



Members of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3) Female Engagement Team (FET) speak to young Afghan students during a visit to clinics and schools in the Garmsir District of central Helmand Province. Read the MCCLL report on [FETs in Afghanistan](#).



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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

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Featured Articles

[Female Engagement Team \(FET\) Lessons from Afghanistan:](#) This MCCLL report addresses the pre-deployment training, integration, command and control, operations, logistics and manpower support of FETs.

[Recent Operation Enduring Freedom \(OEF\) After Action Reports \(AARs\)](#) provide insights into reconnaissance battalion and unmanned aerial vehicle squadron operations in Afghanistan:

- ⇒ [2d Reconnaissance Battalion.](#)
- ⇒ [Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron \(VMU\) 2.](#)

[Tactical Site Exploitation and Forensic Analysis:](#) Recent products identify the resources needed for effective tactical site exploitation, as well as the capabilities of the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility.

[Guidance for Counter-IED Programs:](#) This handbook from NATO provides advice for establishing counter-IED programs, while the latest counter-IED bulletin from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) furnishes additional planning tips.

[Tactical Employment of IED Detector Dogs \(IDDs\):](#) A recent standard operating procedure (SOP) from Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) outlines the procedures to follow in training, employing and caring for these specialized dogs.

[A Handbook for Engineer Route Clearance Patrols \(RCPs\):](#) The Explosives Hazard Coordination Cell of U.S. Forces - Afghanistan has prepared a handbook with advice for engineer RCPs to assist in carrying out this critical mission.

[Marine Corps and Army Training for OEF Deployments:](#) This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter is the third in a series addressing Marine Corps and Army integration topics.

[Three Articles on Safety-Related Topics](#) highlight issues of concern to Marines and their leaders:

- ⇒ [The Risk of Rollovers in MRAP Vehicles.](#)
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[The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website:](#) Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find most interesting.

[Providing Insights Into Middle East Politics and Culture:](#) Recent products from the Middle East Studies Department at Marine Corps University provide valuable insights into this critical region.

News

Three items are included this month: (1) the [Pre-Deployment Training Program Toolkit](#) available from TECOM, (2) an [interview with General James Amos](#) in Seapower Magazine, and (3) a recent assessment that the [V-22 Osprey is safer than helicopters.](#)

[Reading Lists and Book Review:](#) Three books are featured: (1) [McCoy's Marines](#) from the new 2011 Commandant reading list, (2) [The Guns of August](#), a carryover from the previous 2009 list, and (3) a new book, [War Shots](#), about WW II combat cameramen.

[Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts:](#) This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

variations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list can be directed to: [Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor](#) Telephone: (703) 432-1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

Female Engagement Team Lessons from Afghanistan

The first Marine Corps female engagement team (FET) was formed in February 2009 in support of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - Afghanistan (SPMAGTF-A), with a primary mission of supporting search operations. As the benefits provided by the FETs in engaging Afghan women in rural Helmand Province became more and more apparent, the program was subsequently expanded in July 2009 under Task Force Leatherneck to focus on female engagements in remote Pashtun villages. Since then, the concept of forming FETs to perform this core mission (in addition to executing such secondary missions as coordinating village medical outreach (VMO) efforts) has been widely recognized by U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and endorsed by the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF). The [COMISF Tactical Directive on Female Engagement](#), dated 31 May 2010, states that *"my intention is that all units implement this directive and that Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) resource, train and employ females for duty on engagement teams to the maximum extent practical. . ."*

The Marine Corps FET strength in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) has now grown to over forty female Marines, along with a small number of female corpsmen, divided into teams that operate in most of the districts in the RC (SW) AO. In an effort to document the challenges and best practices identified by these teams during recent Afghanistan deployments, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed members of currently deployed FETs, as well as the staffs of II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) (currently serving as RC (SW)) and several subordinate units and previously deployed FET members. The objective was to solicit observations and recommendations concerning FET pre-deployment training, integration, command and control, operations, logistics, and manpower support. The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, [Female Engagement Teams in Operation Enduring Freedom](#).



U.S. and United Kingdom FET members attend training at the Afghan Cultural Center aboard Camp Leatherneck. The FETs also meet regularly to discuss their common experiences reaching out to the women of Afghanistan.



A member of a FET from the United Kingdom assigned to 1 Rifles Battle Group speaks with an Afghan soldier near Checkpoint Salaang in the Nahr-e-Saraj District of Helmand Province.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations is included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Training:** Although the five-month pre-deployment training program (PTP) for the FETs was considered to be adequate for their mission, many FET members indicated that additional infantry training would be beneficial.

⇒ The evolving FET command and control environment and mission has impacted the ability to provide focused training. Many FET members indicated that flexibility in training is key. As noted by one FET member, *"The mission can change by the minute, so you have to be flexible and ready to shift your emphasis. . ."*

⇒ The language immersion class provided ample training on Pashtu, but refresher training was recommended to enhance the language skills of FET members prior to deployment.

- **Operations:** The highest ranking FET members served as liaison officers and advisors, helping to better integrate the teams into every level of command, while providing guidance to commanders on their employment.

⇒ The FETs were very effective during VMO engagements. The availability of female corpsmen was critical to these types of operations.

⇒ FET missions at the small unit level varied greatly, depending on the village tribal structure. Some villages welcomed the FET presence during engagements, while some did not. The village elders had to be consulted to determine whether the FETs could meet with some of the village women alone. If these meetings were allowed, the presence of a female linguist was considered to be critical.

⇒ Units relied on the FETs during village search missions and at vehicle checkpoints. Their presence helped to calm the women and children during these searches.

⇒ Regular "re-set" meetings in theater provided the FET members an opportunity to compare notes and learn what was (and was not) working in other AOs.



Female Marines assigned to the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3) FET travel alongside the Helmand River while returning to their patrol base after visiting a local school and clinic in the Garmsir District of central Helmand Province.

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OEF After Action Report from 2d Reconnaissance Battalion



A Marine with Bravo Company, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, scouts potential enemy crossing points along the Helmand River in northern Helmand Province.

The 2d Reconnaissance (Recon) Battalion deployed to Afghanistan in December 2010 as a division-level maneuver element and “battlespace-shaping” force, with the ability to perform a variety of missions in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) depending on the tactical situation. In particular, the battalion’s operations in the Upper Sangin Valley (USV) and the Malmard area of the Borak District of Kandahar Province were designed to interdict and disrupt enemy forces and provide Task Force Leatherneck, the regimental combat teams (RCTs), and individual infantry battalions with additional levels of knowledge and understanding concerning the physical terrain, human terrain, and enemy forces in their respective AOs. Initially, the battalion supported the RCT responsible for operations in northern Helmand; it then transitioned to providing general support for Task Force Leatherneck. The battalion participated in a number of named operations during its deployment and eventually transitioned into a quasi-battlespace owner in the USV. Based on its experiences performing a wide range of tactical missions, 2d Recon has prepared a detailed and comprehensive [After Action Report for Operation Enduring Freedom for the Period](#)

[from December 2010 to June 2011.](#)

Due to the size and flexibility of 2d Recon, the battalion could be employed on a variety of tactical tasks in support of RCT and Task Force Leatherneck missions. Ideal employment of a reconnaissance battalion involves “battlespace shaping” missions; the AAR recommends that training focus on employment and occupation of platoon and company-sized patrol bases in areas that are defensible against enemy actions. During assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of its Afghan National Army (ANA) partners, the battalion found that the basic and advanced levels of training received by the ANA soldiers are much different from our own. In order to expedite ANA training and be better prepared for performing this initial assessment, 2d Recon recommends that a team be formed early during the pre-deployment training program (PTP) that will mentor their ANA counterparts. This team should undergo additional cultural training during PTP, as well as receive specific training on partnered relations and operations.

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From the 2d Recon Battalion AAR:

On satellite patrolling: *“Having two or more maneuver elements on the deck throws the Taliban off-balance. They . . . have a hard time keeping tabs of where each element is at all times. . . This makes them fight on your terms, not theirs, and also allows you to maneuver, close with, and destroy them. . .”*

OEF After Action Report from Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (VMU-2) deployed in November 2010 in support, initially, of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.2 and then of OEF 11.1. The squadron provided intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets for infantry units, manned aviation squadrons, and NATO forces operating in the areas of operation (AOs) of both Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) and Regional Command South (RC (S)). During its seven-month deployment, the squadron supported numerous indirect fire missions and terminal guidance operations in addition to satisfying aerial reconnaissance training requirements. The squadron made every effort to ensure that its important observations and recommendations were passed on to its replacement (VMU-3). In addition, the squadron has now prepared a very useful and practical [OEF 10.2/11.1 After Action Report](#) as a resource for future VMU deployments.

The squadron found that the units it supported needed to have a good understanding of the ISR capabilities and limitations of its two unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets, the RQ-7B Shadow and the ScanEagle. In particular, units needed to understand how grids are refined, how the squadron locates enemy forces, how information is relayed, the number of sources validating an observation, and the impact of technical issues when employing the asset. This level of understanding allowed for better employment of the assets, as well as helping establish enhanced professional and operational relationships with the supported units.

VMU-2 stressed safety throughout its deployment, emphasizing a proactive approach to mitigate risks and prevent mishaps. The squadron requested multiple site safety visits from members of the base Fire Inspector and Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Department of Safety and Standardization (DOSS). The regular review of safety practices and procedures by an outside entity helped identify hazards that might not be noticed by Marines conducting daily operations. These type of inspections should be non-invasive and not impede normal operations.



A Marine with VMU-2 employs a ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at Forward Operating Base Edinburgh to provide aerial surveillance support for ground troops.

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Tactical Site Exploitation and Forensic Analysis



A military policeman from the Military Police Company, Combat Logistics Regiment 37 (CLR-37) collects materials used for bomb making during a forensic material collection and exploitation course at the Central Training Area, Okinawa.

Thoroughly and systematically exploiting enemy sites and personnel during counterinsurgency (COIN) actions is considered an essential element in the success of these operations. Site exploitation is critical for two primary reasons: (1) to support the need to gather actionable intelligence concerning insurgent activities and (2) the requirement to carefully collect and preserve evidence that may be used in potential future court proceedings. The importance of thorough, systematic site exploitation has been widely recognized for many years, as evidenced by the preparation of a pocket reference guide on the subject by the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) that was referenced over four years ago in the [June 2007 edition of the MCCLL newsletter](#). The concepts in this guide remain highly relevant for today's site exploitation efforts in Afghanistan. Recently, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has developed a [Tactical Site Exploitation Toolkit](#), that identifies equipment and other resources that can help expedite searches of these sites. This toolkit is a modular-based set of capabilities intended for use at multiple echelons by both trained and untrained personnel to allow for the rapid collection and exploitation of site information.

Once evidence and other information from a site or individual has been gathered, the associated forensics must be exploited to determine whether a suspected insurgent can be detained and eventually prosecuted and incarcerated. The focal point for efforts to analyze forensics in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) is the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility (JEFF) 7 located at Camp Leatherneck. JEFF 7 is one of three forensics facilities in Afghanistan, with a fourth facility currently being planned.

A briefing that provides an overview of JEFF 7 capabilities (as well as summary information on current and potential future uses of forensics) has been prepared by the Office of the Provost Marshal General. The briefing, entitled [Forensic Support Across the Full Spectrum of Operations](#), points out that JEFF 7 processes a larger caseload than any other lab in Afghanistan and highlights a number of successful exploitation efforts recently performed by the lab. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

From Forensics Support Across the Full Spectrum:

"JEFF 7 is an enabler to the Regional Command Southwest exploitation process, and (with the creation of the exploitation fusion cell (EFC)) hard science is being translated seamlessly into information used for full-spectrum operations. . . Combining forensics and intelligence analysis, the EFC provides intelligence analysis of forensic results, creates threat networks, and creates easily digestible products for the warfighter. . ."

Recent Guidance for Counter-IED Programs

The threat posed by the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by terrorists and insurgents is expected to be a significant challenge across the full range of anticipated operations for the foreseeable future. It is widely recognized that the integration of counter-IED (CIED) activities and enablers (both people and equipment) for defensive (defeat the device) and offensive (attack the network) operations requires well defined and practiced staff processes. However, the development of robust and effective counter-IED procedures must also take into consideration the need for military forces to maintain flexibility and adaptability in responding to the threat. These competing requirements were one of the prime considerations in developing the [Commander's and Staff Handbook for Countering IEDs](#) by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). So, rather than providing procedures on "what needs to be done," the handbook addresses "how to do it."

From the Counter-IED Handbook:

" . . . Stove-piped counter-IED expertise and operations have proven unreliable to support overall operational objectives and theatre campaigns synergistically. As a result, NATO has conducted two CIED specific experiments to define and validate the optimal staff organization and processes to fully integrate and maximize CIED activities in the overall operational campaign. This information is contained in the following handbook and is provided as a recommended guide to operational commanders and staffs. . ."

Recent CIED Bulletins from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) also provide timely information for helping to plan counter-IED activities and programs. The latest bulletin ([CIED Bulletin IX](#)) focuses on employment of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the IED fight. The previous two editions ([VII](#) and [VIII](#)) are also available in the MCCLL repositories and focus on training and attacking the network, respectively.



A student attending the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Basic Course at Camp Bastion inspects mock devices during a counter-IED class.

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Tactical Employment of IED Detector Dogs



Marine dog-handlers and their IED Detector Dogs (IDDs) from Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) battalions in central Helmand Province gather at Camp Dwyer to receive training on verbal and non-verbal commands, emergency and routine medical training, and the latest tactics for finding IEDs.

The category of military working dogs (MWDs) that are trained specifically for the purpose of detecting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) now constitute a significant element in the overall counter-IED effort in Afghanistan. The ability of these specialized dogs, referred to as an IED detector dogs (IDDs), to smell the scents given off by the various home-made explosives (HME) that are most commonly employed by the Taliban and other insurgents has great potential for helping Marines mitigate this dangerous threat. In an effort to provide additional guidance to commanders, dog handlers and other personnel on the training, employment and care of the IDD, Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) has prepared a [Standard Operating Procedure \(SOP\) for the Tactical Use of IED Detector Dogs](#). In addition to addressing requirements for the kennels, kennel managers and veterinarians located at Camp Leatherneck, Camp Dwyer and elsewhere in theater, the SOP focuses specifically on dog handler requirements and specific procedures for training and caring for the dogs. The SOP points out that bonding between the handler and IDD is expected; however, excessive bonding is discouraged, as it can lead to “pet-like behavior.” Since veterinary care will not always be available, handlers are also expected to be able to provide certain medical care themselves and should always carry sufficient veterinary supplies during operations.

(Note that a number of recent infantry battalion after action reports (AARs) have included observations and recommendations concerning the IDD program. In addition, [last month’s MCCLL newsletter](#) referenced an AAR prepared by the IDD Program Manager from 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (1/10) that includes numerous comments from the dog handlers themselves on the successes and weaknesses of the program in an effort to provide guidance to future units preparing for deployments with IDDs.)

From the *IDD SOP*:

“Military working dogs such as IDDs provide a tangible and needed service in counter-IED operations; however, the success of their operating abilities requires a well-trained and managed IDD section. The policies set forth in this SOP provide the guidance to create a manageable and effective asset for current operations. . .”

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A Handbook for Engineer Route Clearance Patrols

Route clearance is a highly specialized mission to search for, identify, report and assist in removing explosive hazards from a given area or route to help ensure freedom of maneuver for coalition forces, as well as for the local populace. In addition to being one of the key elements of the counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) “defeat the device” mission in the Afghanistan theater of operations (ATO), route clearance patrols (RCPs) also contribute greatly to the overall intelligence picture that enables C-IED “attack the network” operations to take place. In an effort to provide a comprehensive guide for engineer RCPs operating in the ATO, the 160th Explosives Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) of U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USF-A) has prepared an [Engineer Route Clearance Patrols Handbook](#) that includes information on basic route clearance operations, tactical formations, specialized equipment, commonly used tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and best practices. The guide is designed to familiarize engineers with the intricacies of IEDs, but also addresses the route clearance mission in the context of the full-spectrum of engineer operations and the importance of a sound pre-deployment program. The document was prepared with input from a wide variety of sources, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT), the Counter Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC), numerous after action reports (AARs) and the mobile observations (MO) of engineer route clearance battalions based on their Afghanistan tours. Although the handbook has a U.S. Army focus, the concepts and procedures for RCP operations have great commonality across the military services. The handbook includes sections on training, basic route clearance formations, principal categories of explosives hazards, and the route clearance assets available to the RCPs, including vehicles, vehicle add-ons, clearance enablers, and the route clearance equipment itself (i.e., mine detectors).



Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers from the Route Clearance Company, 1st Brigade, 215th ANA Corps, learn clearance procedures at the IED course at Camp Dwyer.

From the *Route Clearance Patrols Handbook*:

“. . . it remains imperative for unit leaders to continue to train on the traditional and fundamental [engineer] skills . . . The contemporary route clearance mission is merely an adaptation of the engineer fundamentals, but is often mistaken for something new. For leaders to be truly successful, they must understand the principles from which the current mission is based. From there, it is then the leader’s responsibility to take the necessary steps in order to ensure a proactive approach instead of a reactive one. . .”

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Marine Corps and Army Training for OEF Deployments

The MCCLL newsletters for [February 2010](#) and [September 2010](#) highlighted the first two in a series of U.S. Army and Marine Corps Integration Newsletters that are being prepared through focused collaboration efforts by the Center for Army Lessons (CALL) and MCCLL. These newsletters are designed to help stimulate innovation, learning and the sharing of ideas between the services. The first newsletter in the series addressed topics of joint maneuver, air-ground operations and fires, while the second focused on joint teams that integrate logistics support for the warfighter.

The third in the series, [Army - Marine Integration, Volume III](#), was published in July 2011 and highlights Army and Marine Corps pre-deployment and sustainment training for operations in Afghanistan by units and commands serving in single service, joint, or coalition roles. The newsletter includes articles that have previously appeared in professional journals; they emphasize training performed at home station, combat training centers and in theater to prepare personnel and units for the challenges faced in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They also serve to highlight the ingenuity and leadership demonstrated by Marines and Soldiers involved in the ongoing fight to defeat this enemy, including the full spectrum of missions necessary to perform counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations effectively.

From the Introduction to Volume III:

" . . . The enemy's ability to quickly change improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to counter friendly TTPs places great demands on training in order to be current, proficient, flexible, and adaptive. New programs continue to evolve, such as the IED detector dogs used by both services. Partnering with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and operating with coalition partners creates additional training demands. . . "



The Recognition of Combatants - Improvised Explosive Devices (ROC-IED) trainer provides instruction on identification of potential sites for IED emplacements or suicide bombers, with pictures of these locations from various angles and under varying lighting conditions.

Articles in this edition of the Army/Marine Integration Newsletter are organized into two sections on the following general topics:

⇒ **Training for Operations Enduring Freedom:** This section of the newsletter includes eleven articles that address such diverse topics as: ■ counter IED operations at a notorious IED hotspot in Iraq, ■ training on the Recognition of Combatants - Improvised Explosive Devices (ROC-IED) trainer, ■ training female engagement teams (FETs), ■ training aviators and ground troops for mountain operations, ■ training during the initial months of a field artillery battalion's OEF deployment, ■ company-level fire support training in OEF, ■ paratrooper operations in OEF, ■ distributed rocket artillery operations, ■ training and mentoring ANA mortar teams and ■ conducting global container management training online.

⇒ **Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Training:** This section includes five articles on MOS training in such areas as: ■ battle command training at Fort Lewis, Washington, ■ training a quartermaster battalion at the National Simulation Center, ■ Army and Marine Corps aviation unit integration, ■ training joint fires observers, and ■ training on the "Danger Close" simulation to practice reacting to real-world situations.

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The Risk of Rollovers in MRAP Vehicles

It has long been recognized that the topography, road conditions and operational environments in Afghanistan create the potential for vehicle rollovers under both combat and non-combat situations. Due to their weight and relatively high center of gravity, the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) variants are especially susceptible to rollover events in the rural Afghanistan environment. Many of the injuries and deaths of Marines and other service members resulting from these rollovers could have been prevented or reduced in severity if common-sense safety practices had been followed. Vehicle rollovers can be especially serious when a body of water is involved; a significant portion of the non-combat related rollover fatalities have resulted from drowning. In an effort to reinforce the need to observe safety precautions when driving MRAP vehicles in theater, Marine Corps Systems Command has issued a [Safety of Use Alert \(SOUA\)](#) concerning the elevated risk of rollovers in the MRAP family of vehicles. The majority of these rollover events have involved the ground giving away on unstable roads and bridges. The SOUA includes a list of planning factors that supervisors and operators should consider when scheduling MRAP movements. Readers may also be interested in a recent publication from the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) that provides summary information on [Tactical Vehicle-Associated Drowning Casualties \(Army only\)](#) in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations during the past nine months. Although the majority of U.S. Army drownings involved HMMWVs, eight of the deaths occurred in MRAPs, with most involving rollover "falls."



A Marine from 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) exits the MRAP Egress Trainer, a rollover simulator at the Battle Simulation Center aboard Camp Wilson,

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Lessons Learned from In-Theater Fire Incidents

The fire that occurred at the Supply Management Unit (SMU) aboard Camp Leatherneck in May 2010 is only one of several fire incidents that have taken place during the past two years in Afghanistan, resulting in significant property damage, as well as the loss of several Marines. Although no loss of life occurred during the fire at the Camp Leatherneck SMU, several vehicles were destroyed, including two P-19 fire trucks, along with a considerable amount of Marine Corps property. In an effort to disseminate critical lessons from these Afghanistan fires (as well as a previous incident that occurred in Kuwait following Desert Storm), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division has prepared a [Mishap Lessons Learned Report: USMC Class A/B In-Theater Fire Analysis](#). This report identifies some of the similarities among these incidents and provides recommended fire prevention measures to help ensure that these types of incidents are not repeated.

Among the recommendations included the report are: ■ headquarters elements should



Marines from Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (MWSS-274) work to contain the May 2010 fire at the Supply Management Unit (SMU) aboard Camp Leatherneck before it spreads to nearby facilities.

From the *In-Theater Fire Analysis*:

“Fire incidents are preventable mishaps that can lead to death, injury, and loss of material. It takes engaged leadership at all levels to ensure our Marines and Sailors are in compliance with local regulations at camps and forward operating bases. Marines and Sailors must also take the initiative to identify fire hazards and report them quickly through appropriate fire and/or safety representatives. We must combat these threats to keep our Marines focused on fighting the enemy and winning battles in theater.”

deploy with skilled safety managers to enforce safety regulations and identify emerging hazards; ■ commanders should develop fire prevention policies that ensure strict enforcement of standards; ■ burn barrels should be strictly controlled; ■ smoking areas should be policed properly and kept away from life support areas and working locations; ■ burn pits and storage lots should be properly planned and constructed; ■ adequate spacing and access needs to be provided for fire-fighting vehicles and personnel into storage lots; ■ contracted water trucks should be integrated into fire mishap response plans; and ■ in the absence of dedicated fire-fighting assets at remote locations, fire bucket teams need to be planned for extinguishing fires. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Safety Grams from the CMC Safety Division



Base emergency personnel and Marines from the Provost Marshall's Office examine a pilot during a Night Mishap exercise at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division publishes a monthly [Safety Gram](#) as a means of disseminating safety tips, information on available safety resources and summaries of the latest mishaps and trends. The [July 2011 Edition](#) includes: ■ a list of all serious Marine accidents in July, ■ lessons that can be learned from recent private motor vehicle (PMV) accidents, ■ available issue papers that have been prepared based on Marine Ground Climate Assessment Surveys (GCASSs) and Naval Aviation Climate Assessment Surveys (ACASSs), ■ the requirement for battalion and squadron-level commands to establish Force Preservation Councils (FPCs), ■ aviation safety grams that were issued in July, and ■ recent Safety Investigation Board (SIB) messages.

In summarizing lessons learned from recent Marine PMV mishaps, the Safety Gram points out that “Since driver improvement (DIC) was removed from the boot camp training curriculum several years ago, there are small pockets across the Marine Corps that have not completed this required training. Lessons from recent 8-day reports and survey statistics show that some units are improving their traffic safety posture by doing a complete by-name unit scrub to ensure training compliance and by using the supplementary PMV, drinking and driving, and recreational/off-duty safety climate surveys.” The Safety Gram recommends that units “take aggressive action against Marines not completing the DIC; consider no base driving privileges until course completion; hold Marines involved in underage drinking and contributing to other reckless driving behaviors accountable; and consider developing safe driving awareness campaign plans for known high-risk roads in your local area. . .” Readers are encouraged to review all of the [2011 Monthly Safety Grams](#).

Force Preservation Councils:

“ . . . Leaders should execute FPCs with the goal of helping Marines and Sailors. The key is getting leaders engaged and mentoring those in their charge. Human factors issues or other problems that can be handled at lower levels should not be elevated up the chain-of-command merely to support a process. Leaders at all levels must be able to recognize and convey cases in which they are not trained or experienced enough to provide appropriate assistance. An effective FPC is intended to facilitate and force meaningful interaction between junior and senior Marines across the entire spectrum of leadership by focusing on communication, individual development, early identification, and resolution development. . .”

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MCCLL Collection Campaign Plan for FY 2012

Per [MARADMIN 486/11](#), the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Collection Campaign Plan for FY 2012, identifies the major collections to be undertaken during the fiscal year. The plan was developed in conjunction with MCCLL program analysts embedded in the operating forces, Headquarters Marine Corps, and supporting establishment following the completion of a data call for lessons learned collection topics. The topics selected were considered to have significant value to provide actionable information and, as applicable, to influence change in operational tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and/or be informative to advocates and DOTMLPF stakeholders for resource application deliberations and decisions. The [FY 2012 Lessons Learned Collection Campaign Plan](#) focuses on collection efforts that will help capture the many lessons being learned by commands and units during their Afghanistan deployments, as well as the results of major exercises designed to improve the amphibious skills of Marines and the planning efforts of their leaders.



as well as the results of major exercises designed to improve the amphibious skills of Marines and the planning efforts of their leaders.



Marines and Sailors from India Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), display their renewable energy/solar power equipment at Patrol Base Gumbatty in the Sangin District of northern Helmand Province. They have evaluated this equipment since pre-deployment training.

Among the collections planned for FY 2012 are:

- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).** Collections are being scheduled on the following topics: ■ the combat operations of two recently deployed infantry battalions (1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6), and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (2/3)), ■ the experiences of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162 (VMM-162) employing the MV-22B Osprey in OEF, ■ the experiences of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) employing the KC130 Harvest Hawk, ■ biometrics operations and capabilities in OEF, ■ the deployment of renewable energy equipment in OEF, ■ an OEF equipment reset and reconstitution (R2) proof of principle for the retrograde of equipment to CONUS, and ■ lessons learned by a recently deployed combat logistics battalion (CLB), civil affairs battalion, and combat engineer battalion.

- Amphibious Operations.** Collections are scheduled for two FY 2012 amphibious exercises: Bold Alligator and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC);

- Other Topics.** Collections are also planned on a diverse set of Marine Corps topics, including: ■ the cultural skills and knowledge required for anticipated future Marine Corps missions and assignments, ■ the emerging Joint Terminal Attack Controllers/Joint Fires Observers (JTAC/JFO) programs, ■ the integration of Navy and Marine Corps logistics, ■ air operations in support of logistics, and ■ Special Purpose MAGTF rotations in support of African interagency engagements.



During Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2011, Marines from 3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) and Australian soldiers from 2d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, walk past the amphibious assault vehicles used to carry out a mechanized live fire raid at Range Training Facility, Kaneohe Bay.

There will undoubtedly be changes in the planned collections as events unfold during the course of the fiscal year. An example from last year was the scheduling of major collections on Operation Tomodachi and Operation Pacific Passage once it became evident that Marine Corps forces would be major participants in the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts following the devastating earthquake and tsunami in northern Japan.

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The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

In addition to the recent MCCLL roll-ups of new documents entered into our databases, the MCCLL report on infantry battalion operations in Afghanistan (based on the experiences of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6)) continues to be one of the most frequently downloaded of any recent MCCLL product. Two other MCCLL reports on Afghanistan topics were also regularly downloaded, as was a report on the recent employment of the Crisis Augmentation Cell during a 2011 exercise.

In comparison, the second table highlights documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during August. The MCCLL report on 1/6 operations is also on this list, as is the MCCLL report on female engagement teams, a recent Marine Corps Gazette article on re-learning the same lessons over and over, after action reports from Combat Logistics Battalion 7 and 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, a victim-operated IED recognition guide, a newsletter on irregular warfare, and a smart card with tips for military service members during Ramadan.

These documents were accessed most frequently by officers in grades from O-2 to O-5, NCOs in grades from E-5 to E-8, DoD civilians in grades G-11 and GS-14, and DoD contractors.

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- Top Ten MCCLL Products, August 2011**
1. thru 5. [MCCLL New Data Rollups for August 2011](#)
 6. [Infantry Battalion Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines \(2/6\)](#)
 7. [Female Engagement Teams in OEF](#)
 8. [Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company \(ANGLICO\) Operations in OEF](#)
 9. [Coalition Interoperability: Georgia Deployment Program \(32d Georgia Infantry Battalion\)](#)
 10. [Crisis Augmentation Cell: Lessons from Exercise Integrated Advance 2011](#)

- Top Ten Downloads, August 2011**
1. [Infantry Battalion Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines \(2/6\) \(MCCLL\)](#)
 2. [Fighting: Are We Re-learning the Same Lessons \(Marine Corps Gazette\)](#)
 3. [First 100 Days After Action Report, Combat Logistics Battalion 7](#)
 4. [After Action Report, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion](#)
 5. [Reshaping America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness \(Force Structure Review Group\)](#)
 6. [Victim-Operated IED Recognition Guide \(Joint IED Defeat Organization\)](#)
 7. [Narco-Armor in Mexico \(Small Wars Journal\)](#)
 8. [Female Engagement Teams in OEF \(MCCLL\)](#)
 9. [Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective \(Center for Army Lessons Learned\)](#)
 10. [Ramadan Smart Card \(International Security Assistance Force\)](#)

Providing Insights into Middle East Politics and Culture



President Hamid Karzai meets with Afghan citizens at the Nawa District Center in Helmand Province during a visit with the Nawa District Council and U.S. Marines deployed in the area.

Publications prepared by the [Middle East Studies \(MES\) Department, Marine Corps University \(MCU\)](#), provide valuable insights into current and (potential) future developments in this critical part of the world, which will likely continue to have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy, as well as U.S. military strategy, for years to come. Two of the more recent products from MES are:

⇒ The latest issue of the bi-monthly publication, [MSE Insights](#), addresses issues associated with the Afghanistan political system. These include efforts by President Hamid Karzai to have the Afghan Independent Election Commission finalize the controversial results of last year's parliamentary elections and the decision by President Karzai to not seek a third term as president when his current five-year term ends in 2014. [Insights](#) points out that "since the October 2004 presidential election, Afghanistan's democratic experiment has declined in transparency and fairness, and the enthusiasm of the Afghans for a better future through the electoral process has diminished. The recurring causes of concern from past Afghan elections include the lack of adequate preparations before elections, the failure to address irregularities in a timely and transparent manner, and the selection of expedient, short-term solutions. . ."

⇒ An MES monograph on the topic of [Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran \(IRI\): Operational and Policy Implications](#) is the first in a series of scheduled monographs designed to disseminate original research papers on subjects pertaining to the greater Middle

East, including countries of the Arab world, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The first issue highlights key features of the IRI strategic culture and their implications for planning, strategy and policy.

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From the Strategic Culture of Iran:

" . . . The foreign policy of the "strategically lonely" Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is a byproduct of competition between Islamic universalism and Iranian nationalism. Iran, while feeling threatened by a number of states, including the United States, has ambitions beyond the size of its conventional forces. To address both its perceived threats and satisfy its grand strategic ambitions, Iran relies on armed surrogates, large volunteer forces, a "guerilla navy", strategic rockets and missiles, and soft power. . ."

News

Pre-Deployment Training Program Toolkit

In order to assist the operating forces in planning their pre-deployment training program (PTP), Training and Education Command (TECOM) has established an online [PTP Program Toolkit](#) that provides links to resources identifying specific requirements for the program. This CAC-enabled website includes the latest resources on such topics as: ■ individual skill requirements, ■ collective capabilities, ■ code of conduct, ■ law of war, ■ culture and language training, ■ key leader engagements, ■ combat policing, ■ isolated personnel, ■ vehicle egress training (HMMWV and MRAP), ■ counter-

IED training, and ■ command and control standardization. For each of these topics, the website provides links to the Marines Corps Order or other directive that establishes the requirement. In many cases, guides and briefings are also provided that can be used to assist in developing training classes on the topic. One example is a training aid from the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) on [Communicating Non-Verbally](#) that is designed to assist Marines in conversing with the local populace through gestures, body language, facial expressions and eye contact.

The website also highlights some recent documents that may be of particular interest to deploying forces. Documents that are currently highlighted include: ■ a standard operating procedure (SOP) and other documentation from U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) on employing Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, ■ a [pre-deployment briefing from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines \(1/6\)](#), and ■ a series of [escalation of force \(EOF\) vignettes](#) for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units.

Leading the Nation's Crisis Response Force

The [September 2011 Issue of Seapower Magazine](#) includes an extensive interview with General James F. Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, in which he addresses how the service can meet the demands of today and prepare the expeditionary force of the future under extreme fiscal constraints.

Leading the Nation's Crisis Response Force:

How would you make the case that the Marine Corps is vital to national defense?

General Amos: "In a nutshell, we are America's crisis response force. The

U.S. needs a force that can get out the door very quickly, a force that's in a high state of readiness - all the time - and a force that is willing to adapt to really any kind of environment, that is willing to live in harsh environments, that brings skill sets that range from full major combat operations to taking care of folks.

I'm not saying that a force in the Army can't respond to something, I'm not saying a force in the Navy or the Air Force [cannot], but we bring the whole package. We don't just bring airplanes, we don't just bring ground forces, we bring everything.

We bring an air-ground logistics capabil-

ity that is structured and scaled and sized for each individual crisis. We respond to today's crisis, with today's force, today.

When a crisis hits around the world - it can be a humanitarian crisis, it can be a crisis off the coast of Libya, it can be something someplace else— America needs a force that it can send rapidly. Ideally, it would come from some type of forward-deployed naval vessels; you could put it on air-planes, but it is ready to go. That is the Marines Corps' lane. . . It means that we come with this expeditionary "adapt" and "overcome" mindset. We're ready to go. . ."

The V-22 Osprey: Safer than Helicopters?

[The V-22 Is Safer Than Helos, Effective, Says Man Who Wrote The Book](#), By Richard Whittle, Aol Defense

" . . . Once upon a time, the evil ogres of the military-industrial complex spawned a mutant flying machine, a freakish helicopter-airplane hybrid so dangerous and costly it deserved to die. Yet tribes of pork-addicted toadies and blind intellectual dwarfs shielded the beast from knights in shining armor who sallied forth tirelessly -- heavily armed with GAO reports -- to slay it. That's the fairy tale the V-22 Osprey's

bitterest critics like to believe, but the facts about the tiltrotor transport, which the Marines fought a quarter of a century to get into service, tell a far happier story. This ugly duckling is turning out to be a swan.

The Marines and the Air Force Special Operations Command have been flying Ospreys in combat zones nearly four years now and they love them, for while the V-22 isn't a very pretty bird to look at, it has a graceful and extraordinary way of flying. It tilts two big rotors on its wingtips upward to take off and land like a helicopter but swivels them forward to fly like

an airplane. That lets it cruise at nearly 290 miles an hour -- more than twice as fast as military helicopters, whose top speeds are limited by the aerodynamics of rotors to about 140 to 175 mph. By the time the Marines first put the Osprey into service in Iraq in 2007, though, it had cost more time, money and lives than any other piece of equipment the Corps has ever bought. . . The Osprey was a very ugly duckling. Since then, the saga has taken a very different turn. . ."

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Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The July 2011 revision to the [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#) was produced by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the reading list remains relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives, as well as help ensure that Marines benefit from the experiences of others. The new list continues to highlight *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret) as the Commandant's "choice book" to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence) are highlighted on the [Marine Corps University \(MCU\) website](#), along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) a book that has been added to the new 2011 list, *McCoy's Marines* by John Koopman (on the list for Staff Sergeants), (2) a classic that has been retained from the 2009 list, the Pulitzer Prize winning, *The Guns of August*, by Barbara W. Tuchman (on the list for Majors and Chief Warrant Officers 5), and (3) a recent book that should be of particular interest to the Marine Corps combat camera community, *War Shots* by Charles Jones.

***McCoy's Marines: Darkside to Baghdad*, by John Koopman (Zenith Press, 2004)**

Review by Don De Nevi, *Air Force Times*:

*"In ***McCoy's Marines: Darkside to Baghdad***, readers are thrust into the thick of Operation Iraqi Freedom alongside units of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, of the 1st Marine Division as the battalion fights its way from Kuwait across the Rumaylah oil fields and Basra down Highway 1 through Diwaniyah into Baghdad.*

The first troops to enter Firdos Square and pull up in front of the towering statue of Saddam Hussein, the Marines hesitate to join thousands of jubilant Iraqis ready to topple the statue. Lt. Col. Bryan McCoy, radio in one ear patiently debating higher-ups on whether his Marines should become involved, and insistent locals screaming in the other, shouts to a captain, "Aw, the hell with it. Just tear the damn thing down."

Such is our introduction to a blue-eyed, 6-foot-2-inch battalion commander from Oklahoma whose call sign is 'Darkside.' Forty years old and sporting a Marine Corps high-and-tight haircut, McCoy confides to John Koopman, "Being a Marine is not something I do. It's who I am. When necessary, I kill and order others to kill. I see it as a necessary evil because in this world there are sheep and wolves. We are the sheepdogs. Someone has to know how to fight. If it weren't for us sheepdogs, where would the sheep be?"

Koopman, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle (and a former Marine) who was embedded with McCoy's battalion, witnessed plenty of action, including coming under fire with McCoy. And Koopman agrees with McCoy's analogy.

The pair's odyssey through the hell of combat, replete with personal battle accounts, interviews and anecdotes, as well as a look at McCoy's philosophy of "hands-on" motivational leadership are at the core of this gripping 300-page front-line report detailing the vast campaign with the courage of ordinary Marines.

*Koopman's assignment started in late 2002 when the Chronicle sent him to cover the impending war in Iraq. Allowed to select a unit with which to embed, Koopman chose 3/4 . . ." **Read the complete review from the [Air Force Times](#).***

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***The Guns of August*, by Barbara W. Tuchman (Random House, 1962)**

Review from *ResoluteReader*:

"The outbreak of war in 1914 was greeted in many countries by rejoicing. Indeed, many of the most ardent and eloquent opponents of the expected conflict rolled over and supported their governments.

Barbara Tuchman's history of the first month of the First World War is an excellent military history, dealing with a forgotten part of the conflict - the war of maneuver that all the European powers engaged in, before becoming bogged down in the trench warfare that we all think of when hearing about the conflict.

Up until 1914, all wars had been on a relatively small scale, and very few (with the interesting exception of Lord Kitchener) believed that the coming war would be anything but a short war of conquest. Certainly no-one expected the slaughter that would take place.

The scale of the outbreak of hostilities however, shocked everyone. The first German attacks on the French forts on the second day of the conflict cost the lives of thousands of men. Tuchman describes how the "dead piled up in ridges a yard high" and points out the attitude of the German commanders in this battle "spending lives like bullets in the knowledge of plentiful reserves to make up the losses" set the scene for the later battles at the Somme and Verdun, where both sides wasted the lives of millions.

But not all of this history is as unsurprising as the horrific casualty figures. We learn that the British Army in France, who famously fought a brave battle at Mons in the first days of the war, under the cowardly leadership of Sir John French retreated in the face of the enemy, only returning to join the French in the battle to defend Paris. This is the second shock – how close the German's came to capturing Paris, and ironically Tuchman points out that it's precisely this failure on the part of the German military that sets the scene for the long, drawn out war of iteration.

*As I finished the book, I was reminded of Rosa Luxembourg's wonderful opening chapter of her anti-war pamphlet, written in 1915. She describes how the scenes of joyous crowds waving the armies off, had been replaced by a sullen acceptance of the horrific realities of war. . . ." **Read more of the review from [Resolute Reader](#).***

Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

War Shots: Norm Hatch and the Marine Corps Combat Cameramen of World War II, by Charles Jones (Stackpole Books, 2011):

Review by LtCol Eugene P. Wittkoff, *Marine Corps Gazette Online*

"On a hot June day at Arlington National Cemetery, retired Marine Maj Norman Hatch attended the funeral of a fellow Marine combat photographer, Col Wally Nelson. (Nelson, my grandfather, is mentioned in pages 53–55 of the subject book of this review.) As the Marines fired the last of the three-volley honor salute, lightning struck the hill behind the columbarium, and a large thunderclap rattled across the funeral party, both of which were captured by Quantico combat cameramen recording the service. Norm later told me that he'd muttered to himself at that moment, "I guess the rifles just weren't loud enough for Wally." Norm Hatch's wry humor is also evident throughout Charlie Jones' most gratifying book about a great Marine.

I've known Norm for some years through my grandfather, and this book is a superb recapitulation of the wide range of contributions Norm made to our Corps over the years. I learned more about Norm in 1999 while writing a Gazette review of the book, [Shooting the Pacific War: Marine Combat Photography in World War II](#) (The University of Kentucky Press, 1999), written by one of his fellow Marines, Thayer Soule. At retired Maj Rick Spooner's venerable Globe and Laurel restaurant, I commented to Rick, a veteran of the battles of Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa, that I was reviewing the first definitive book about Norm Hatch. Rick enthusiastically stated that it was nice to see this great Marine's contributions documented in one place for all to see at Norm's young age of 90.

Jones' writing style is exceptionally clear, informative, and well researched as he weaves Norm's key contributions into the major turning points in our Corps' history, such as the Pacific landings in Tarawa and Iwo Jima. Most Marines learn quickly that chance is a significant factor in their careers' development, and this applied to Norm's career as well. Beginning at the start of Norm's service in 1939, the book relays a theme of officers asking him, "Norm, what the hell are you doing here?" Norm always happened to be in the right place at the right time to witness key events in our Corps. Adding to chance was Norm's aggressive drive to make a positive difference and contribute to our Corps through improvisation. In particular, he broke new ground in combat photography and motion picture film. Until World War II the Marine Corps did not have a combat photographic services branch. Then the Commandant, Gen Thomas Holcomb, directed BGen Robert L. Denig and Capt Wally Nelson to organize combat photo. Norm Hatch and his Marines went to Hollywood and picked up the latest training from the entertainment business along with camera equipment from second-hand stores in Los Angeles and New York. While with 2d MarDiv, his team created a spellbinding motion picture film that President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally approved for release despite graphic footage of combat between Marines and the Japanese in Tarawa. Much of Norm's footage was used in [With the Marines in Tarawa](#) in 1943 (film available online at www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/video/marines-tarawa-full-movie). The film's Academy Award statuette resides at the Tarawa exhibit at the National Marine Corps Museum. Somehow throughout that desperate fight, Norm and his Marines kept their 35mm Eyemo cameras going. Charles Jones relays that "throughout the furious action, he worried more about his cameras than about himself. The intense heat, dampness, and sand were taking a toll." On Iwo Jima, Norm sent his best camera crew up the hill to document the flag raising and worked with Associated Press (AP) photographer Joe Rosenthal. Norm Hatch was rushed back from Iwo to the Navy Annex in Arlington to help the commandant, Gen Alexander Vandegrift, negotiate no-cost rights to the Iwo Jima AP photo.

After the war as President Truman and the Army questioned the future of the Marine Corps, then-LtCol Victor H. Krulak was a member of the Chowder Society, a group of officers designated to argue for the continued existence of the Corps. One day, LtCol Krulak came to Norm asking for footage to showcase the value of the Corps to Congress. Interestingly, Krulak's book, [First to Fight](#) (Blue-jacket Books, 1999), does not mention the monumental contribution that Hatch's 1947 film, [Bombs Over Tokyo](#), made to ward saving the Corps. This persuasive movie was quickly cobbled together to show how the island-hopping campaign made possible the defeat of Japan in World War II.

***War Shots** is a rewarding read for Marines of all ranks. Norm always took care of his Marines. Norm's credo of how to run his life is wise counsel to all Marines, "It was looking for the next thing, never standing still and waiting for something to come to you. You had to go out and look for it." His relationship with Washington's press corps continued for 70 years, and to this day, Norm continues to campaign for this generation to realize the importance of what they are documenting, and he cautions our Corps to maintain good records of our photo and film footage of Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, because a new generation of Chowder Society members may need it again."*

Read more about this subject in the [Marine Corps Gazette Online](#).

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Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Contact information for LtCol Jack Estep, located with 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) (Fwd), is now available and is included below. Maj John Duselis is scheduled to deploy in October as the MCCLL program analyst at Task Force Leatherneck. His contact information will be provided once it becomes available. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact [Mr. Mark Silvia](#), the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.