



Marine Corps and U.S. Army observers/ controllers assess soldiers from the 32d Georgia Light Infantry Battalion at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany. Read the third in a series of MCCLL reports on the [Georgia Deployment Program](#).



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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

Inside this issue:

Featured Articles

[Lessons from the Georgia Deployment Program \(Part 3\)](#): This MCCLL report is the third in a series addressing the training of Georgia light infantry battalions and their operations in Afghanistan.

[Recent After Action Reports \(AARs\)](#) provide insights into infantry battalion and regimental combat team (RCT) operations in Afghanistan:

- [1st Battalion, 8th Marines' OEF AAR](#) and
- [2d Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Learned Conference](#),

[Operation Odyssey Dawn Crisis Augmentation Cell \(CAC\)](#): This AAR from U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) addresses the employment of the CAC to augment planners during Libya operations

[A Scenario for Fratricide Mitigation Training](#): This scenario, based on an actual event and involving platoon-level operations in Helmand Province, is designed to support training on fratricide prevention.

[Alcohol-Related Deaths of Marines in FY 2011](#): This report from the Marine Corps Safety Division highlights the contribution of alcohol in the deaths of Marines as a result of off duty and vehicle mishaps.

[Force Preservation Lessons from 2d Marine Division \(MARDIV\) \(Forward\)](#): The May 2011 Force Preservation Council AAR from 2d MARDIV (Fwd) addresses best practices for dealing with medical and tactical safety issues in Afghanistan.

[Defeating the Taliban in Helmand's Sangin District](#): An article by Dr. Mark Moyer, *Orbis Operations*, addresses the successes of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) in this highly kinetic district.

[Preparing for the Afghanistan Transition](#): The British Land Warfare Centre (LWC) has prepared a report with initial guidance on the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces.

[Recent Products from the Center for Army Lessons Learned \(CALL\)](#) address topics relevant for current Marine Corps operations:

- [Civil Affairs Operations in Afghanistan](#) and
- [Detainee Operations in Deployed Environments](#).

[The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website](#): Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find most interesting.

[Do Marines Need an NMCI Account to Access the MCCLL Website?](#) The answer is no. All you need is an Common Access Card (CAC), CAC reader, and free, downloadable software.

News

Three items are highlighted this month: (1) the [IED Threat in Mexico](#) (2) [Understanding Afghan Culture \(with a focus on language, colors and numbers\)](#), and (3) the first semi-annual report on [Training Priorities](#).

[Reading Lists and Book Review](#): Three items are featured: (1) *We Were Soldiers* from the Commandant's List, (2) a new book on *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, and (3) an article from the *New Yorker* on *Knowing the Enemy*, included on the I MEF List

[Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts](#): This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and [requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list](#) can be directed to: [Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor](#)
Telephone: (703) 432-1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

Lessons from the Georgia Deployment Program (Part 3)

In 2009, the Republic of Georgia agreed to support Marine Corps operations in southwestern Afghanistan by deploying four light infantry battalions, in turn, for six-month rotations each over a two-year span. This program is referred to as the Georgia Deployment Program - International Security Assistance Force (GDP-ISAF), with U.S. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) assigned the responsibility for conducting a program to train and equip each Georgian battalion and help facilitate its successful integration into the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO). This training is being conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, with three successive Georgian light infantry battalions having gone through the training and deployed in succession to the RC (SW) AO. In an effort to collect observations and lessons on the GDP-ISAF program in a systematic manner, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) initiated a multi-phase collection effort in early 2010 that is being documented in a series of three reports. The first collection took place both in Germany and CONUS and addressed the training of the 31st Infantry Battalion, the first Georgian battalion to train and deploy. The results of this collection were documented in a MCCLL report, entitled [Lessons and Observations from the Assessment, Development and Training of the 31st Georgia Infantry Battalion](#). The next collection took place in-theater and addressed operations of the 31st Battalion as it performed its counterinsurgency mission in the RC (SW) AO. This collection was documented in the MCCLL report, [Lessons and Observation from the Deployment of the 31st Infantry Battalion](#). In the final phase of the collection, MCCLL collected lessons and observations on the deployment of the 32d Infantry Battalion, the second battalion to deploy. This collection included interviews in theater with the Georgia Liaison Team (GLT), Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8), RCT-2, the RC (SW) Counterinsurgency Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT), and the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG). The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, [Lessons and Observations from the Deployment of the 32d Georgia Infantry Battalion](#).



Major Alexander Gugushi, Commanding Officer, 31st Georgia Infantry Battalion, transfers the Georgian flag to Major Phridoni Tereladze, Commanding Officer, 32d Georgia Infantry Battalion, during a change of command ceremony at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Delaram II in Nimruz Province, Afghanistan.



Capt Taniel Makharashvili, Deputy Commander, 32d Georgia Infantry Battalion, briefs MajGen John A. Toolan, Commanding General, RC (SW), during his visit to Command Outpost (COP) Shukvani to assess the status and needs of the Georgian soldiers.

They successfully shared facilities at one patrol base.

- ⇒ A Marine Corps Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Team (ANGLICO) integrated well with the Georgians and became a staff element of the Georgian commander.
- ⇒ Although trained on Marine Corp TTPs, the Georgians incorporated a number of their original TTPs during operations. Marines realized it was best to assist them in performing operations “their way” and leverage Marine Corp TTPs when it would assist in accomplishing the mission.
- **Equipment and Logistics:** Due to equipment shortfalls, the Georgians had to be loaned a number of Marine Corps items of equipment.
- ⇒ Despite equipment shortfalls and the lack of certain maintenance support, the Georgians were able to adapt well in the field and received good reviews on their innovations.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are contained in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Pre-deployment Training:** MCTAG assisted the battalion both during pre-deployment training in Georgia and at the JMRC. This training involved numerous concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that were unfamiliar to the Georgian soldiers.
- ⇒ A number of items of equipment employed by the battalion in theater were not available for the training at the JMRC.
- ⇒ The language barrier added an additional layer of complexity to the training.

- **Operations:** The Georgians partnered well with some of the Afghan National Army (ANA) units.



Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB-8) improve and expand the facilities at Combat Outpost (COP) Shukvani for the soldiers of the 33rd Georgia Infantry Battalion, who are replacing those from the 32d Georgia Battalion.

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OEF After Action Report from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines



A Marine from Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (1/8), conducts a search of a compound for IED components and other illicit material in the village of Deh Kerez, Musa Qal'eh District.

1st Battalion, 8th Marines (1/8) deployed in August 2010 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.2 to the Now Zad and Musa Qal'eh Districts of northern Helmand Province in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO). In performing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in this highly kinetic environment, the battalion's Marines quickly learned that "fire and maneuver works." Belief in this concept allowed them to increase their confidence and effectiveness, as they quickly learned that the enemy does not want to fight in situations in which they are receiving effective fire. As a result of the battalion's experiences during its seven-month deployment, the commander, battle staff, company commanders and separate platoon commanders have documented their lessons learned in a detailed and wide ranging [OEF 10.2 Deployment After Action Report](#) that, in many cases, provides specific examples of enemy engagements that support their observations and recommendations.

Since most patrols were conducted at the squad or team level, the battalion recommends that the pre-deployment training program focus on basic patrolling at this level in the types of complex terrain environments that will be experienced in

theater. The current rehearsals in open fields during live fire do not effectively replicate the level of complexity often faced in northern Helmand. The flow of information both up and down the chain of command is critical for situational awareness, with events in adjacent AOs impacting those around them. As a result, the patrol debriefs were considered to be very important and should be standardized across AOs. The AAR recommends that squad leaders coach the partnered Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers on the information that should be collected while patrolling. Eventually, the ANA soldiers will be the only members of the patrols speaking with the villagers. It is also critical that the Marines not segregate themselves from the ANA soldiers, even during their down time. Such activities as playing games of soccer or volleyball with them will increase their morale and trust in the Marines. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

From the 1/8 AAR on the topic of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) training:

"ANSF development is the line of operation the average Marine can most affect. There is training involved with every partnered patrol. However, ensuring that the daily instruction adds up to tangible results is challenging. . . Most ANSF soldiers are willing to learn everything they can from the Marines because they see how the Marines conduct themselves on patrol and how they react in firefights. . ."

2d Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Learned Conference

In January 2011, the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) published the results of its first regimental-level lessons learned conference, which in this case addressed the results of discussions among the 7th Marine Regiment battle staff and enablers in a focused effort to compile observations and recommendations based on the thirteen-month deployment of Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10. The resulting document, [7th Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Observed Conference](#), emphasized training issues identified by the RCT, but also included many observations and recommendations concerning combat operations.

In May 2011, MCTOG hosted its second regimental-level conference in support of an effort by 2d Marine Regiment to document its lessons from OEF 10. Besides the key leaders and staff members from 2d Marines, participants in the conference included 10th Marine Regiment, the Advisor Training Group (ATG), the Training and Education Command (TECOM) G-3, MCCLL, the Mountain

Warfare Training Center (MWTC) the Marine Corps Engineer Center (MCEC), 6th Marine Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 23d Marines (3/23). The results have been documented in the conference report, [2d Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Observed Conference](#), which includes an Executive Summary highlighting some of the key insights from the conference, as well as a complete after action report.



Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James F. Amos, visits with the Marines of RCT-2 at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Delaram II during the December 2010 holiday period.

From the Executive Summary, 2d Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Learned Conference:

"Command and control (C2) is a challenging warfighting function at all levels, but particularly at the company and battalion levels. The challenges range from the number and types of C2 systems being utilized, to the information sharing requirements with joint and coalition partners..."

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Operation Odyssey Dawn Crisis Augmentation Cell



Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Marines from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) line the walls of the flight deck of USS Kearsarge in preparation for a mission in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

As the popular uprising in the Middle East, referred to as the “Arab Spring,” has spread from nation to nation, the level of violence has also escalated, with the number of civilian casualties peaking in several Arab nations, particularly, in Libya as the government of Muammar Qadhafi ruthlessly targeted dissidents and rebel forces. The international response to the Libyan crisis, referred to as Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD), is led by Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn (JTF-OD), with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) providing the operational and tactical command and control of U.S. military forces supporting this operation in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. This resolution authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya under threat of attack by Qadhafi regime forces. USAFRICOM immediately began crisis action planning in support of OOD. In an effort to augment its staff, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) requested a total of fourteen Crisis Augmentation Cell (CAC) personnel in two echelons, with eleven CAC personnel eventually deploying. (Note that the CAC concept was addressed in detail in a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) report

that was highlighted in [last month’s MCCLL newsletter](#). The CAC was first employed as a proof of concept during Exercise Integrated Advance 2011. The CAC is designed to be deployed when a crisis or other significant operation exceeds the organic planning and operational capabilities of a U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) headquarters.)

CAC Marines were inserted into key billets in MARFORAF during the initial crisis. Based on the observations and recommendations of the MARFORAF staff, the command has developed an [OOD CAC After Action Report](#) with specific recommendations for future CAC employments. Although MARFORAF’s concept for CAC employment was somewhat different from the original intent, the flexibility permitted by Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) and Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM) resulted in a very successful operation. The CAC employment in OOD illustrates an effective course of action that should be institutionalized in the CAC process.

From the MARFORAF CAC AAR:

“ . . . the MARFORAF concept of employment for the Crisis Augmentation Cell (CAC) demonstrates an innovative and effective adaptation to a real world crisis that should be institutionalized. MARFORAF will improve its processes for reception and integration of CAC members and will also review its process for identifying permanent personnel capable of being sent forward vice relying solely on the CAC. . . ”

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A Scenario for Fratricide Mitigation Training

The [MCCLL August 2009 Newsletter](#) highlighted a report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) that compiled a number of articles addressing [Combat Identification](#) initiatives designed to prevent instances of fratricide (i.e., friendly fire). Although the numbers of fratricide events have been relatively rare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the few that have occurred have tended to be widely reported in the news media and have obviously been devastating news for family members.

In an effort to provide a training scenario on fratricide mitigation for Marines preparing for Afghanistan deployments, the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Operations staff has documented a combat situation involving platoon-level operations in Helmand Province that is based on an actual engagement that resulted in friendly casualties. The scenario has been altered slightly, but the key learning points from the engagement remain. The [Fratricide Mitigation Training Scenario](#), in addition to briefing slides, includes extensive notes that can be used by trainers, or by Marines studying the situation on their own, to understand the sequence of events and determine “What do I know? and Who needs to know it? The deaths that occurred during the actual event were considered to have been preventable. The training scenario should help Marines understand how they could have been avoided.



Fratricide mitigation was the topic of a Bold Quest Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration at Camp Lejeune. Here, communications experts from the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIT) check communications equipment on Marine Corps vehicles prior to the demonstration.

From the Fratricide Mitigation Training Scenario:

“The primary audience for the training scenario is any unit that will conduct mounted and dismounted patrolling operations; alternate audiences should include staff officers and personnel associated with providing close air support (CAS) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. . . ”

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Alcohol-Related Deaths of Marines in FY 2011

The strain imposed by multiple combat deployments, separation from loved ones, and the ordinary stresses of daily life has led many Marines to excessive alcohol consumption, creating the potential for serious accidents, including off duty/recreational mishaps or automobile, motorcycle and pedestrian accidents. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division has published a short article in its series of [Did You Know? Papers](#) on the subject of [Alcohol-Related Deaths of Marines in FY 2011](#). Even though there are three months left in the fiscal year, there have already been thirteen confirmed alcohol-related deaths of Marines this year. Alcohol has been involved in five out of seven off-duty/recreational fatalities and eight out of 29 motor vehicle fatalities. Although alcohol by itself can significantly impair an individual's reflexes and judgment, its combination with many medications can be particularly deadly. In addition to the risk of injury or death as a result of an accident or violence, alcohol and prescription drugs pose a broad range of physiological and psychological dangers if mixed or abused. Alcohol not only depresses the central nervous system, lowers inhibitions and impairs judgment, but can lead to neurological dangers such as impaired



During a Health and Wellness Fair at Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MarForPac), Marines had a chance to wear "beer goggles" that simulated the effects of alcohol on an individual's vision.

From "Did You Know" on Alcohol Abuse:

"It is critical that leaders at all levels continue to educate Marines on the dangers involved in the recreational use of alcohol and prescription drugs, and remain vigilant for the warning signs a Marine abusing these substance may exhibit. Know your Marines and don't let them become one of the statistics . . ."

vision, impaired motor coordination, memory defects, hallucinations, blackouts, and seizures, with permanent damage to the brain possible if the abuse is long term. Cardiological problems include elevated blood pressure and heart rate and a risk of stroke or heart failure. Respiratory dangers include respiratory depression and failure, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and lung abscesses. The potential damage to the liver is well known, including hepatitis, and cirrhosis.

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Force Preservation Lessons from 2d Marine Division (Fwd)



A family physician with the Concussion Restoration Care Center at Camp Leatherneck examines an artilleryman from 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (1/11) who had suffered a grade-two concussion from an IED explosion during a foot patrol in the Kajaki region of northern Helmand Province.

On a quarterly basis, the Task Force Leatherneck Force Preservation Council meets aboard Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, to document observations and recommendations concerning medical and tactical safety issues that are relevant for Task Force Leatherneck personnel. This council met regularly during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10, while 1st Marine Division (MARDIV) (Forward) served as Task Force Leatherneck. The first Council meeting following the assumption of command of 2d MARDIV (Fwd) took place on 31 May 2011. The results of this Council meeting are now available as both an [After Action Report for the 2d MARDIV Force Preservation Council, 2nd Quarter, CY 2011](#) and the [Quarterly Force Preservation Council Briefings](#) that were presented to the Council. These two documents provide a wealth of information and best practices for dealing with the many force protection issues faced by Marines in Afghanistan. Among the topics addressed in the AAR are:

- blast exposure and concussive incidents, ■ post-exposure mandatory rest periods,
- military acute concussion evaluations, ■ the theater medical information program,
- electronic health records, ■ malaria prevention, ■ post-deployment health assessments and re-assessments, ■ helicopter evacuations, ■ suicide prevention, ■ hand injuries when entering and exiting armored vehicles, ■ family readiness and relationship problems, ■ warrior transition training, and ■ best practices for the tactical safety specialist.

The briefings presented to the Council attendees, in addition to addressing the topics noted above, included discussion of:

- mild traumatic brain injuries, ■ combat and operational stress,
- responding to sexual assault allegations, ■ the "safety climate," ■ weapons safety, ■ vehicle safety, ■ explosives safety,
- fire safety, ■ hazardous materials safety, and ■ safety best practices identified by Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), RCT-8, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12), 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB), 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion, and 3d Reconnaissance (Recon) Battalion.

From Regional Command Southwest Safety Statistics:

"Two significant spikes occur in safety mishaps: approximately 45 days post-relief in place (RIP) for inbound units and 30 days pre-RIP for outbound units."

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Defeating the Taliban in Helmand's Sangin District

[Last month's MCCLL newsletter](#) highlighted an after action report from 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) that documented lessons learned by the battalion during its counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the highly kinetic Sangin District of northeastern Helmand Province. During 3/5's deployment, significant improvements were realized in the security posture of the district, which, up to then, had been a major Taliban stronghold. Although security improvements, such as those achieved in Sangin, are often tenuous, the Sangin success story is considered to be of sufficient importance to be the subject of a well-researched article by Dr. Mark Moyar, *Orbis Operations*, which has now been reprinted in the *Small Wars Journal*. His article, [The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin](#), addresses the successes achieved in Sangin in the context of the previous four years of relatively unsuccessful efforts to improve security in the district.

During the period from 2006 to the summer of 2010, two different COIN strategies were employed in Sangin with very little success, an enemy-centric approach and a population-centric approach. The enemy-centric approach had failed since it did not provide the population with adequate governance or deprive the insurgency of



Marines from Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), conduct a census patrol in the Sangin District of northeastern Helmand Province in partnership with members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

From "The Third Way of COIN:

"The principles and methods of leader-centric COIN that were employed in Sangin have broad applicability across Afghanistan, and, in fact, would be easier to implement in most of Afghanistan's other districts because popular support for the insurgents was exceptionally strong in Sangin. General David Petraeus has encouraged units across Afghanistan to adopt many of these principles and methods . . ."

access to the population. The population-centric approach had failed due to the enemy's persistent military strength that had impeded governance and discouraged popular support for the government. Beginning in the fall of 2010, 3/5 began a COIN campaign that combined elements of both approaches into a hybrid strategy that gave small-unit leaders great latitude in selecting and implementing a mix of enemy-centric methods (employed mainly in unpopulated areas to disrupt and destroy enemy forces) and population-centric operations in populous areas to obstruct the

insurgent shadow government and allow the government to supplant it. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Preparing for the Afghanistan Transition



British Forces and U.S. Marines gather to mark the transfer of authority of Forward Operating Based (FOB) Edinburgh near Musa Qal'eh in northern Helmand Province from British to U.S. forces' control.

British forces providing security in Helmand Province, this report should be of particular interest to Marine Corps' planners. The report emphasizes the fact that the Afghan government must strive to connect with the people and be accountable, acceptable and inclusive if it is to offer a future that is more attractive than that offered by the insurgency. The ANSF must be able to create an environment that is secure enough for the Afghan government to deliver essential services through the key line Ministries, including those of Justice, Education, Reconstruction and Development, Power and Water, Agriculture, and Health. The report provides summary information on the current status of the various elements of the ANSF, acknowledging that the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are further along in their development (and in their credibility) than the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), who continue to be mistrusted due to predatory behavior, endemic corruption, and inability to provide security for the local populace.

The stated goal of U.S. policy and that of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is the transition of security responsibility during the next three years to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As a result, U.S. military forces and those of our coalition partners are beginning to plan for the drawdown of forces scheduled to take place in 2011 through 2013, with each of the ISAF member nations developing their individual transition and drawdown plans.

In an effort to provide initial guidance to the British military on this transition, the Afghan Counterinsurgency (COIN) Centre, Land Warfare Development Group (LWDG), of the British Land Warfare Centre (LWC) has prepared a report, entitled [Preparing for Transition in Afghanistan](#). Due to the key role of

From *Preparing for Transition in Afghanistan*:

"Transition will be possible only when we have helped the Afghans set the conditions for enduring stability. This is not a race for the finish line, rather a deliberate and gradual transfer of responsibility to the Afghans as their competence and confidence increases across all lines of operation."

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Recent Center for Army Lessons Learned Products

Civil Affairs Operations in Afghanistan

Conducting civil affairs operations in Afghanistan is an enormously challenging endeavor for many reasons, due in part to the great distances involved, difficult terrain, absence of a credible governance capability, and the decentralized operations of many small units. The civil affairs (CA) units and teams charged with this responsibility must be able to fully understand the commander's intent, leverage a wide range of resources and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), employ a variety of enablers effectively, and communicate with all the relevant participants. In an effort to provide guidance to civil affairs personnel and their leaders, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has prepared a [Civil Affairs Afghanistan Newsletter](#), with eighteen articles that highlight the best practices of civil affairs teams that have successfully overcome the myriad challenges faced by the CA community. Although based on the experiences of U.S. Army soldiers operating in Afghanistan, many of the ideas and concepts presented are considered to be applicable to Marine Corps CA teams operating in Afghanistan or other deployed environments.



A civil affairs team from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) participates in a weekly shura with tribal elders from the Now Zad District in northern Helmand Province to discuss upcoming civil affairs projects.

From the article, "Road Work in Southern Afghanistan:"

"The absence of road development and refurbishment projects in the outlying villages of southern Afghanistan greatly impedes the expansion and influence of the [government]. By initiating these projects, thousands of villagers, many who previously lived under Taliban rule, can experience the benefits of increased transportation and commerce routes, which open a channel for agrarian trade and economic growth. . ."

Among the topics addressed in the newsletter

are: ■ the civil affairs role in helping establish good governance; ■ employment of a mobile civil-military operations center (CMOC); ■ tips on contracting for CA services; ■ mentoring civil affairs leaders; ■ the structures, training, and employment of female engagement teams (FETs); ■ working with civil affairs units from other coalition partners; ■ civil affairs involvement in land registry reforms; ■ the tactical mobility of civil affairs teams; ■ civil affairs outreach programs; and ■ cultural considerations in conducting operations in southern Afghanistan.

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Detainee Operations in Deployed Environments



During a visit to Camp Pendleton by a delegation from the Afghan National Army (ANA), an ANA officer from the 205th Corps observes detainee training conducted by Marine transition teams and role players.

The detainee abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib in Iraq in 2003/2004, together with the subsequent investigations of these abuses, have had a major impact on national policy with respect to detainee operations, as have recent Supreme Court decisions and the development of new military doctrine. As a result, it is essential that U.S. military personnel conduct detainee operations appropriately in current and future conflicts in order to prevent the kinds of strategic and operational impacts that the abuses at Abu Ghraib had on U.S. operations. Among the resources available on detainee operations is a new handbook from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), entitled [Detainee Operations in a Deployed Environment](#), which was prepared in cooperation with the 89th Military Police Brigade. Although based primarily on the experiences of U.S. Army military police brigades, battalions, and companies performing detainee operations in Iraq since 2003, the handbook is designed to have general relevance for all detainee operations in a deployed environment, whether performed by personnel from the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, or other military services. The handbook provides commanders, leaders, and individual military service members with proven best practices for detainee operations and a better understanding of what may be required to establish and perform these operations at the theater-level.

The handbook provides very detailed information on the establishment of detainee housing in a hastily constructed facility, as well as in more permanent structures. Among the other topics addressed are: the segregation of detainees in order to prevent their communication with others, the support structures for theater internment facilities (TIFs), sustainment operations for TIFs, support functions for TIFs, work program for TIFs, and cultural considerations in detainee operations.

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From the "Cultural Considerations" Chapter:

"It is very important to realize the numerous cultural differences, so that situations do not arise from failing to or simply neglecting to be aware of those cultural differences. . . Ensure that all unit personnel fully understand those cultural differences and . . . do their best to adhere to the highest military standards and not overlook those differences. . ."

The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

Two editions of the MCCLL New Data Rollup (which is distributed weekly to registered users on the MCCLL NIPR website) were among the most popular downloads during the month of June, as was the May 2011 newsletter. Five MCCLL reports addressing Afghanistan topics were also among the most frequently downloaded MCCLL products, as were papers on lessons learned concerning the Crisis Augmentation Cell and the 2010 deployment of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

In comparison, the second table highlights the documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during June. A report from the Naval Safety Center/CMC Safety Division on a recent amphibious assault vehicle mishap was downloaded most often during the month, followed by an after action report from the 2d Marine Regiment lessons observed conference sponsored by MCTOG. These documents were read most often by officers in grades from O-2 to O-4, NCOs in the grades of E-6 and E-8, and DoD civilians and contractors.

- | Top Ten MCCLL Products, June 2011 | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. | MCCLL New Data Rollup, 18 - 24 May 2011 |
| 2. | Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Operations in OEF |
| 3. | MCCLL New Data Rollup, 07 - 14 June 2011 |
| 4. | Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as a Coalition Headquarters (Regional Command Southwest) |
| 5. | MCCLL May 2011 Newsletter |
| 6. | Reserve Component Sourcing of OEF Security Force |
| 7. | Crisis Augmentation Cell: Lessons from Exercise Integrated Advance 2011 |
| 8. | Coalition Interoperability: Georgia Deployment Program (32d Georgia Infantry Battalion) |
| 9. | Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Operations: Lessons from the 15th MEU |
| 10. | Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability |

- | Top Ten Downloads, June 2011 | |
|------------------------------|---|
| 1. | Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mishap Lessons Learned (Naval Safety Center/CMC Safety Division) |
| 2. | 2d Marine Regiment OEF Lessons Observed Conference (MCTOG) |
| 3. | MCCLL New Data Rollup, 18 - 24 May 2011 |
| 4. | Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Operations in OEF (MCCLL) |
| 5. | MCCLL New Data Rollup, 07 - 14 June 2011 |
| 6. | Rules of Engagement (ROE) Vignettes (Center for Army Lessons Learned) |
| 7. | Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as a Coalition Headquarters (Regional Command Southwest) (MCCLL) |
| 8. | Best Practices in Counter-IED (Center for Army Lessons Learned) |
| 9. | MCCLL May 2011 Newsletter |
| 10. | Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 (VMM-365) OEF After Action Report |

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Do Marines Need an NMCI Account to Access the MCCLL Website?



ing requirements.

Many junior Marines do not have an NMCI e-mail account and, as a result, may have assumed that they do not have the ability to access protected Marine Corps websites, including the [Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned \(MCCLL\) NIPR site](#). Although the MCCLL site, like those of many other Marine Corps and Department of Defense organizations, is Common Access Card (CAC) protected, that fact does not mean that an NMCI e-mail account or access to an NMCI computer is necessary in order to register on the site or gain access. This mistaken belief may have discouraged Marines from checking out the MCCLL NIPR site (as well as many other CAC-enabled DoD sites) and learning about the experiences of other Marine Corps units, furthering their professional education, researching topics of interest for upcoming deployments or exercises, or locating resources to be used to satisfy training requirements.

Since every active duty Marine has a government-issued CAC (as do many reserve Marines), all that is needed to access the MCCLL NIPR website from a home computer is a [CAC reader](#) and the [ActiveIdentity ActiveClient™](#) software needed to provide the required strong authentication and to satisfy public key infrastructure (PKI) requirements. Both of these products are readily available. CAC readers can be purchased for as little as \$15 on the internet, with some laptops and certain desktop keyboards already having built-in CAC readers. The ActiveClient software is free for download from a number of websites (even a year's technical support and maintenance for this software is available for as little as six dollars).

With this small investment, Marines can access MCCLL and many other Marine Corps and DoD websites during their leisure hours, including that of the [Joint Lessons Learned Information System \(JLLIS\)](#). When accessing the MCCLL site from your home computer, you should ensure that the three boxes (shown to the right) are checked in Internet Explorer (Go to the [Tools](#) menu; select [Internet Options](#); select the [Advanced](#) tab; scroll down to the bottom and ensure these three boxes are checked.) Also note that individuals who register on the MCCLL website, who do not have a .mil or .gov e-mail address, will not be able to enter a civilian address in their profile and be automatically placed on distribution for MCCLL products, including this newsletter or the NIPR New Lessons Rollup. In that event, you can submit a separate request to [MCCLL Ops](#) asking to be placed on distribution.

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Use SSL 2.0 |
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News

The Improvised Explosive Device Threat in Mexico

Although the improvised explosive device (IED) threat is most often associated with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has now become a world-wide phenomena. The employment of IEDs by terrorists and criminals has become increasingly common, with their attempted use in U.S. terrorist incidents evidence of the universal threat they currently pose. A briefing prepared by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) provides a [Review of IED Activity in Mexico](#), highlighting the fact that there have been over a hundred IED incidents in this country since 2004. These IEDs have been employed by leftists extremists, transnational criminal organizations

(TCOs), and other criminal elements. Obviously, the counter-drug efforts by Mexico law enforcement agencies, as well as increased violence between TCOs and other criminal organizations, is having an impact on the level of IED employment. From 2004 to 2007, the IED attacks were primarily conducted by leftist groups and criminal organizations focusing on elements of the infrastructure such as banks and pipelines. From 2008 to the present, the attacks have been mainly orchestrated by TCOs, with the targets including municipal and federal police organizations. Beginning in 2010, their employment has increasingly involved higher profile, bolder attacks. The NGIC briefing provides a number of

specific examples of IED employment, including a radio-controlled IED that was detonated in a public bathroom in Cadereyta, two vehicle-borne IEDs that were discovered in Juarez, three vehicle-borne IEDs that detonated in Ciudad Victoria on two separate occasions against a public safety complex, a television station, and a transit police headquarters. All these incidents took place in 2010. In addition to highlighting these and a number of other specific incidents, the briefing identifies the type switches employed, main charges, explosives and initiators that were utilized in each attack.

Understanding Afghanistan Culture

There are many resources available for military service members and other individuals who need to know as much as possible about Afghanistan culture. One of the most interesting is a 2009 report from the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) of the Naval Postgraduate School, entitled [Understanding Afghan Culture: The Perception of Colors, Numbers and Language Among Afghans](#). This report focuses on the connotations of colors and numbers, which can be very different from (and even opposite to) those perceived by Americans. The re-

port also addresses some of the idiomatic expressions and proverbs that constitute important communications tools for expressing complex ideas by the Afghan people.

An example of the information included in the report is the discussion of the color red, which was widely used during the Soviet occupation. The Afghan flag was even changed from black, red and, green to red only, with the government printing thousands of these red flags of various sizes and distributing them among the public. The state also produced and published many red banners

that carried pro-government and anti-U.S. messages. These were hung from nearly every available door or wall in the major cities. The Marxist government did not realize that in the context of politics, red is not a favorite color among the Afghan populace. Instead of representing the color of revolution and sacrifice, for the Afghan people, it primarily represented threats, bloodshed, anger, and danger. One of the only positive connotations for red, is referring to someone as "red-faced," which implies being victorious or proud.

Training Priorities for Predeployment Training Programs

The U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) Lessons Integration Division (TLID) has prepared the first in a planned series of semi-annual reports to compile training trends that have been highlighted in Systemic Trends Reports, after action reports (AARs) submitted by commands and units to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), and responses to surveys administered to members of the operating forces following their deployments. These source documents reveal a number of training areas that are regularly

highlighted as candidates for additional emphasis and focus. The purpose of the semi-annual report is to increase awareness on the part of the Training Support Centers (TSCs) concerning these tactical-level training trends.

Among the topics addressed in the initial report (entitled [Input to Develop Training Priorities in Support of Predeployment Training Program](#)) are: ■ intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance platform (ISR) training, ■ the employment of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, ■ patrolling tech-

niques, ■ standard operating procedures (SOP) development, ■ driver training, ■ vehicle licensing, ■ vehicle recovery, ■ counter-IED training, ■ battle staff training, ■ command and control systems, ■ command relationships, ■ combat operations center (COC) actions, ■ fire support functions, ■ biometrics, ■ tank-infantry integration, ■ casualty evacuation, ■ machine gun, rocket weapons and grenade launcher training, and ■ long-range marksmanship.

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Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#) was updated almost two years ago by a review board to ensure that it remained relevant and provided all Marines with opportunities for professional and career development. A revised list from the Commandant, General James F. Amos, is scheduled to be published shortly and will be featured in an upcoming newsletter. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), provide Marines with a wealth of resources for their own development programs, featuring many books and articles that are as entertaining as they are instructive. These reading lists are highlighted on the [Marine Corps University \(MCU\) website](#), along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) [We Were Soldiers](#) by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Joseph L. Galloway, featured on the Commandant's list for Gunnery Sergeants (and made into the popular 2002 movie with Mel Gibson), (2) a very timely recent book that offers a fascinating overview of our controversial ally, [Pakistan: A Hard Country](#) by Anatol Lieven, and (3) an article from the New Yorker Magazine on the I MEF list for Colonels and General Officers, [Knowing the Enemy](#) by George Packer.

[We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young: Ia Drang — The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam](#), by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Joseph L. Galloway (Random House, 1992)

Review by George Chabot, [Epionions.com](#):

"The Battle of Ia Drang was the first major engagement between United States regular Army and the North Vietnamese. The Army was testing a new concept: Air-mobile Infantry; troops would be quickly inserted into enemy territory using UH-1 Iroquois ("Huey" or "Slick") helicopters from whence they would fight on foot. The horse cavalry of the Indian Wars was now the Air Cavalry.

Commanding this experimental detachment was Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. (Hal) Moore. The unit was created from elements detached from the 1st Cavalry Division and denominated the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment or 1/7 Cav, with the motto "Garry Owen," alluding to General George A. Custer's former command and marching song of the same name. The idea of Custer's ill-fated demise at The Little Bighorn also factors into the thinking of the troopers who staff the battalion, and Colonel Moore especially.

In November of 1965, LTC Moore, UPI Correspondent Joe Galloway and 450 troopers of the 1/7 Cav were inserted by helicopter into the Ia Drang Valley, deep in hostile territory. Immediately surrounded, the troops later learned they had landed in the middle of a North Vietnamese Divisional Headquarters composed of approximately 4,000 men. Three days and nights of intense fighting result in a victory at LZ (Landing Zone) Xray, while the 2/7 Cav coming to their relief is defeated a short distance away at LZ Albany. Such are the fortunes of war... The final tally, 1,800 kills for the 1/7 Cav and 80 dead troopers. Overall 305 troopers from the 7th Cavalry Regiment were killed in the action at Ia Drang.

Harold G. Moore and Joe Galloway collaborated in authoring [We Were Soldiers Once... And Young](#). Their account is not easy reading as they tried to be comprehensive with names, dates, and places for all of the men involved in the action. You can sense Moore's concern for his men as he struggled to include everybody in the narrative. The authors sought out men from BOTH sides, including the Vietnamese commander, so all aspects of the battle are covered. . ." Read complete review at [Epinions.com](#).

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[Pakistan: A Hard Country](#), by Anatol Lieven (Allen Lane, 2011)

Review by Peter Osborne, [The Telegraph Online](#):

"The crisis in North Africa and the Middle East has driven Pakistan out of the headlines, but this is surely only a temporary lull. Cursed by nuclear weapons, home to al-Qaeda, victim of several raging insurgencies and notorious for a chronically unstable political structure – most Western experts continue to view Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world.

So this book by Anatol Lieven could hardly be more timely. Lucid and well informed, he deals carefully with all Pakistan's well-known problems. And one of the joys of this nicely written volume is that it avoids the hysteria and partial judgment that disfigure much contemporary writing on the subject.

Above all, it emanates a deep affection bordering on love for unfortunate, beleaguered, magical Pakistan. Lieven's research takes him to an army cantonment in Quetta, boar-hunting in the Punjab and to a stay in Taliban-dominated Mohmand Agency on the North West Frontier. Lieven, a former foreign correspondent who is now professor of terrorism studies at King's College, London, talks to just about everybody who counts: farmers, intelligence officers, judges, clerics, politicians, doctors, soldiers, jihadis.

In the course of this journey he demolishes the neo-conservative narrative that Pakistan is dominated by a mortal struggle between virtuous modernity and rage-filled Islamist conservatism. He insists that Pakistan is not – as Western intelligence agencies, journalists and think tanks believe – a country on the brink. We needn't worry too much about its nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. Pakistan is not about to be taken over by Islamists.

On the contrary, Pakistan is remarkably stable and it is completely daft to compare it to failed states such as Somalia, Congo or Yemen. The key question, Lieven asks, is not why Islamist political movements are so strong in 21st-century Pakistan. It is why they are so weak. His argument is for the most part persuasive. Most Western commentators look for the wrong things. It is certainly true that the institutions imposed by the British before independence – above all parliamentary democracy and the rule of law – are failing. . ."

Read more of the review [on the next page](#).

Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

(Review of *Pakistan* continued) “. . . But that does mean that Pakistan itself is failing? Democracy and the rule of law were imposed by the West and have never taken hold. The big, powerful forces in Pakistan remain the same as ever – family and tribe. It is a profoundly traditional society and Lieven argues that even destabilising forces such as the Taliban are best understood as new manifestations of something very ancient: the implacable hostility to the outside world demonstrated by Pathan tribes since time immemorial.

He quotes Olaf Caroe, the last governor of North West Frontier Province, writing in 1958: “There arose one of those strange and formidable insurrections among the Pathans which from time to time sweep across the frontier mountains like a forest fire.” Taliban leaders are really contemporary versions of warlike figures such as the old Mullah of Hada, who caused such trouble to Winston Churchill and his Malakand Field Force, when the future British prime minister was based on the North West Frontier at the end of the 19th century. . .” **Read the remainder of the review from [The Telegraph Online](#).**

Knowing the Enemy, by George Pakcer, From the 18 December 2006 Edition of *The New Yorker Magazine*:

“In 1993, a young captain in the Australian Army named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West Java, as part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One day, he visited a local military museum that contained a display about Indonesia's war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, against a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. “I had never heard of this conflict,” Kilcullen told me recently. “It's hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, hands down. And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a successful counterinsurgency campaign.”

Kilcullen, the son of two left-leaning academics, had studied counterinsurgency as a cadet at Duntroon, the Australian West Point, and he decided to pursue a doctorate in political anthropology at the University of New South Wales. He chose as his dissertation subject the Darul Islam conflict, conducting research over tea with former guerrillas while continuing to serve in the Australian Army. The rebel movement, he said, was bigger than the Malayan Emergency--the twelve-year Communist revolt against British rule, which was finally put down in 1960, and which has become a major point of reference in the military doctrine of counterinsurgency. During the years that Kilcullen worked on his dissertation, two events in Indonesia deeply affected his thinking. The first was the rise--in the same region that had given birth to Darul Islam, and among some of the same families--of a more extreme Islamist movement called Jemaah Islamiya, which became a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. The second was East Timor's successful struggle for independence from Indonesia. Kilcullen witnessed the former as he was carrying out his field work; he participated in the latter as an infantry-company commander in a United Nations intervention force. The experiences shaped the conclusions about counter-insurgency in his dissertation, which he finished in 2001, just as a new war was about to begin.

“I saw extremely similar behavior and extremely similar problems in an Islamic insurgency in West Java and a Christian-separatist insurgency in East Timor,” he said. “After 9/11, when a lot of people were saying, ‘The problem is Islam,’ I was thinking, It's something deeper than that. It's about human social networks and the way that they operate.” In West Java, elements of the failed Darul Islam insurgency--a local separatist movement with mystical leanings--had resumed fighting as Jemaah Islamiya, whose outlook was Salafist and global. Kilcullen said, “What that told me about Jemaah Islamiya is that it's not about theology.” He went on, “There are elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive what's happening. The Islamic bit is secondary. This is human behavior in an Islamic setting. This is not ‘Islamic behavior.’” Paraphrasing the American political scientist Roger D. Petersen, he said, “People don't get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social networks.” He noted that all fifteen Saudi hijackers in the September 11th plot had trouble with their fathers. Although radical ideas prepare the way for disaffected young men to become violent jihadists, the reasons they convert, Kilcullen said, are more mundane and familiar: family, friends, associates.

Indonesia's failure to replicate in East Timor its victory in West Java later influenced Kilcullen's views about what the Bush Administration calls the “global war on terror.” In both instances, the Indonesian military used the same harsh techniques, including forced population movements, coercion of locals into security forces, stringent curfews, and even lethal pressure on civilians to take the government side. The reason that the effort in East Timor failed, Kilcullen concluded, was globalization. In the late nineties, a Timorese international propaganda campaign and ubiquitous media coverage prompted international intervention, thus ending the use of tactics that, in the obscure jungles of West Java in the fifties, outsiders had known nothing about. “The globalized information environment makes counterinsurgency even more difficult now,” Kilcullen said.

Just before the 2004 American elections, Kilcullen was doing intelligence work for the Australian government, sifting through Osama bin Laden's public statements, including transcripts of a video that offered a list of grievances against America: Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, global warming. . .” **Read more of this article from [The New Yorker Magazine](#).** [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Steve Thompson is redeploying and being replaced by Mr. Ken Hurst as the MCCLL representative at RC (SW). Mr. Scott Kemp is deploying as the MCCLL representative at 2d MLG (Fwd). Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact [Mr. Mark Silvia](#), the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.