



Marines and Sailors from III Marine Expeditionary Force load equipment onto a KC-130J at Naval Air Facility Atsugi in support of Operation Tomodachi. Read the MCCLL report on [Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, March 2011.](#)



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# Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

## Inside this issue:

### Featured Articles

**[Lessons from Operation Tomodachi Relief Efforts in Japan:](#)** This MCCLL report documents the lessons learned by III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and its subordinate units providing support to Japan following the devastating earthquake and tsunami.

**[Recent Operation Enduring Freedom \(OEF\) After Action Reports \(AARs\)](#)** provide insights into infantry battalion, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) and tank battalion operations in Afghanistan:

- ➔ [3d Battalion, 9th Marines \(3/9\)](#)
- ➔ [VMM-264.](#)
- ➔ [Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion](#)

**[Trends and Systemic Issues Identified During Training:](#)** This quarterly report from the Training and Education Command (TECOM) identifies trends from mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) assessments.

**[Lessons Learned During Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2011 \(UFG-11\):](#)** 3d Marine Division has prepared an AAR with detailed observations and recommendations based on its participation in UFG-11.

**[Anti-Piracy Resources from the Civil Military Fusion Centre \(CFC\):](#)** The CFC of the NATO Allied Command Transformation has begun publishing products on the latest piracy threats, particularly off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

**[Partnering, Mentoring and Advising in Afghanistan:](#)** This MCCLL report documents the results of interviews conducted with training teams and other units involved in efforts to mentor and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

### [Village Stability Operations \(VSO\) in Afghanistan:](#)

A recent edition of Special Warfare magazine and an article from the Small Wars Journal highlight VSO best practices in rural villages.

### [Evolving Unmanned Ground Systems \(UGS\):](#)

Ongoing UGS programs are designed to develop unmanned systems that can perform critical counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency missions.

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### [The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website:](#)

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### [The Marine Corps Safe Driving Program:](#)

A recent *Did You Know* from the CMC Safety Division emphasizes the importance of this critical program.

### News

Three items are included this month: (1) additional information on the [MRAP rollover threat](#), (2) an article on the employment of [solar power by Marines in Afghanistan](#), and (3) another *Did You Know* from the CMC Safety Division on [energy drinks](#).

### [Reading Lists and Book Review:](#)

Three books are featured: (1) *Marines in the Garden of Eden* from the new 2011 Commandant reading list, (2) *Achilles in Vietnam*, a carryover from the previous 2009 list, and (3) a new book, *Rage Company* on the Iraq *Awakening*.

### [Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts:](#)

This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and [requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list](#) can be directed to: [Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor](#) Telephone: (703) 432-1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

# Lessons from Operation Tomodachi Relief Efforts in Japan

The catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that struck the east coast of mainland Japan on 11 March 2011 resulted in an immediate pledge by the U.S. government to provide whatever support the Government of Japan required to help alleviate the devastation and suffering. On 12 March, at the request of the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), the Commander, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) directed the deployment of a forward command element (FCE) of twenty key personnel to Yokota Airbase, Japan. A portion of the FCE collocated with the USFJ and Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) staffs, while another cell deployed to Camp Sendai near areas impacted by the tsunami. This cell was designated as the FCE for the Joint Support Force Japan (JSFJ). A U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Squadron, 350th Special Operations Group, deployed from an exercise in Korea to conduct airfield surveys of three affected airfields, including Sendai International Airport, which then became the focus of the clearing, recovering, and repairing effort. The FCE and the newly formed Joint Task Force Tohoku (JTF-TH) formed a bilateral crisis action team (BCAT) cell to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies, with the first shipment arriving at Matsushima Airbase on 16 March to be delivered by a joint U.S. and JSDF team to the hardest hit areas.



*Marines from Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) move the wall of a destroyed house at the Uranohama Port on the isolated island of Oshima.*

The ability of III MEF and its major subordinate commands (MSCs) to respond rapidly and effectively to the complex circumstances involved in the earthquake, tsunami and damaged nuclear power plant resulted from their geographic proximity, organic air and contract sealift, and staff practices and relationships developed during previous theater engagement exercises, as well as other humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, thirteen of which have occurred in the area since 2004. In order to ensure that the observations, lessons, best practices and recommendations associated with this relief effort were captured, MCCLL program analysts with III MEF and its major subordinate commands (MSCs) conducted interviews with key participants immediately following the relief effort, documenting the results in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, [Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, March 2011](#).



*Marines from III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) set up a satellite system for the humanitarian assistance center at Camp Sendai to help support the government-led relief efforts.*

**A complete set of FOUO comments and observations is included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:**

- **Command Relationships:** Command and control relationships evolved as the scope of the disaster, including the heightened radiological threat, became apparent.

⇒ Frequent video teleconferences between multiple levels of command were a key means for C2 of the operation during the first few days.

⇒ The availability of workspaces for the FCE at the USFJ headquarters provided access to an established C2 and communications infrastructure.

⇒ The commander and staff of Combined Arms Training Center (CATC), Camp Fuji, gained approval to organize into Task Force

Fuji to be employed as a general purpose force in relief efforts and airfield cleanup operations. Communications and C2 for this task force proved to be a challenge.

- **Operations:** As has been the case in previous HA/DR efforts, the speed of the initial response is critical, including the ability to move people, equipment and supplies throughout the operational area.
- TF Fuji was the first general purpose force to arrive at Sendai International Airport and immediately began the airport cleanup. The task force established a liaison cell with U.S. Air Force air traffic controllers to facilitate the off-load of relief supplies and for staging and organizing for pickup and delivery.

⇒ Execution of relief efforts in coordination with interagency and non-governmental organization (NGOs) through the U.S. Embassy is considered essential for mission success.

⇒ Among the greatest needs of the Japanese was the U.S. military "expertise," including the ability to assess accurately the situation on the ground.

⇒ Throughout the operation, the desired end state was that HA/DR assistance was no longer needed by the Japanese.

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*Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) fill water jugs in the hanger bay aboard the forward-deployed amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD-2).*

## OEF After Action Reports from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines



*A vehicle commander with the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) Personal Security Detachment (PSD) provides security during a foot patrol in the Marjeh District.*

3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) deployed into the Marjeh District of central Helmand Province in late December 2010 to continue the “hold” and “build” activities begun by its predecessors in this highly kinetic region that had previously been a major Taliban stronghold. Based on the first three months of the battalion’s deployment, 3/9 has prepared its [First 100 Days After Action Report \(AAR\)](#) in slide show format, emphasizing the basic Marine Corps skills that are necessary for success in almost any counterinsurgency operation. (A much smaller (in file size) [version of the briefing](#) is also available in pdf format.) Among the topics addressed in the AAR are: governance, development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), reconstruction and development, medical engagements, security, preparations for deployment, building solid counter-IED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), mounted patrols, helping the local populace, and the constant need to be prepared to “go kinetic.” 3/9 emphasizes effective partnering with the ANSF so that they can perform command and control (C2) at the lowest level, take the lead in the counter-improvised explosive device (IED) fight, and perform their own planning in preparation for operations. For medical engagements, the AAR points out the critical need for female engagement teams (FETs) to be involved in order to ensure that this half of the Afghan population can be fully engaged and assisted.

The 3/9 Battalion Gunner has prepared his own [after action report](#) in storyboard format that documents best practices and lessons learned concerning weapon employment and force multipliers that have been successfully utilized by the battalion. In addition to providing guidance on the employment of specific weapons systems, the AAR addresses the establishment of effective overwatch locations, use of scout snipers, massing combat power, ensuring patrol dispersion, maintaining ammunition accountability and field storage, reducing incidents of negligent discharges, and the proper employment of counter-IED resources such as metal detectors, “sickle sticks” and IED detector dogs (IDDs).

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### From the 3/9 Battalion Gunner AAR:

**Rules of counterinsurgency for the individual Marine:** ■ *“Be alert and aware at all times; security is always first. ■ Present a hard target; don’t be easy to kill. ■ Set the example for the local people; be a Marine, firm but fair. ■ Respect is a two-way street. ■ Be the solution; don’t be part of the problem.”*

## OEF After Action Report from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 (VMM-264) deployed in January 2011 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11.1 to carry out assault support missions in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO), as well as in the AOs of Regional Commands South and West. The squadron performed externals, air-to-air refueling, command and control (C2), air delivery and VIP lifts, as well as numerous air assault missions. Support was provided first to I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) and then II MEF (Forward), as well as Task Force Helmand and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units. The [VMM-264 After Action Report for OEF 11.1](#) documents the experiences, observations, best practices and lessons learned by the squadron during this seven-month deployment.

In addition to its core assault support mission, the squadron highlights the fact that air delivery for tactical resupply has continued to evolve as a core VMM mission. However, further analysis is needed to determine the appropriate number of personnel and crews to be trained to support this as one of the primary missions. Among other specific topics addressed in the AAR are: ■ determining appropriate MV-22 sortie output standards, ■ a hub-and-spoke organization for general support tasking, ■ objective area communications, ■ the Common Grid Reference System (CGRS), ■ flight director approach techniques, ■ the air tasking order (ATO) interface, ■ Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) fixed wing/rotary wing taskers, ■ the Ramp Mounted Weapons System (RMWS), ■ the Defensive Weapons System (DWS), ■ the Air Delivery (AD) Equipment/Cargo Restraint System (CRS), ■ the Cabin Situational Awareness Device (CSAD), ■ the Aircrew Wireless Internal Communications System, ■ cockpit cabin monitoring, ■ the C2 mission kit, ■ the CASEVAC mission kit, ■ the Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Reporting System (M-SHARP), ■ the Deployed Flight Hour Program (FHP), and ■ the Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP).



*Marines from VMM-264 sit on the ramp of an MV-22B Osprey during a night mission in support of Operation Rawhide II, an interdiction operation along the Afghanistan border with Pakistan.*

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## OEF After Action Report from Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion



*Marines from Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion, fire the main cannon of their M1A1 Abrams tank during a range firing aboard Camp Leatherneck.*

Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion, deployed to northern Helmand Province in early January 2011 in the Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8) area of operations (AO) as a company (-) in support of a Marine Corps infantry battalion in the Upper Gereshkh Valley (UGV), while one platoon operated in direct support of an infantry battalion in the Musa Qal'eh District. The three platoons in the UGV operated in direct support of the three infantry companies, while the Headquarters Tank Section, scouts, and combat trains were in general support of the battalion. This arrangement provided the battalion with an additional maneuver element, as well as scouts and a very robust and tactically capable combat train element. In order to support the many required tasks, the company established a company logistics operations center (CLOC) at Camp Leatherneck that provided access to communications and facilitated the provision of support to its platoons as they conducted distributed operations throughout the battlespace.

Following the completion of its seven-month deployment, the company prepared a comprehensive package of after action report (AAR) resources that include the following documents:

- ⇒ [U.S. Marine Corps Tank Operations in Afghanistan](#) provides a high-level summary of observations and lessons learned that is designed to be a resource for Marine Corps leaders and other high-level individuals who need to learn about basic tank operations in Afghanistan.
- ⇒ [1st Tank Battalion After Action Report on Deploying Tanks in Afghanistan](#) was prepared by the Battalion Enabler Detachment, which assisted in the company's reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) and helped shape the arrival of the tank company's main body into theater.
- ⇒ [Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion OEF Post-Deployment AAR](#) was developed by the company staff, with observations and lessons learned primarily applicable to the tank community and others interested in detailed lessons learned concerning the company's specific operations.
- ⇒ [Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion OEF 11 AAR Briefing](#) captures the highlights of the company's deployment, with observations and recommendations organized by warfighting function and a number of photographs and other graphics incorporated into the presentation. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

## Trends and Systemic Issues Identified During Training

[Marine Corps Order \(MCO\) 3502.6](#) tasks the Training and Education Command (TECOM) with the requirement to review mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) assessments, identify trends in these assessments, and publish a quarterly report documenting these trends for the purpose of improving awareness throughout the operating forces. The [3rd Quarter FY 11 MRX Assessment Report](#) was published the end of September, identifying both positive and negative MRX assessment trends based on a statistical analysis of assessed training and readiness events. The report provides recommendations for correcting negative trends based on Systemic Trends reports, as well as resources



*Marines from Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (MWSS-274) perform 5 and 25 meter checks during the halt of a convoy traveling to Camp Dwyer.*

### **From the 3rd QTR FY11 Assessment Report:**

*"... With relatively minimal training and money, an insurgent force can build, purchase, emplace and employ IEDs almost anywhere. These give the insurgents the ability to compete with a better trained, equipped and led force as he is able to employ these with minimal risk and devastating effect on the counterinsurgency force. In order to train to combat these, there must be near daily training. . . It requires that Marines are more attuned to their environment, and this has to become a habit of thought and action. . ."*

from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), including after action reports, surveys, and MCCLL reports. Twelve training areas are identified in the report that require corrective action, including the proper employment of 5 and 25 meter checks, effective communications between infantry and tank units, conducting counter-IED operations, conducting urban operations, conducting defensive operations, clearing an area of insurgents, communicating across functional areas in the fire support coordination center (FSCC), processing casualties, and utilizing the resources of the combat operations center (COC) effectively. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

## Lessons Learned During Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2011



*Marines from 7th Communications Battalion re-establish communications for UFG at the Central Training Area following Typhoon Muifa. This equipment had to be dismantled before the storm hit Okinawa on 5 August.*

The [January 2011 MCCLL Newsletter](#) highlighted a MCCLL report that had been prepared based on the employment of the first fully operational combat operations center (COC) capabilities set (CAPSET) version two (V2) in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) during Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) 2010. This report, entitled [Marine Corps TACC Operations: Lessons and Observations from 1st MAW TACC in Exercise UFG 2010](#), addressed the ability of the facility to support the needs of the commander and his staff in planning, executing and assessing aviation and aviation support operations.

This year's Exercise UFG took place over a ten-day period in mid-August 2011, with a primary objective of enhancing the ability of the Republic of Korea (ROK), in partnership with the U.S. alliance, to defend its own country. UFG is considered to be the largest command and control simulation exercise in the world, designed to train deployed and permanent party service members, while, at the same time, refining the decision-making capabilities of senior leaders. Following completion of this year's exercise, the 3d Marine Division prepared a detailed after action report that provides lessons learned by the division operating from the Division Staff Training Facility (DSTF) to exercise command and

control of simulated units. The document has been prepared in two formats: a standard [AAR for Operation UFG for the Period from 16 to 26 August 2011](#) and a [UGF-11 After Action Briefing](#), with both documents having essentially the same content.

One of the topics highlighted in the AAR is the common occurrence of key staff personnel being "drafted" to be liaison officers and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) augments, thus requiring the Division staff to "draft," in turn, additional personnel from subordinate units. As a result, units that work, plan and train together do not always operate together during the exercise. The AAR recommends that requirements for augmentation be identified early so that the most efficient arrangements can be made.

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### From the 3d Marine Division AAR:

*"Amphibious assault is a complex operation that requires detailed coordination and collaboration to be executed successfully. In UFG-11, the G-4 worked with the G-3 to prioritize the equipment capabilities being phased ashore. The detailed planning resulted in a published landing plan that allowed the Division to develop execution timelines and logistics consumption estimates and identify timelines for capability assessments of branch/sequel planning. . ."*

## Anti-Piracy Resources from the Civil Military Fusion Centre

Since January 2010, the Civil - Military Fusion Centre (CFC) of the NATO Allied Command Transformation has published a weekly newsletter, entitled [Afghanistan Review](#), that provides an overview of the latest developments in this country in terms of economic development, governance, infrastructure, justice, reconciliation, security and other critical factors in its transition to a more stable, secure, and functioning government. Then, beginning in February 2011, the CFC began producing a similar newsletter, entitled [Mediterranean Basin Review](#), that addressed the rapidly evolving events in Libya and other countries in the region. In addition to these periodic reports, CFC has prepared many special reports that focus on various civil military topics in much greater detail. All of these documents are accessible on the MCCLL website by performing a [MCCLL Quick Search](#) on "Civil Military Fusion Centre," as well as on the CFC's own website.

Most recently, the CFC began publishing similar products on the current piracy threat, particularly off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. This topic has been of particular interest to many Marines ever since the 15th



*A Navy boat launched from the USS New Orleans off of Southern California's San Clemente Island carries maritime raid force members from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to a vessel that the force then boarded as part of its counter-piracy and counter-terrorism training.*

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) rescued the crew of the M/V Magellan Star off the coast of Yemen in September 2010. The [CFC Anti-Piracy Review](#) provides up-to-date information on the recent pirate threat; recent special reports on this topic have addressed the [Clan Structure in Somalia](#), [Barriers to the Prosecution of Pirates](#) and [Changes in Maritime Practice as a Result of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden](#). The latter report points out that there have already been 22 hijackings this year and seven deaths, with pirates still holding 19 vessels and 377 crew members.

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### From Changes in Maritime Practice:

*"The naval presence of NATO, the European Union and other military efforts, such as Combined Task Force 151, have benefitted the area of the Gulf of Aden in three practical ways: ■ The operation of naval forces . . . has complicated the structure of systematic pirating. ■ Navy forces are able to react to piracy attempts if they are located sufficiently close . . . ■ Naval forces have the ability to both break off an attack or capture the pirates involved. . ."*

## Partnering, Mentoring and Advising in Afghanistan

Marine Corps efforts to partner, mentor and advise Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so that they will be able to assume overall responsibility for the security of their nation are a continuation of a long history of Marine Corp operations that involved training foreign militaries. From the integration of Marine units at the platoon level with the South Vietnamese Popular Forces through the past decade of partnering with the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps has focused on modifying and making continual improvements in the training and preparation of its advisor teams. Guidance from the Commander, International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (COMISAF) is that coalition units will partner with like ANSF units (e.g., battalion with battalion), with coalition units living, training, planning and operating with their partnered units and bearing equal responsibility for planning and executing missions. Unlike the embedded training teams in Iraq, where the teams were globally sourced, the teams in Afghanistan are often from the individual unit that is the battlespace owner. This arrangement places the responsibility on a single commander and ensures unity of effort between the training teams and the unit. However, the primary goal of the training teams is to develop the ANSF, while the primary goal of the battlespace owner is security. Effective communications is essential to ensure that these two goals are coordinated effectively across the battlespace.



*With the help of an interpreter, Marines from a Border Advisor Team take inventory of Afghan Border Patrol weapons at a security checkpoint at Bost Airfield in Helmand Province.*

In an effort to capture the experiences, observations, best practices, and lessons of the training teams, as well as of tactical commanders, staff members responsible for ANSF development, and training centers and groups tasked with training the teams for deployment, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) program analysts conducted interviews in May and June 2011 with personnel in Afghanistan, Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune and 29 Palms. The results have been documented in the MCCLL report, [Partnering, Mentoring and Advising in Operation Enduring Freedom \(OEF\)](#).

**A complete set of FOUO comments and observations is included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:**



*Coalition mentors at the Joint Sustainment Academy Southwest, Camp Leathemeck, guide and mentor Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) on the correct tactics used to gain access and maneuver into position when clearing a house.*

- **Organization and Manning:** As the partnering mission becomes the primary focus of efforts in OEF, it should be resourced accordingly. However, this is complicated by the fact that teams sourced from battalions must compete for resources with the battalion's own companies.

⇒ The members of the teams need to be identified early on and provided sufficient time to train together as a team.

⇒ Globally sourced teams present additional challenges, since the Marines come from various units and locations and may include reservists, volunteers and individual augments. As a result, MOSs do not always match with team member job requirements and responsibilities.

⇒ In training many of the Afghan police forces, special Marine Corps skills have not been required since the Afghan police were still at low skill levels themselves. As these units develop, more Marine

specialists will be required, including policemen, investigators, and administrators.

- **Equipment and Manning:** Training the Afghan soldiers and police proved to be "the easy part." However, the ANSF often did not have adequate equipment, uniforms, weapons, vehicles, or communications equipment. These shortfalls limited the ability of the Marines to train them effectively

⇒ Logistics challenges of the ANSF (particularly, the Afghan National Army (ANA)) were a major concern. ANA logistics was a systemic problem all the way up to the national level.

- **Best Practices:** "If you go in there with the attitude that this is how we do it in the Marine Corps, or this is how coalition forces train or operate, without understanding Afghan culture and how they do business, then you're going to set yourself up for failure. . . Again, it may not be a solution that you would ever see that would be acceptable in the Marine Corps or another U.S. force or coalition force, but the bottom line is, if it's an Afghan solution and it works for them . . . You've got a workable solution." LtCol Steinhilber, OIC Brigade Advisor Team, RCT-2

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*A counter-IED instructor demonstrates the proper stance and sweeping pattern for the Vallon metal detector to Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) trainees at Camp Leathemeck.*

## Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan

The [May 2011 MCCLL Newsletter](#) highlighted two recently published source documents that address village stability operations (VSO) in rural Afghanistan designed to establish Afghan Local Defense Forces (LDF) that can assist in providing security in their own communities. These initiatives have proven to be especially effective in the Marjeh District and other locations in Helmand Province. The VSO programs are expected to assume additional importance as the Marine Corps and other U.S. and allied military services seek to transition Afghanistan security responsibilities to various elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the LDF. The implementation of the LDF concept is being accomplished through the VSO program (under the auspices of the Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CJSOCC-A)) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative (sponsored by the

Afghanistan Ministry of Interior).

### From *Special Warfare, Summer 2011*:

*"The unit on the ground for VSO is the village stability platform, or VSP, the embedded security apparatus that works through and with Afghan leaders both formal . . . and informal . . . to establish that link. . . The majority of the insurgents do not live and operate in urban areas — they live and operate in the rural Afghan countryside. It is in these areas where the insurgency thrives. The rural population is under-secured and under-served by a government that is under-represented and under-resourced. In this gap lies a large Afghan citizenship with grievances that are both resolved and exploited by the insurgents on a daily basis. . ."*

Additional information on the VSO program is provided in the [Summer 2011 Edition](#) of *Special Warfare*, which is an authorized, official quarterly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as well as in an article from the [Small Wars Journal](#), entitled [One Team's Approach to VSO](#), by the Detachment Commander, Operational Detachment (Afghanistan) (ODA), 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)), who is currently deployed in Afghanistan to conduct VSO.



*Marines from Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Stability Operations ensure that proper signatures (or fingerprints) are collected in Nikazia, Helmand Province, as official records of payments to members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).*

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## Evolving Unmanned Ground Systems



*An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician with the Royal Thai Air Force inspects the BomBot, an EOD robot, as part of a course of instruction with Marines from Marine Wing Support Squadron 172 (MWSS-172) during Exercise Cobra Gold 2011.*

While unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have received much of the publicity lately, especially after the drone attack that killed a prominent Al Qaida leader in Yemen, unmanned ground systems (UGS) have also proven to be beneficial tools in the counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency fights. The UGS category includes unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), as well as unattended munitions and sensors. For many readers, the robots that have been employed to disable improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most familiar UGS, but the category consists of all powered physical systems, with no operator on board the principal platform, that can act (either remotely operated or with some degree of autonomy) to accomplish assigned tasks. As far back as May 2006, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) published a report on [Robot Requirements and Employment: A Summary of Observations and Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom](#). However, since then the number of UGS programs has grown appreciably, incorporating a variety of systems that may be mobile or stationary, smart learning, or self-adaptive.

A briefing, prepared jointly by the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), entitled [Unmanned](#)

[Ground Systems](#), provides an update on both U.S. Army and Marine Corps UGS programs. The objective is to ensure that these programs are closely coordinated in order to avoid redundancy and ensure that resources applied to these programs are efficiently and effectively utilized. The briefing also provides background information on UGS programs, beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2001, which identified a target of one-third of operational ground combat vehicles being unmanned by 2015. Specific Marine Corps programs addressed in the briefing include the R2C Robot, Tactical Robotics Controller (TRC), Ground Unmanned Support Surrogate (GUSS), Cargo Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Legged Squad Support System (LS3), and the Combat Robotic System (CRS).

### From the UGS Briefing:

*" . . . Due to the proliferation of unmanned ground systems on the battlefield and the rapid advances in associated technologies, it is imperative that Army and Marine Corps efforts avoid duplication where able. To this end, there has been significant collaboration to date on UGVs. . ."*

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## Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps

The Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps/Logistics Chain Management (GCSS-MC/LCM) is one of the components of the Marine Corps enterprise-wide logistics modernization program that is designed to replace the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System - Automated Information System (MIMMS-AIS) and the Supported Activity Supply System (SASSY), as well as legacy systems that feed into these two systems. Block 1, Release 1.1 of the GCSS-MC (for short) was implemented initially in III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), beginning in March 2010, as part of a multi-year, multi-phased plan. This initial release did not include all of the features and capabilities that will eventually be incorporated into GCSS-MC. The III MEF implementation first involved a field user evaluation (FUE), followed by operational testing by the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA). The operational test concluded that the GCSS-MC, as a whole, is operationally effective, suitable, and survivable, although some issues with the system were also documented by MCOTEA. Following the operational testing, fielding of the GCSS-MC to the remainder of III MEF units began. Since the GCSS-MC utilizes more workstations in more locations than the legacy systems that it replaces, a prime consideration was ensuring adequate connectivity and network support. Additional computers had to be procured and additional connectivity drops planned and implemented. During GCSS-MC implementation, III MEF had to coordinate extensively across its different communities (including the G-1, G-4 and G-6).



*A GCSS-MC instructor teaches Marines from the 31st MEU on the use of the system. This was the first MEU to employ the system.*

In an effort to document the GCSS-MC experiences of III MEF staff and those of its major subordinate commands (MSCs), Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) program analysts conducted interviews with key personnel in January and February 2011. The results have been documented in the MCCLL report, [Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps, Logistics Chain Management, Block 1, Release 1.1: Lessons, Observations and Recommendations from Initial Fielding to III MEF](#).

**A complete set of FOUO comments and observations is included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:**

- **Training:** Initial pre-cutover training began with a comprehensive series of classes and demonstration exercises, starting as early as six weeks prior to cutover. Although the training addressed "what the system does," additional training would be helpful on "how the information is to be used."

⇒ The training regimen should clearly differentiate between supervisory and user-level training. *"Individuals in senior billets do*



*GCSS-MC implementation is now taking place in II MEF to enhance logistical capabilities of its Marines (including this landing support specialist from Helicopter Support Team (HST) Landing Support Detachment, 2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward), shown supporting an HST mission at Camp Bastion). These Marines will now have access to a more efficient consolidated data system for supply and maintenance support requests.*

*not have a need to learn the lower level curriculum in order to properly function as a supervisor."* Col James Rubino, Commanding Officer, CLR-35.

⇒ Marines were trained on GCSS-MC in Okinawa before a systematic process has been established for documenting the successful completion of their training. As they move to future assignments, they may be required to undergo the training again. A tracking mechanism is needed to prevent these potential instances of training duplication.

- **System Functions:** GCSS-MC provides near, real-time status on requisitioned parts and supplies, a significant improvement over the batch processing of legacy systems.

⇒ The system also provides near real time visibility of maintenance activities, although this does not translate directly into maintenance, since repairs and the processing of equipment must still take place.

⇒ The report emphasizes the fact that GCSS-MC Release 1.1 is the first phase of GCSS-MC Block 1 implementation and does not yet perform all the required functions of maintenance management, supply, maintenance and logistics with which the system will eventually be capable.

⇒ The report recommends that GCSS-MC interoperability with the following systems continue to be addressed: Storage, Retrieval, Automated Tracking,

Integrated System (STRATIS), the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS), and the Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT).

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## The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

In addition to the recent MCCLL roll-ups of new documents entered into our databases, the MCCLL report on infantry battalion operations in Afghanistan (based on the experiences of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6)) continues to be one of the most frequently downloaded of any recent MCCLL product. Three other MCCLL reports on Afghanistan topics were also regularly downloaded, as was a report on the recent employment of the Crisis Augmentation Cell during a 2011 exercise.

In comparison, the second table highlights documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during September. After action reports (AARs) from the Battalion Gunner, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) and the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion were most frequently downloaded followed by the MCCLL reports on 1/6 operations and female engagement teams. Three other Afghanistan AARs are also on the list. These documents were accessed most frequently by officers in grades from O-1 to O-5, NCOs in grades from E-5 to E-8, DoD civilians in grades G-11 through GS-14, and DoD contractors.

Due to the ongoing 2d Marine Division's MCCLL website registration drive, in September the website recorded the greatest number of new registrations ever in a single month (over 1,300!) [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

1. thru 5. [MCCLL New Data Rollups for September 2011](#)

6. [Infantry Battalion Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines \(2/6\)](#)

7. [Female Engagement Teams in OEF](#)

8. [Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company \(ANGLICO\) Operations in OEF](#)

9. [Coalition Interoperability: Georgia Deployment Program \(32d Georgia Infantry Battalion\)](#)

10. [Crisis Augmentation Cell: Lessons from Exercise Integrated Advance 2011](#)

Top Ten MCCLL Products,  
September 2011

1. [After Action Report, Battalion Gunner, 3d Battalion 9th Marines](#)

2. [After Action Report, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion](#)

3. [Infantry Battalion Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines \(2/6\) \(MCCLL\)](#)

4. [Female Engagement Teams in OEF \(MCCLL\)](#)

5. [After Action Report, Delta Company, 1st Tank Battalion](#)

6. [Playbook Lineup, 02 Sep 2011 \(Division of Public Affairs, HQMC\)](#)

7. [After Action Report, First 100 Days, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines](#)

8. ["Did You Know?" Energy Drinks \(CMC Safety Division\)](#)

9. [After Action Report, Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 2 \(VMU-2\)](#)

10. [After Action Report, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 \(VMM-264\)](#)

Top Ten Downloads,  
September 2011

## The Marine Corps Safe Driving Program



*A wrecked pickup truck parked near the front gate of Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort drives home the necessity of safe driving over the holiday period.*

The majority of motor vehicle accidents (whether caused by speeding, distracted driving, driving under the influence, or driving while fatigued) could have been avoided through defensive driving and utilizing the skills learned in a comprehensive driver education program. The most recent edition of [Did You Know](#) from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division highlights the importance of the [Marine Corps Safe Driving Program](#) and documents the requirements for the program. Marines should understand that motor vehicle driving, whether for business or pleasure, is "a task that should not be taken lightly." The objective of the program is to arm Marines with the correct information and driver education so they have the greatest opportunity of being safe on the road.

Among the facts and statistics provided in the article are:

⇒ Young, inexperienced drivers (18 to 25 years old) have the highest proportion of distraction-related fatal crashes.

⇒ Drivers who use hand-held devices are four times as likely to be involved in crashes serious enough for injuries to be sustained.

⇒ Aggressive driving and reckless behavior (speeding, running red lights, frequent lane changes) greatly increases the chances of a crash.

⇒ Proper vehicle care and maintenance is critical to a safe journey.

The article also provides information on the three courses that are available under the safe driving program: Driver Improvement Course (DIC) (which is required training for military personnel), the Remedial Driver Training Course, and the Drivers Awareness Training (DAT). The objectives of each of these courses are highlighted in the article.

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### Leadership Responsibilities:

- "Conduct a formal records check to identify Marines under 26 who have not completed training . . .
- Ensure required training is completed. . .
- Make inquiries about past driving history (i.e., traffic violations) . . .
- Mentor and educate Marine on local area driving laws and recognized traffic hazards . . .
- Reinforce the importance of traffic safety and personal responsibility when operating a motor vehicle."

## News

### More on the MRAP Rollover Threat in Afghanistan

#### [Last month's MCCLL newsletter](#)

highlighted the unacceptable number of rollovers of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that have been reported in recent months in Afghanistan due to drivers not adequately compensating for the topography, road conditions and operational environment in this theater of operations. Since then, two additional source documents have addressed this same issue, the first being a briefing that was presented during the most recent meeting of the [U.S. Forces, Afghanistan \(USFOR-A\) Training Community of Interest \(COI\)](#). The briefing updates the incidence of

MRAP rollovers in theater, along with the associated casualties, showing a steady increase in both since the second coalition troop increase began in February 2010. As noted by General John R. Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), *"We simply cannot stand these kinds of casualties."* In particular, the analysis shows that the number of incidents increases significantly up to about week 11 of a unit's deployment and then gradually decreases.

The second source document is a [Geospatial Analysis of MRAP Rollover Events](#) by the U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) of the

Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). This organization reviewed the specific locations of rollovers in theater and identified those provinces and districts in which the greatest number of incidents occurred between January 2010 and September 2011. The objective is to highlight the most hazardous areas of operation where special precautions need to be taken. (Readers may also be interested in a 2008 MCCLL Safety Corner that summarizes many [Best Practices for Preventing and Mitigating Vehicle Rollovers](#).)

### Energy Conservation by the Marine Corps

#### [Solar Power to Arrive at USMC Afghan Bases](#) by Michael Hoffman, Defense News:

"The U.S. Marine Corps in December will start shipping 10 sets of 20 solar panel systems to Afghanistan to power patrol and forward operating bases as part of an alternative energy initiative to cut the Corps fuel use in half by 2025. Marine Corps officials accelerated the fielding of energy-saving equipment to include tent liners, LED lights, a solar powered radio and a solar panel network that the Corps expects will save it more than \$40 million per year. Marines with India Company, 3d Bat-

*talion, 5th Marines, deployed to Sangin, Afghanistan, last year and used this equipment while engaged in some of the fiercest fighting since U.S. forces entered Afghanistan. Their rave reviews urged Corps leaders to ship more alternative energy systems to Afghanistan faster.*

*"Guys didn't want to give it up," said Maj Sean Sadlier, a logistics analyst with the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office. "What better review can you get than that?" Solar shades and two sets of the solar panel systems, officially called the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network Systems (GREENS),*

*are still in use at Patrol Base Boldak, where India 3/5 Marines used them. Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan also has five sets of solar floodlights that Sadlier said have proved "very reliable."*

*The Marine Corps has gotten out in front of the Defense Department-wide effort to cut down fuel consumption, focusing especially on small-unit energy use. . . Marines use 5 million barrels of oil at a cost of \$1 billion per year. Even more alarming is the number of Marines wounded hauling that fuel on streets laced with IEDs in the war zone . . ."*

### Energy Drinks — Use with Caution?

A [Did You Know](#) newsletter on the subject of the Marine Corps Safe Driving Program was featured previously in this newsletter. A second [Did You Know](#) was also published this month on the subject of [Energy Drinks](#):

*" . . . The commercial market for energy drinks is similar to the same individuals who join the military: young, "type-A" individuals who could be considered thrill seekers or "extreme" in nature. A quick review of advertisements on TV, on the internet or in magazines reveals the beverage industry is in a full court press to market their energy drinks*

*specifically to extreme sports enthusiasts and those who naturally operate on the extreme side of life. For this cadre of individuals, there is no such thing as moderation and it is not uncommon for them to consume multiple energy drinks on a daily basis. . . The age old adage applies, "everything in moderation". If you feel the need for an energy drink ask yourself "why" and do a quick evaluation of your current lifestyle. While counter intuitive, it's easier to adjust your diet, sleep habits and exercise routine to get the extra energy you need throughout the day than to decide which energy drink is best. If you should choose to partake,*

*then read the product labels to know what's in the drink and what the serving size is. Check for any type of warning or caution on the product. Also, keep track of your caffeine consumption to minimize the potential for adverse effects. Finally, consider that many energy drink products are mainly marketing devices to generate money for the beverage companies and that a cup of coffee used strategically during the day can be just as beneficial and easier on the wallet."*

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## Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The July 2011 revision to the [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#) was produced by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the reading list remains relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives, as well as help ensure that Marines benefit from the experiences of others. The new list continues to highlight *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret) as the Commandant's "choice book" to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence) are highlighted on the [Marine Corps University \(MCU\) website](#), along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) a book that has been added to the new 2011 list, *Marines in the Garden of Eden* by Richard S. Lowry (on the list for Corporal), (2) a book that has been retained from the 2009 list, *Achilles in Vietnam*, by Jonathan Shay (on the list for Master Gunnery Sergeant and Sergeant Major), and (3) a more recent book that addresses the experiences of Company F, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4) in Iraq during the period referred to as the "Awakening" of tribes in Al Anbar Province against al-Qaida, *Rage Company* by Thomas Daly.

### *Marines in the Garden of Eden: The Battle for An Nasiriyah*, by Richard S. Lowry (Berkley, 2006)

Review by Brian Grafton, *Military History Online*:

"Richard Lowry's *Marines in the Garden of Eden* is the story of the creation, deployment and initial commitment of USMC Task Force Tarawa in the coalition invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. TF Tarawa's story is framed by the "ambush" of the Army's 507th Maintenance Company, and of the capture and subsequent rescue of Jessica Lynch – arguably the most famous PoW of the assault on Iraq. Task Force Tarawa entered Iraq with what might have been a simple mission: secure a path on the east side of the city of An Nasiriyah which would allow other Marine groups to close on Baghdad from East of the Euphrates. Without the complications arising from the Iraqi assault on 507th Maintenance Company, which became lost and strayed into Iraqi-controlled territory, the week-long battle for An Nasiriyah may never have taken place.

Lowry's book is, in truth, more a chronicle than a history; it is concerned with military mobilization and deployment, not with geo-political complexities and assessments. Lowry has worked hard to follow the chronology of the seven days his story covers. For the most part, he has done this well, conveying the intensity and complexity of battle very effectively. *Marines in the Garden of Eden* gives a fine sense of the nature of combat, seen from various perspectives in the field, during the seven-day battle for An Nasiriyah.

For the general reader, I would have been happier to see time markers included with each sub-head in the book: given the number of groups Mr. Lowry is dealing with, time sequences would have helped understand the relationship between various complex military actions being described. Lowry attempts to provide time indicators in his narrative, but this is not always possible; as a result, there are one or two places where (for this reader, at least) the sequence of events becomes hazy. An editorial decision to provide a time frame outside the narrative would have provided an additional level of clarity.

The book will not please all readers. From his very first sentence, Lowry makes it clear that this is a book in praise of the US Marine Corps. . ."

Read the complete review from [Military History Online](#).

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### *Achilles in Vietnam*, by Jonathan Shay (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1994)

Review by Irwin L. Kutash, *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*:

"In *Achilles in Vietnam*, Jonathan Shay, a psychiatrist who works with a group of Vietnam War veterans with severe, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and who was struck by their similar experiences to Achilles in Homer's *Iliad*, highlights these parallels, feeling that this will lead to a greater understanding of combat stress. His major thrust is that Homer's epic highlights war time experiences not often privy to behavioral scientists. He is most struck by Homer's emphasis on two "common" continuous heavy combat occurrences: betrayal of moral or ethical standards by combat leaders and the onset of a "berserk state." The author also was happy to discover in a serendipitous fashion that the understanding of Vietnam War combatants would lead to a better understanding by scholars of the *Iliad*.

The author's principal goal for this book, however, is to educate people to what the results of catastrophic experiences in war are on the individuals who physically survive them; in particular, chronic psychological disorder as well as the destruction of character. His hope is this will promote a raised consciousness in the public at large that will lead to a strong desire on their part to do something about the cause of these post-traumatic stress disorders; in short, prevention.

Shay, upon experiencing sustained dialogues with Vietnam veterans, unearthed profound effects of the war over twenty years later. Of the three quarters of a million present day Vietnam War heavy combat survivors, the author believes a quarter of a million are casualties with such symptoms as impaired mental function, potential for explosive violence, chronic health problems from sustained mobilization of responses to danger, lack of social trust, pre-occupation with both Vietnamese and U.S. military activities, alcohol and drug abuse, as well as depression, isolation and a general malaise or feeling of meaninglessness. He concludes that chronic post-traumatic stress disorder leaves its victims unable to participate in domestic, economic or political life, or as Shay dramatically states, "fighting for one's country can render me unfit to be its citizen." . . ." Read more of the review from the [Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture](#).

## Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

**Rage Company: A Marine's Baptism by Fire**, by Thomas Daly (John Wiley & Sons, 2010):

Review by LtCol Charles S. Gaede (USMCR, Ret), [Leatherneck Magazine Online](#)

*"WHY? What did Lance Corporal Anthony Melia, Sergeant Clinton Ahlquist and LCpl Steven Chavez die for? **Rage Company**, the call sign for Company F, 2d Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment, is an intense, first-person narrative by then-First Lieutenant Thomas Daly in which he brings the reader into the Marines' lives and attempts to answer that question. As the **Rage Company** forward observer, in charge of the company intelligence cell, Daly had a unique viewpoint and access to information that enables him to describe the complex issues of urban guerrilla warfare in a foreign culture.*

***Rage Company** has a narrow perspective, in that it deals with the experiences of one company of Marines from November 2006 to March 2007. Even so, those experiences require **Rage Company** Marines to apply policies from the highest levels of the American government in making split-second decisions that decide the life and death of U.S. Marines, insurgents and Iraqi civilians.*

*It is no easy task, but Daly immerses the reader in the hot and cold, dust and mud, streets and homes, fear and pride, superstition and faith, and sometimes hourly experiences of the Marines, insurgents and civilians.*

*Although narrow in an operational and chronological sense, **Rage Company** is monumental in its description of the "Awakening of Anbar's tribes against al-Qaida" and the role of the local Sunnis, known as Thawar Al Anbar, in the defeat of the insurgents.*

*The Awakening resulted in a dramatic change in attitude of the civilian population toward the Marines. To illustrate, on Nov. 26, 2006, during a night patrol, Daly describes interviewing a 60-year-old man in his home: "I became more frustrated. Through his fear, the old man was telling me that the insurgents were the obvious power in the area."*

*A few short months later on March 25, 2007, while on another night patrol, "Julayba's citizens met the Marines at the door, rather than hiding in a room and waiting for them to barge in. Interior lights were on; blinds were open. Families gathered in living rooms. A sense of normalcy that none of the Americans had previously seen in Iraq seemed to be taking place."*

*The difference? Previously on Jan. 27, 2007, the Awakening scouts had questioned detainees and identified them and their families by name. "The scouts were informing them that their one advantage over the Americans was no longer in play. The shadow of anonymity surrounding the local militants was thrust into the light."*

*The Awakening is only one of many episodes in **Rage Company** worthy of study. Embedded in Daly's narration are opportunities for studies in policy, theory and leadership at many levels. Daly does not enumerate these "lessons"; he leaves it up to the reader to identify them. His approach is a strength that can generate numerous thoughtful discussions. But there is, perhaps, another benefit. It is difficult to explain to the parents of a Marine killed in action why his comrades may have been prevented from returning fire due to rules of engagement. Some insight into that perplexing situation can be gained by the reader.*

*The overall value of Daly's work is his contribution to the study of leadership and insurgent warfare in an urban environment. It joins books from another era such as **A Rumor of War** (Philip Caputo), **The Village** (Bing West), **Fields of Fire** (James Webb), **Village at War** (James W. Trullinger), and it recalls the issues raised in **The Ugly American** (William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick). Students can take such studies and extract policy and leadership principles that transcend the physical and cultural environments.*

*As Daly learned, "military tactics is an art, not a science. There is no set answer for battlefield problems, only principles to help you make up your mind." For this reason, **Rage Company** should be read by noncommissioned officers and officers who are preparing for deployments involving insurgent warfare, and it should be considered for the Commandant's professional reading list. Others will enjoy the book for its vivid description of heroic Marines engaged in the struggle to bring peace in Iraq."*

Read more about this book in the [Leatherneck Magazine Online](#).

An [interview with the author](#) is also available online.

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## Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Maj John Duselis has now deployed as the MCCLL program analyst at Task Force Leatherneck. His contact information is provided below. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact [Mr. Mark Silvia](#), the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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