

The formal definition of irregular warfare (IW) from Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is that this category of warfare involves a "violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will." Although the danger of conventional, inter-state war has not completely passed, and the U.S. must continue to maintain its dominance in interstate warfighting capabilities, conventional warfare and IW are now often combining into a hybrid threat. The assigned missions of special operations forces (SOF), together with their distinctive capabilities, are a natural fit for IW, with these forces uniquely qualified to seek to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, with a primary emphasis on prevention. Five SOF activities are considered to be relevant for countering irregular threats: counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In an effort to compile some of the recent literature on the role of SOF in IW, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has prepared a newsletter, entitled Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective that examines the SOF role at the operational and tactical levels in ten articles by military and civilian authors. These articles have appeared in recent professional journals or have been obtained from CALL and joint archives. They are not considered to be all-inclusive, but have been compiled to represent a wide range of opinions for future reference.

Building the “Capacity” of Host Nations

From the article, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare”:
“As a result of the current environment, war is not what it used to be. Traditionally defined forms of warfare such as counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare are now lumped under the umbrella term of ‘irregular warfare.’ . . . [Former] Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, identified it best when he wrote recently, ‘What is dubbed the war on terrorism, in grim reality, is a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation.’ . . .”

The civil affairs team lead from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) meets with the Now Zad District Governor to discuss the status of the Salaam Bazaar. Since by rule of Afghanistan law, each district is allowed only one official bazaar, the Salaam bazaar will be required to close.

“failed” or “failing” states to function fully as strategic international partners. As noted in an introductory article on Thinking Strategically, “The general conclusion from experience over the last decade—and particularly from the investments in Iraq and Afghanistan—is that providing the host nation with unlimited external assistance or fulfilling an ideal list of state ‘capabilities’ does not a functioning state make. Furthermore, if the number of troubled states and cycle of state dependency continues to grow, the international order will no longer be able to sustain the escalating demands on donors.”

From the article on Supporting the Rule of Law:
“The Rule of Law (ROL) is the principle that the government, its institutions, private entities and the governed are accountable to the laws. It is a key end state in stability operations as well as counterinsurgency. The core tenet in ROL is that laws “are publically promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.” Meeting that standard strengthens the people’s confidence in the government (legitimacy) and allows the government to more efficiently provide services to the people (effectiveness). Abandoning the effort to attain that benchmark means criminal violence increases, bribes inflate the costs of goods, medicines do not reach hospitals, the people are exploited, and political opponents are attacked or imprisoned.”
The recent MCCLL report on infantry battalion operations in Afghanistan (based on the experiences of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines) was the most popular MCCLL product in July. Four other MCCLL reports addressing Afghanistan topics were also frequently downloaded, as were two editions of the monthly newsletter and one of the recent weekly rollups of new documents entered into our database.

In comparison, the second table highlights documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during June. An after action report (AAR) from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (1/8) was downloaded most often, with three other AARs based on Afghanistan deployments also making the list. These documents were read most frequently by officers in the grades from O-2 to O-4, SNCOs in the grades of E-6 and E-7, DoD civilians in the grades of G-12 and GS-13, and DoD contractors.

Recent after action reports (AARs) provide valuable lessons from the 2011 deployments of two Marine Corps Security Cooperation Task Forces (SCTFs):

⇒ The Security Cooperation Task Force Southern Partnership Station 2011 (SCTF SPS-11) After Action Report addresses this Marine task force that deployed aboard the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) from mid-January to mid-March 2011 to conduct military subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) in Colombia, Guatemala, and Belize, as well as to make logistical port visits in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Colon, Panama. The objective of these exchanges was to further the security cooperation initiatives of the Combatant Commander and be prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. The ground combat element (GCE) consisted of Marines from the 2d Tank Battalion, with the bulk of the command element (CE) and logistics combat element (LCE) comprised of Marines from Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 (MWSS-271).

⇒ The Security Cooperation Task Force Africa Partnership Station 2011 (SCTF APS-11) After Action Report addresses the activation, work-up, deployment, and de-establishment of this task force during the period from September 2010 to June 2011. The task force (formed mostly from elements of the 2d Marine Division) was required to deploy by air due to the re-tasking of the ship scheduled to support the task force. SCTF APS-11 first deployed a platoon-sized detachment by air to Ghana in March to lead basic infantry tactics training and live fire training, while the Ghanains led jungle warfare training. A detachment then flew to Senegal in April to conduct basic infantry tactics and NCO leadership training and participate in Senegalese-led riverine operations and a combined field training exercise. This detachment then flew to Gabon to conduct infantry tactics and intelligence training, participate in Gabonese-led riverine operations, and conduct a combined field exercise. The detachment returned to Camp Lejeune in June.

A USN Petty Officer with the ground combat element (GCE) of SCTF APS-11 observes as Senegalese commandos conduct a fire and movement rushing exercise in Thies, Senegal.
Never Leave a Marine Behind

The importance placed by the Marine Corps on the need for leaders at all levels to do everything possible to reduce the incidence of suicides among young Marines is evidenced by the prominence of an article on the subject in the most recent Current News “Playbook” from Marine Corps Public Affairs. As of the end of July 2011, 21 Marine deaths are suspected of being the result of suicide. Although this number (so far) represents a relative decrease over 2010 when 37 Marine suicides were recorded (as well as a dramatic decline from 2009 when 52 Marine deaths were attributed to suicide), the improving statistics do not mean that this issue can now receive reduced emphasis. The loss of young, capable Marines shortchanges their fellow Marines, their family members, and the Corps as a whole. The Marine Corps is currently participating in an ongoing U.S. Army study to determine whether there are relationships between combat deployments, dwell times, and suicides. In the meantime, among the key points to emphasize to young Marines are:

• “Help is available to Marines and their family members.
• Nobody is alone with the issues they face. Everyone goes through hard times.
• Stress is like a balloon, and you keep it from popping by getting Marines to talk.

We will keep faith with our Marines, our Sailors and our families. We will ensure that Marines, Sailors and their families have availability and access to quality facilities and support programs.

The Marine Corps Suicide Prevention Program takes a proactive approach to suicide prevention by educating our Marines on how to handle hard times, so when it happens, they’ll know what to do and what options they have available.

Additional information on the Marine Corps Suicide program is available at: Never Leave a Marine Behind.

Will Democracy Lead to Stability in the Middle East?

The July 2011 Edition of Translational Research from the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) includes two articles addressing the potential for democratization in the Middle East as a result of the current wave of popular unrest sweeping the region:

• The article, Democratization and Stability in the Middle East by Blago Tashev, PhD, provides an introduction to the topic and points out that “neither democracy nor stable peace is certain in the region. Although democracy and peaceful stability tend to be associated, the processes leading to consolidated democracy are both uncertain and volatile. In fact, the process of democratization almost universally leads to short- and medium-term instability and conflict. . .”
• A more specific example of the path to democracy is provided in the article, The Egyptian Army and the Test of Democratic Transformation, by Basema Maki. The Egyptian Army has promised parliamentary and presidential elections sometime between September and November 2011, with subsequent turnover to a civilian government. In reviewing modern Egyptian history, there are signs that this transition could “go either way,” with Egyptian experiences during the ruling periods of Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat providing contrasting examples. Among the crucial factors required for building a democracy are permitting political parties to form, development of a free press, and the presence of a citizenry capable of self-organizing into civic, social economic, and political associations.

The Marine Corps Force Structure Post-OEF

In the Fall of 2010, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, directed that a comprehensive review be conducted to evaluate and refine the organization, posture and capabilities required of America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness in a post-Afghanistan security environment. The results of this review became available in March 2011 and have been widely reported. Marines who are interested in reading the report itself can access it at: Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness: Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Readiness Review Group.

The recent legislative and executive maneuverings to approve an increase in the national debt limit have brought the budgets of all federal departments and agencies into sharp focus, with that of the Department of Defense (DoD) being no exception. As a result of the Force Structure Review, the Marine Corps should be in a strong position during the deliberations of a special congressional committee established by the debt limit legislation to identify $1.2 trillion in deficit savings by November 2011. These cuts are in addition to the $917 billion in cuts that were specifically identified in the legislation (including $325 billion in Defense cuts, which are in line with the administration’s current plans for DoD funding for the next decade). However, automatic spending cuts that would be triggered should Congress be unable to agree on the makeup of the cuts would require major (and unacceptable) changes over and above those identified in the Force Structure Review. Stay tuned!

Return to the Table of Contents!
The July 2011 revision to the Commandant’s Professional Reading List was devised by a review panel established by General James F. Amos for the purpose of ensuring that the reading list remains relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives, as well as help ensure that Marines benefit from the experiences of others. The new list continues to highlight First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret) as the Commandant’s “choice book” to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence) are highlighted on the Marine Corps University (MCU) website, along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) a book carried over from the 2009 list, The Arab Mind by Raphael Patai (on the lists for Staff Sergeant, Captain, and Chief Warrant Officer 4), (2) an older book that has been added to the 2011 list, Crisis Leadership by Gene Klann (on the list for Master Gunnery Sergeant/ Sergeant Major), and (3) a more recent book that provides a first-hand account of a journalist captured by the Taliban, Captive by Jere Van Dyk, which offers considerable insights into the mentality and customs of the Pashtun Taliban.

The Arab Mind, by Raphael Patai (Charles Scribners and Sons, 1973 (Revised in 1983 and 2007))

Review by Lloyd F. Jordon, CIA Historical Reviews:

“...The Arab Mind, is a significant scholarly contribution to the field of national character research in general and, more specifically, to the understanding of Arab culture and national character. Further, the book implicitly suggests the relevance of national character research to intelligence analysis. It seems, therefore, both appropriate and useful to assess Patai’s book in the following contexts: (1) its contribution to the literature on the Arabs, (2) its status in terms of the evolutionary development of national character research as a field, and (3) both its relevance and that of national character research in general to intelligence analysis.

Patai’s book is clearly the product of a profound knowledge of Arab civilization. The book is well organized and, for a scholarly study, especially interestingly and elegantly written. The author does a masterful job of integrating his knowledge of the many facets of the culture, such as the language, the arts and literature, and child-rearing practices, and then delineating the ways that these cultural variables influence personality development. In this respect, it is appropriate to compare Patai’s book with Sania Hamady’s The Temperament and Character of the Arabs, published in 1960, since the objective of both authors was the same — the delineation of Arab national character. While Hamady and Patai reach many of the same conclusions about the Arabs, Patai’s analysis and explanation of the “why” of their behavior places his study on a considerably higher analytical plane than that of Hamady. The specialist on the Arabs may not discover anything startlingly new about Arab character or world view in Patai’s book, but he will probably acquire a better appreciation of the cultural and psychological wellsprings of Arab behavior. It is in this latter respect that The Arab Mind is an important contribution to the scholarly literature on the Arabs. . .

What, if any, utility does the field of national character research have for intelligence? It appears that the intelligence officer often implicitly incorporates into intelligence assessments certain national character considerations in an unsystematic and, perhaps, unconscious way. . .”

Read the complete review from the CIA Historical Review Program.

Captive: My Time as a Prisoner of the Taliban, by Jere Van Dyk (Henry Holt and Company, 2010)

Review by Ann Scott Tyson, The Washington Post:

“...In the opening pages of journalist Jere Van Dyk’s stark account of his ill-fated foray into Pakistan and capture by the Taliban, he takes readers back to 1973, the year he drove an old Volkswagen across Asia to Kabul. That trip marked the start of Van Dyk’s lifelong fascination with Afghanistan, where he covered the mujaheddin leaders during their war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the Taliban insurgency since 2001. The insights that he has drawn from his decades of experience in Afghanistan and his familiarity with Pashtun culture in particular make his account of 45 days of captivity with the Taliban rich and revealing.

Van Dyk’s history with mujaheddin figures such as Jalaladin Haqqani and Gulbadeen Hekmatyar, who are now allied with the Taliban, served as background for his plan to disappear into Afghan society and then secretly cross the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan. “I wanted to explain the Taliban to the outside world,” he writes. “I wanted to go deep into the heart of Taliban country, to get to their leaders, men I knew from the 1980s, and through them, perhaps even to find Osama bin Laden himself.” He grew a beard, stayed away from officials and other journalists and set off with his interpreter and guide to meet a contact in the eastern city of Jalalabad who would lead them to the Taliban. But only a few hours into the journey, walking in the mountains of Pakistan, they were surprised by a Taliban group armed with rifles and rocket-launchers, who sprung out from behind rocks and apprehended them. “I couldn’t run. I couldn’t do anything. I was dead. I was going to die,” Van Dyk writes.

The first section of the book, leading to his capture, is called “The Way of the Pashtuns,” and in it Van Dyk deftly weaves lessons on tribal culture into his narrative. For example, he describes how after his blindfold is untied in a small mud hut, one of the first questions his Taliban interrogator asks him is “What is your father’s name?” This was deep Pashtun culture, where it was necessary to know a man’s father’s name, and his grandfather’s name, to know who he was, where he fit in society, and what kind of a family he came from. These were Pashtun... . .” Read more of the review on the next page.
These reasons alone, there is much that the civilian leader can learn from the Army's leadership renaissance beyond their civilian counterparts, and, even as junior leaders, have had responsibilities that equal those of mid-level and high-level officers. These are leaders who have had several global assignments, can speak more than one language, are educated beyond the college level, have had experience leading a diverse group of people, can handle stress and coolness under fire (literally), a degree of comfort in making quick decisions, and an appreciation for teamwork. The average Army officer's experience and training with crisis situations is extensive. The necessity of training for and experience during a career as an active duty officer in the United States Army. This includes decorated service as an infantry company advisor in the Vietnam War and as a battalion commander of 600 paratroopers during the Gulf War. I write about leading in difficult situations from the vantage point of more than 25 years of crisis leadership training and experience during a career as an active duty officer in the United States Army. This includes decorated service as an infantry company advisor in the Vietnam War and as a battalion commander of 600 paratroopers during the Gulf War.

There are many books written about crisis management, but few focus on crisis leadership. Managing a crisis and providing leadership in a crisis are not the same thing, although each addresses different aspects of a difficult situation. I would differentiate the two by saying that crisis management relates mainly to operational issues, while crisis leadership principally deals with how leaders handle the human responses to a crisis, including their own. We all have natural behavioral responses to crisis situations based on how our behaviors send messages to others about our underlying needs and emotions. It is within this set of behaviors that we find the core of crisis leadership.

But this book is not just a litany of the Army way of leadership, useful only to those few people who must lead in the most harrowing situations. Leaders in the private sector can readily adopt many of the Army's crisis leadership lessons. But what is the argument for civilian leaders' adopting such tactics? The answer lies in the Army's dramatic and well-documented post-Vietnam change in leadership philosophy, which brought about one of the most successful organizational transformations in recent history. Gone is the popular Hollywood and news media image of the yelling, abusive, and irrational military leader. The combination of the military's high-tech equipment, its growing participation in international missions, and its extremely diverse volunteer force has created a very different mid- and upper-level Army leader.

The average Army officer's experience and training with crisis situations is extensive. The necessity of training for and the experience of leading in high-stress situations has resulted in the officer having a high degree of flexibility, a calm and coolness under fire (literally), a degree of comfort in making quick decisions, and an appreciation for teamwork. These are leaders who have had several global assignments, can speak more than one language, are educated beyond their civilian counterparts, and, even as junior leaders, have had responsibilities that equal those of mid-level and some upper-level corporate leaders. This is not profit-and-loss responsibility, but life-and-death responsibility. For these reasons alone, there is much that the civilian leader can learn from the Army's leadership renaissance.
Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Ken Hurst, Mr. Scott Kemp, and LtCol Jack Estep have deployed as MCCLL representatives at RC (SW), 2d MLG (Fwd), and 2d MAW (Fwd), respectively. LtCol Estep’s contact information will be provided once it becomes available. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact Mr. Mark Silvia, the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.