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Camp Pendleton kicks off its 101 Critical Days of Summer Campaign with a safety briefing at the base theater. Read reports on "PMV Fatalities Among Military Service Members" and "Safety During AAV Operations."

JUNE 2011 NEWSLETTER

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

Inside this issue:

Featured Articles

Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Operations: This MCCLL report provides observations and recommendations from 2d ANGLICO, based on its support of joint, allied, and coalition forces in Afghanistan by providing terminal control of fires.

Four recent Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) After Action Reports (AARs) provide insights into infantry battalion, Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ), engineer support battalion, and Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) operations:

- ⇒ 3d Battalion, 5th Marines' OEF AAR,
- ⇒ VMAQ-2 OEF AAR,
- ⇒ 8th ESB OEF Battlebook, and
- ⇒ VMM-365 OEF AAR.

Motor Vehicle Fatalities Among Military Service Members: This report from the Defense Safety Oversight Council highlights the human factors associated with fatal automobile and motorcycle deaths of military personnel from FY 2006 to FY 2009.

Safe Practices During Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) Operations: The Naval Safety Center addresses the recent AAV incident that resulted in a Marine's death and notes many similarities to an AAV mishap that occurred seventeen years ago.

Reserve Component Sourcing for OEF Security Forces (SECFOR): This MCCLL report addresses the deployment of reserve infantry battalions to Afghanistan to perform a non-traditional mission.

Crisis Augmentation Cell (CAC) Proof of Concept: The employment of the CAC during Exercise Integrated Advance 2011 as a proof of concept provided MCCLL with the opportunity to interview participants and document their lessons learned.

Recent Products from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) address topics that are highly relevant for current Marine Corps operations:

- ⇒ Rules of Engagement (ROE) Vignettes for Afghanistan Deployments,
- ⇒ A Commander's Guide to Female Engagement Teams (FETs), and
- ⇒ Challenges for the Geographic Combatant Commands.

The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website: Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find most interesting.

Lessons from Exercise Golden Guardian 2011: The annual Golden Guardian Exercise tests the responses of various installations throughout California to catastrophic events, in this case a major flood.

News

Three items are highlighted this month: (1) the 2010 Afghanistan Report from the Civil Military Fusion Center (2) a report on Nutrition and Traumatic Brain Injuries, and (3) a guide for Heat Acclimatization.

Reading Lists and Book Review: Three books are featured: (1) *Tried by War* from the Commandant's List, (2) a new book , *Unbroken*, with a World War II survival story, and (3) a book on counterinsurgency in Iraq, *Innovation, Transformation and War*.

Roster of MCCLL Liaison Officers: This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor

Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company Operations

The primary mission of Marine Corps' air/naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICOs) in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has remained constant during the past ten years, with the companies responsible for providing terminal control of fires in support of joint, allied, and coalition forces. However, many operational and technical factors have changed significantly, with split-team operations becoming much more common, communications systems evolving, dismounted patrols becoming standard, new partner nations joining the Afghanistan coalition, and new fire support targeting systems and unmanned aerial systems (UASs) becoming available.

In an effort to address the impact of these changes on ANGLICO operations and to identify lessons learned and best practices during the most recent ANGLICO deployment, a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed key personnel from 2d ANGLICO in January and February 2011 at about the mid-point of the company's deployment. 2d ANGLICO was responsible for providing direct support to I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) (Forward) and to the joint and coalition partners of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW) in support of their COIN operations. In addition, 2d ANGLICO, on order, provided general support to RC (SW). The MCCLL interviews of 2d ANGLICO personnel focused on these operations, as well as the company's organization, its diverse command relationships, inter-service and coalition liaison and partnering, and its training, equipping, and manning. The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, **Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company Operations: Lessons, Observations and Recommendations from 2d ANGLICO in OEF**. A classified version of this report is also available and can be downloaded from the MCCLL SIPR website at: **http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil**.

In December 2010, LtCol Leland Suttee, 2d ANGLICO Commanding Officer, and SgtMaj Larry Watson participated in the assumption of command ceremony at Camp Leatherneck, as 2d ANGLICO assumed command from 5th ANGLICO in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations.

A complete set of FOUO and classified comments and observations are contained in the two versions of this MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

LtCol Leland Suttee, 2d ANGLICO Commanding Officer:

"Inter-service and partnering operations are the reason ANGLICO exists. . ."

- **Pre-deployment Coordination and Training:** The company was able to leverage the OEF experiences of its predecessor (5th ANGLICO) effectively by maintaining communications with the company before deployment. Thus, the number of personnel required to participate in the pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) and the subsequent advanced echelon (ADVON) deployment could be reduced.

⇒ Training for OEF deployments must prepare the ANGLICO Marines physically for the rigors they will face; for example, ANGLICO Marines must often carry considerably more equipment than personnel from the supported units.

⇒ The company considered that the pre-deployment training conducted with other nations, including the British and Georgians, to be invaluable. However, ANGLICO Marines working with other nations should receive rules of engagement (ROE) classes that are specific to the nation supported so that the ROE interpretations of these nations can be thoroughly understood.

- **Operations:** Throughout its deployment, the company emphasized the doctrinal employment of supporting arms liaison teams (SALT) and firepower control teams (FCT). The company further task organized into smaller elements in order to maximize its command and control capabilities and better support the battlespace owners and their coalition partners.

⇒ The 2d ANGLICO platoon commander and SALT OICs were able to tie-in with the battlespace owners during planning to ensure effective support.

⇒ Opportunities should be found, whenever feasible to work with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As security responsibility in Afghanistan transitions to the ANSF, it is anticipated that ANGLICO support will be increasingly important for effective ANSF operations.

Marines from 2d ANGLICO and British soldiers from the 7th Parachute Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, call in indirect fire in Otterburn, UK, during Exercises Mountain Dragon and Pashtun Sabre. Training with the British was especially beneficial, since 2d ANGLICO supported the unit during its deployment.

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OEF After Action Report from 3d Battalion, 5th Marines

An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier provides security during a foot patrol by 3/5 Marines to the Allikozai village in the Sangin District to meet with village elders and deliver funds to help repair a mosque damaged by the Taliban.

Beginning in October 2010, Marines from 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) were involved in some of the deadliest fighting encountered so far in Afghanistan, with the extent of the casualties sustained by the battalion widely reported in the news media. The battalion's assigned area of operations (AO) in the Sangin District of northeastern Helmand Province has been violent for many years due to its strategic location in the upper Helmand River Valley as a transiting point for narcotics, weapons and insurgent fighters. The British had been responsible for this AO until August 2010, when the district was turned over to the Marine Corps. When 3/5 assumed responsibility, the battalion was immediately involved in highly kinetic clearing and security operations that resulted in significant casualties, especially during October and November. However, by January 2011, declining enemy activity and an increasing security bubble allowed the battalion to transition its focus from "clearing" to "holding," as well as on expanded efforts to increase the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP). In addition, the establishment of local defense initiatives in the district increased the availability of security personnel and extended the credibility and effectiveness of the Sangin government.

Based on 3/5's experiences during this deployment, the battalion has produced a detailed and comprehensive ***Sangin District, October 2010 to April 2011, Operation Enduring Freedom 10.2 After Action Report*** that is available on the MCCLL SIPR website (**http://www.mccll.smil.mil**) and should be of great interest to follow-on forces who deploy into the most kinetic regions of Helmand Province. The AAR includes observations from each of the battalion's staff sections and companies, with well-thought out and actionable recommendations.

From the *3/5 OEF 10.2 AAR*:

"Ninety-five percent of our patrols have been partnered with either the ANA or ANCOP. . . We have seen big improvements in the ANA, and they have started to take the lead in some patrols. . . [However], do not expect the ANA to perform like the role players you will see at Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The ANA in Sangin are much more tactically proficient, [but] the ANA lieutenants will not take the initiative unless they get permission from the company commander . . ."

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OEF After Action Report from Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Two

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Two (VMAQ-2) deployed to Bagram Air Field in April 2010 with the assigned mission of conducting seven months of airborne electronic warfare (EW) operations, day and night and under all weather conditions, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.1. In addition to its presence at Bagram, the squadron had liaison officers at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Based on this deployment, the squadron has prepared its **OEF 10.1 After Action Report** with many practical lessons learned and best practices for consideration by Prowler and other aviation communities. In addition to its airborne electronic warfare (EW) mission, the squadron was involved in defending Bagram during an attack by insurgent fighters on the airfield in May 2010 that included the employment of rockets, hand grenades and small arms against the airfield. During the attack, sixteen insurgents were killed. This incident reinforces the fact (highlighted in the AAR) that regardless of military occupational specialty, Marines are "riflemen first and foremost."

A Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler, based out of Bagram Airfield, conducts operations over eastern Afghanistan.

From *the VMAQ-2 OEF 10.1 AAR*:

"[This was] a challenging deployment with respect to service relationships, flight hour limitations and maintenance limitations. Remaining informally attached to the U.S. Air Force 455th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) and the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82) aboard Bagram was critical to mission accomplishment. This required the VMAQ squadron leadership to attend USAF and USA meetings and continually crosstalk with other commands . . ."

The VMAQ-2 AAR includes numerous lessons based on its requirement to operate initially on Bagram's U.S. Army network and subsequently on the U.S. Air Force network. Other topics addressed include: aircrew flight time restrictions, required ground training while deployed, acquisition of supplies aboard Bagram, EA-6B operations during the summer months, safety and standardization issues, supply and maintenance issues, aircraft refueling procedures, and safe weapons handling practices.

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8th Engineer Support Battalion OEF Battle Book

Marines from 8th ESB lay the final sections of a bridge constructed over an existing, deteriorating Afghan bridge near the village of Durzay in the Garmsir District of Helmand Province.

The April 2011 edition of the MCCLL monthly newsletter highlighted a **First 100 Days After Action Report (AAR) from 8th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB)** that documented the initial lessons learned by the battalion in the course of providing general engineering support to Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) units. The 8th ESB focus was on improving the tactical mobility and operational sustainment of supported units, in particular, through the repair and enhancement of existing road networks in Helmand Province. Road improvements contributed not only to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission of coalition forces, but also the mobility requirements of the local populace.

Following the completion of its deployment in May 2011, the battalion prepared an **ESB OEF 2011 "Battle Book,"** which, in contrast to the content of some unit "battle books," provides detailed storyboards for **49 different projects** that the battalion supported during its seven-month deployment, beginning in November 2010. These projects were key elements of the mobility, survivability, general engineering, bulk fuel storage, water purification, bridging, and tactical distribution support provided by the battalion in support of RC (SW) COIN operations. For each project, the storyboard identifies: ■ the project requirements in the form of a short summary of the statement of work, ■ the RC (SW) unit being supported, ■ the executing subordinate unit of 8th ESB, ■ the man-hours and equipment hours expended, ■ the specific equipment employed, ■ the execution dates, and ■ a short description of some of the key considerations involved in project performance. Photographs are also provided in the battle book for each project. This information, collectively and individually, should be of great benefit to follow-on engineer units that will be performing many similar missions in the RC (SW) area of operations.

The battle book concludes with a synopsis of metrics that 8th ESB collected for its entire deployment. These show, for example, that the battalion improved about 46 kilometers of roads, conducted over 750 combat logistics patrols, purified over 5.6 million gallons of water, and issued over 2.58 million gallons of bulk fuel.

From the storyboard for *"Road Improvements in the Sangin District"* (improvements to over six kilometers of road surfaces):

"Approximately 43,000 gallons of water were used for every kilometer of road construction for a total of 260,000 gallons. Most of the water was pulled from the Helmand River. . ."

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After Action Report from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365

During the period from early July 2010 to early January 2011, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 (VMM-365) performed a variety of missions across the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO), as well as the AOs of RC (South), RC (West), and RC (Capital). Among the operations supported by the squadron's MV-22B Ospreys were assault support missions, aerial refueling, command and control and VIP lifts. During its seven-month deployment, the squadron's Ospreys accumulated over 2200 hours of flight time, lifted over 1.134 million pounds of cargo, and transported over 22,800 passengers. Based on the squadron's experiences during this deployment, VMM-365 has prepared an **Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.2 After Action Report (AAR)** as an aid to follow-on MV-22B squadrons and to Marine Corps planners at all levels. Among the topics addressed in the AAR are: ■ single ship and split ship operations, ■ training sorties, ■ medium altitude approaches, ■ negligent flare dispensing, ■ squadron helicopter landing zone management, ■ availability of forklifts at forward operating bases (FOBs), ■ availability of building materials, ■ availability of non-tactical vehicles, ■ POL refueling points, ■ intra-squadron communications, ■ situational awareness and aircraft avoidance, ■ mishap investigations, ■ hazardous materials, ■ ground support equipment, and ■ hung landing gear recovery of aircraft.

A crew chief from VMM-365 provides instruction to a British soldier from the United Kingdom's 664 Squadron before a flight from Camp Bastion aboard an MV-22B Osprey to familiarize the British soldiers with the aircraft's capabilities.

From *the VMM-365 OEF 10.2 AAR*:

"The continuation of training for aircrew during combat operations is necessary to allow the squadron to excel upon return to CONUS. Squadrons routinely lose many of their experienced aircrew after returning from deployment. . . When the threat allows, and when operationally feasible, allow squadrons to train to maintain proficiency and increase qualifications or certifications . . ."

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Motor Vehicle Fatalities Among Military Service Members

A motorcycle safety instructor aboard the Combat Center at 29 Palms provides instruction to a class during the Basic Rider's Course.

As we enter the ***101 Critical Days of Summer Campaign for 2011***, the Marine Corps is already experiencing an unacceptable number of non-combat related casualties due to individual carelessness and disregard for the safety lectures that have all too often become merely rote exercises. In particular, automobile and motorcycle deaths (many involving alcohol), drownings, and suicides are depriving the Marine Corps of some of its most promising and talented Marines. The summer months are certain to involve additional deaths of many junior (and not so junior) Marines due to vehicle accidents, suicides and other incidents.

A recent report from the Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) addresses **Human Factors Associated with Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) Fatalities Among Military Service Members**, based on a review of fatal automobile and motorcycle deaths involving Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Coast Guard personnel from FY 2006 through FY 2009. Although there was a 36% reduction in PMV fatalities from FY 2002 to FY 2010, the goal established by the Secretary of Defense was for a ***75% reduction*** from the 2002 rates. PMV fatalities still constitute the number one cause of non-combat deaths, with 17% of the fatalities surveyed in the report involving Marines. Among the statistics included in the report were: ■ 75% of all automobile fatal mishaps occurred within 120 miles of the base; 75% of motorcycle mishaps occurred within 30 miles of the base; ■ 39% of motorcycle fatalities involved a "super-sport" category of motorcycle; ■ the most common age for an automobile fatal mishap was 20 and for a motorcycle mishap was 22; ■ the vast majority of fatalities were male (94%); ■ motorcycle helmet use has increased over the years from less than 75% in 2006 to over 90% in 2009; ■ 91% of fatalities involved speed (not necessarily excessive speed), 28% involved fatigue, 27% involved alcohol, 24% involved limited experience (including 54% of motorcycle fatalities), and 12% involved peer pressure.

Calendar year 2009 was a particularly deadly year for Marine Corps PMV fatalities with 49 reported, while 2010 saw a significant decrease with only 39 fatalities. So far in 2011, the Marine Corps is on track to match the 2009 death toll with 23 PMV fatalities reported as of 22 May 2011, including six motorcycle fatalities (there were only nine in all of 2010). The DSOC report not only provides numerous statistics concerning the human factors associated with military service member fatalities, but also provides a number of mitigation recommendations in terms of education, enforcement and engineering strategies. These should provide a wealth of data for safety officers and NCOs to use this year in their scheduled safety briefings.

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Safe Practices During Amphibious Assault Vehicle Operations

Marines from the United States, Thailand and the Republic of Korea assault the beachhead in Hat Yao, Thailand, during Exercise Cobra Gold 2011.

The death of a Marine in an amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) mishap during training in the Del Mar Boat Basin in Oceanside Harbor on 14 January 2011 has been a painful reminder of the need to incorporate safe practices during all Marine Corps activities, including training evolutions, exercises, combat deployments, and off-duty recreational activities. As the Marine Corps makes a concerted effort to return to its amphibious roots after ten years of ground combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to re-learn procedures that ensure safe AAV water operations becomes increasingly important, especially when the Marines Corps includes many Marines with limited experience operating in amphibious environments. Based on a review of this particular incident, the Naval Safety Center has prepared a **Lessons Learned Mishap Report** that identifies the key contributing factors to the mishap and provides recommendations for helping to ensure safe AAV operations. The report highlights the fact that there have been six incidents during the past three years in which AAVs have sunk. Although the last fatality from an AAV sinking occurred seventeen years ago in 1994, the recent incident bears a striking similarity to the previous fatality. The report identifies the specific causal factors of the two incidents and highlights the lessons from 1994 that should have been applied in 2011.

From the *AAV Mishap Lessons Learned Report*:

"The AAV community has been gradually returning to its amphibious roots after multiple protracted deployments in support of OIF/OEF land-based operations. Emphasis on identifying and mitigating risks associated with AAV water operations is more critical than ever, especially when the community has Marines who have limited experience operating in an amphibious environment."

Readers may also be interested in other recent mishap reports prepared by the Naval Safety Center that address such topics as a recent **Support Automated Supply System Management Unit (SMU) fire**, **recreational swimming fatalities**, and an **artillery live fire mishap**.

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Reserve Component Sourcing for OEF Security Forces

With the announcement of the surge of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan in December 2009, the Marine Corps' role began to evolve and to expand significantly. Marine Corps Reserve Component (RC) units have been no exception to this expansion, with reserve infantry battalions being called upon to perform non-traditional missions, including a special Security Forces (SECFOR) role in the Marine Corps area of operations (AO) in southwestern Afghanistan. During the most recent Marine Corps force iterations, this non-traditional SECFOR role has been sourced from units of the 4th Marine Division (MARDIV). The first reserve infantry battalion assigned this mission was 3d Battalion, 25th Marines (3/25), followed by 1st Battalion, 23d Marines (1/23). In addition to providing some relief for the active forces, the employment of these reserve infantry battalions also assists in maintaining the desired deployment-to-dwell ratios for active duty Marines. In satisfying their security role in central Helmand Province, the reserve battalions have been required to work closely with the forces of other coalition partners, in particular, those of the United Kingdom and Denmark. The AO of these reserve infantry battalions is primarily desert, with only a few small population centers and local bazaars and a few thousand inhabitants. This mission has also required close interaction and engagement with the local populace, with the skill sets available in the reserve component (including police officers, tradesmen, salesmen, marketers, and customer service representatives) lending themselves very well to the types of civil engagements required. Many of the reserve Marines in their civilian occupations work closely with neighbors in their local communities, exercising these skill sets on a daily basis.



A reserve Marine rifleman with Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines (1/23), participates in immersion training in a simulated Afghan village at Camp Pendleton in preparation for the battalion's upcoming OEF deployment.

In an effort to identify issues associated with tasking reserve infantry battalions with this security force mission, as well as determine best practices for their training and SECFOR operations, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews with the commanders and staffs of Marine Corps Forces Reserves (MARFORRES), the 4th Marine Division, 3/25, 1/23, and a number of other commands and units, both in CONUS and Afghanistan, from January to March 2011. The results have been documented in the MCCLL report: **Reserve Component Sourcing of Operation Enduring Freedom Security Force**.

Reserve Marines from 3d Battalion, 25th Marines (3/25) are transported in an EH 101 Merlin by the United Kingdom's1419 Flight Squadron to a location along Route 1 in western Kandahar Province to participate in Operation Aero Hunter with British soldiers from the Royal Highland Fusiliers of Scotland.

A comprehensive set of FOUO observations and recommendations is contained in the MCCLL report. Among the comments that are releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Staffing:** In order for the reserve battalions to have adequate time to recruit and man, the order for the unit to mobilize should be issued at least six months prior to mobilization.
- **Training:** "*The most important lesson that we learned is that we cannot just narrowly train to the security force mission, but we have to train to the infantry mission essential task lists*." BGen James Lariviere, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division.

⇒ Reserve battalions have limited time available to conduct their pre-deployment training program (PTP), with the majority of their individual PTP requirements satisfied during drill weekends and annual training prior to mobilization. The goal is for the battalions to have 120 days at their intermediate location (ILOC) following mobilization to conduct the remainder of their PTP training.

⇒ Consideration should be given to establishing a combat operations center at the ILOC to assist in developing the battalion's command and control proficiency.

- **Facilities and Equipment:** The ILOC facilities at Camp Pendleton have been enhanced significantly as a result of efforts by both the active and reserve establishments; however, potential additional enhancements are identified in the MCCLL report.

⇒ As much equipping of the battalions as feasible should take place prior to mobilization.

⇒ Establishing a fully equipped supply warehouse at the ILOC would also help alleviate the supply needs of the battalions.

- **Command Relationships:** Reserve battalions assigned the SECFOR mission need to fully understand the command relationships and the associated challenges they will face once they deploy.

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Crisis Augmentation Cell Proof of Concept

The Marine Corps has long realized that it does not have sufficient manpower to be able to staff numerous, large component headquarters during all potential contingencies. As stated in **Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.8 (Marine Corps Componency)**, "*Along with the basic core of personnel required to man Marine Corps component headquarters, augmentees, liaisons, and representatives are also necessary for component operations*." For example, U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) was augmented in 2010 by Marines of various occupational specialties during the Haiti humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) mission designated as Operation Unified Response (OUR). These augmentees were sourced on short-notice from across the Marine Corps. Following OUR (and growing out of a desire to have a systematic process in place to be able to surge personnel augmentation for the smaller regional U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) headquarters), the concept of a Crisis Augmentation Cell (CAC) was developed. The objective would be to employ the CAC when a crisis or other significant operation exceeded the organic planning and operational capabilities of a MARFOR. The CAC was first employed in February 2011 as a Proof of Concept to augment the staff of MARFORSOUTH during Exercise Integrated Advance 2011, a U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) joint exercise.

The U.S. Army Runnymeded-class large landing craft USAV Chicahominy (LCU 2011) transports vehicles and equipment to the leeward side of the Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to participate in Exercise Integrated Advance 2011.

Following the exercise, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews with the MARFORSOUTH staff, as well as members of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O), to document their observations and recommendations concerning the development and establishment of the CAC concept and its employment during Integrated Advance 2011. The results have been documented in the MCCLL report, entitled **Crisis Augmentation Cell: Lessons and Observations from a Proof of Concept Conducted During Exercise Integrated Advance 2011**.

A comprehensive set of FOUO observations and recommendations is contained in the MCCLL report. Among the comments that are releasable in this newsletter are:

BGen David Berger, Director, Operations Division, PP&O:
" . . . If you don't exercise [the CAC], you don't know that it can do what it's supposed to do . . . that [the CAC staff] can react in the time lines that are prescribed . . . Go through the pre-deployment checklist to make sure they're ready to go, and do all but deploy them. . . You regularly need to do this, so that you're confident that if something happened tomorrow, we could get [the CAC] out of town in pretty short order."

- **Planning:** A manning document for the CAC was developed by Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) to help pre-designate those Marines who will deploy as members of the CAC, when required. This document proved to be very beneficial.
- **Operations:** The proof of concept successfully demonstrated the ability to deploy the CAC for augmentation of the MARFORSOUTH staff.

⇒ No significant gaps or shortfalls were identified in terms of capability, equipment, or training.

⇒ However, the proof of concept also served to identify areas in which the CAC concept could be refined, including:

- The need to tailor the CAC billets to the requirements of the specific operation.
- The need for flexibility in assigning the CAC members to positions that are outside their specific billet designation, if required.
- The need to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) at each regional MARFOR that address such topics as CAC integration with the existing staff, points of contact, equipment requirements, pre-deployment training requirements, etc.

⇒ The augmented commander should be able to tailor the CAC over time, including releasing personnel to return to their home stations as the operational tempo permits or (by exception) requesting selected members be extended for the continuing mission.

U.S. interagency advisors work together at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during Exercise Integrated Advance 2011, coordinating with external entities, such as the MARFORSOUTH Crisis Augmentation Cell.

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Rules of Engagement Vignettes for Afghanistan Deployments

An instructor at the Joint Security Academy Southwest teaches compliance techniques during an escalation of force class for Afghan Unformed Police.

The proper application of rules of engagement (ROE) and escalation of force (EOF) procedures in Afghanistan is considered to be essential in order for U.S. military service members to be able to protect both themselves and the local civilian population. U.S. forces must continually work to maintain support for their operations by the local populace and ensure that their actions do not encourage new enemy recruits or put coalition forces in situations that may lead to civilian casualties. However, the ability to practice restraint and limit civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, while still protecting themselves, is a complex endeavor requiring an understanding of counterinsurgency and its real-world applications, understanding the operational environment, understanding ROE for both defensive and offensive engagements, the ability to automatically execute appropriate EOF techniques, and being proficient on their weapons and fully confident in their ability to use them. In an effort to provide real-world examples of ROE and EOF situations that may be faced during Afghanistan operations, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has published a **Rules of Engagement Vignettes Handbook**, with fifty scenarios originating from the combat experiences of U.S. forces, primarily in Afghanistan. These situations were originally developed by the U.S. Army's 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division during pre-deployment training and then expanded during its deployment. The vignettes were finalized by the observer/controller-trainer team at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). The handbook's vignettes are designed to assist small-unit leaders by providing them with a hip-pocket reference to help train subordinates on the application of ROE and EOF fundamentals and make correct choices in situations that are not always clear cut.

From the *ROE Vignettes Handbook*:

"These vignettes do not work alone. They are intended to be used in group environments and as the spark to ignite further discussions at the fire team and squad levels. In many cases, you will find that a vignette asks a distinct question and gives an exact "right/wrong, yes/no" answer. In other cases, you will find the discussions less concrete. That is the reality of the complexity of the battlefield. . ."

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Other Recent Center for Army Lessons Learned Products

Two other recent products from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) should be of particular interest to Marines:

The cultural advisor for Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) speaks to Marine Corps and British FETs and their linguists during training at the Afghan Cultural Center on Camp Leatherneck.

- A CALL handbook, entitled a **Commander's Guide to Female Engagement Teams**, documents the best practices of female engagement teams (FETs) deployed to Afghanistan for the purpose of engaging not only the local female population, but Afghan males as well. The handbook focuses on the experiences of Marine Corps FETs deployed in Helmand Province, as well as comparable Culture Support Teams (CSTs) deployed by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The handbook notes that the success of the Marine Corps FETs has been widely acknowledged, not only by the U.S. military, but also by the international community, specifically the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and many of the ISAF member nations. The document focuses on the training provided to Marine Corps FETs, as well as the best practices they have identified during recent Afghanistan deployments. Since the handbook is an initial effort to consolidate FET best practices, CALL welcomes Marine Corps comments on the document, with contact information for feedback provided at the end of the handbook.

- A CALL newsletter, entitled **Challenges in the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)**, focuses on joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) activities, issues and challenges. Although, stability operations in the U.S. Central Command area of operations continue to be the primary focus, the other five GCCs face challenges, potential dangers, and future threats that merit attention as well. The CALL newsletter includes three articles that provide an overview of JIIM activities, with the remaining thirteen articles addressing topics specific to one of the GCCs. A number of these articles will be of interest to Marines in general, while others will be of particular value to Marines based on their upcoming deployments. Among the topics addressed are: ■ building partnership capacities, ■ establishing professional relationships, ■ participating in full-spectrum operations, ■ planning for potentially failing states, ■ integrating civilian and military activities, ■ drug and human trafficking, ■ targeting piracy operations on the open seas, ■ chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, ■ disaster responses, and ■ homeland security.

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The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

Four editions of the MCCLL New Data Rollup (which is distributed weekly to registered users on the MCCLL NIPR website) were the most popular downloads during the month of May. Four MCCLL reports addressing Afghanistan topics were also among the most frequently downloaded MCCLL products, as were papers on the deployment of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in 2010 and a recent Mountain Warrior exercise.

Top Ten MCCLL Reports, May 2011

1. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 11 - 17 May 2011*
2. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 26 April - 03 May 2011*
3. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 04 - 10 May 2011*
4. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 18 - 24 May 2011*
5. *Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as a Coalition Headquarters (Regional Command Southwest)*
6. *Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Operations: Lessons from the 15th MEU*
7. *Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability*
8. *Marine Logistics Group (Forward) Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan*
9. *Exercise Mountain Warrior 8-10: Lessons, Observations and Recommendations*
10. *Reserve Component Sourcing of OEF Security Force*

Top Ten Downloads, May 2011

1. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 11 - 17 May 2011*
2. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 26 April - 03 May 2011*
3. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 04 - 10 May 2011*
4. *MCCLL New Data Rollup, 18 - 24 May 2011*
5. *The Taliban's Top 5 Most Deadly Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TRADOC)*
6. *Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as a Coalition Headquarters (Regional Command Southwest) (MCCLL)*
7. *1st Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) OEF 10.2 After Action Report*
8. *2d Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) OEF 10.2 After Action Report*
9. *1st Battalion, 10th Marines (1/10) First 100 Days After Action Report*
10. *3d Marine Division After Action Report for Operation Tomodachi*

In comparison, the second table highlights the documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during May. The MCCLL New Data Rollups are also on this list, as is the MCCLL reports on I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) functioning as a coalition headquarters (i.e. Regional Command Southwest). Three recent after action reports (AARs) based on Afghanistan deployments are on the list, as is a paper from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on deadly Taliban TTPs and an AAR from the 3d Marine Division on the Operation Tomodachi humanitarian assistance/disaster relief provided following the Japanese earthquake and tsunami.

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Lessons from Exercise Golden Guardian 2011

Medical personnel treat a mock patient at 29 Palms, during the California state-wide Exercise Golden Guardian 2011. The exercise included evaluation of the responses of Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) and other Marine Corps installations to a major California flood.

The annual California Emergency Management Agency (CALEMA) Exercise Golden Guardian began in California in 2004 as a full-scale, state-wide exercise to test the responses of various California Agencies and military installations to catastrophic events. For Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWEST), the objective has been to train Marine Corps personnel at California-based installations on their Mission Essential Tasks (METs) in responding to potential natural and man-made disasters and to exercise the associated command and control capabilities. The **September 2010 edition of the MCCLL newsletter** included an article highlighting the MCIWEST After Action Review (AAR) for Golden Guardian 2010. It provided numerous recommendations for strengthening coordination among installations involved in the 2010 exercise, which tested the response capabilities of installation personnel to terrorist attacks throughout the state.

This year's Golden Guardian took place in May 2011, and was based on a scenario of a major flood sustained in the interior of the state. The participating MCIWEST installations were: Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) 29 Palms, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) Bridgeport, Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow, and MCAS Yuma. Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego was also a participant. The **MCIWEST AAR for Exercise Golden Guardian 2011** includes observations and recommendations from all MCIWEST installations and the MCRD. The AAR also identifies the required flow of information, both when the state is able to handle the disaster on its own and when assistance from the Federal Government is required. A number of MCIWEST installations pointed out the need to have a Common Operational Picture (COP) for complete situational awareness. Sharing of information as events took place occurred initially, but follow-on visibility is needed to ensure a common up-to date understanding of the situation.

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News

2010 Afghanistan Report from the Civil Military Fusion Center

The annual **Afghanistan Report from the Civil Military Fusion Center (CFC)** of the International Security Assistance Force (Force) provides a wide range of information on civil and military developments in Afghanistan, with separate sections on international conferences, governance, economic development and infrastructure, humanitarian affairs, security, rule of law and socio-cultural development. The report notes that there were significant "*challenges and successes observed in 2010 related to efforts to improve the lives of the Afghan people and sustain socio-cultural development. Civilian casualties as a result of conflict were a recurrent theme in the media in 2010, with anti-government elements cited as causing **76% of all incidents** according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Positive developments were observed in the health sector with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) undertaking numerous vaccination campaigns to inoculate more than 7.8 million children against polio, as well as responding to various disease outbreaks. . . Education and child protection efforts saw both improvement and decline in 2010 with some schools reopening while others were closed due to increased violence and several gas attacks on girls' schools. Attempts to restrict the recruitment of children into Afghan security forces and to improve under-age child labor practices were bolstered by the development of a national committee on child rights in July 2010. . . There was a reported 300% increase in kinetic events in 2010 with both planned and seasonal episodes. Targeted attacks by the Taliban against Afghan police and civilians associated with the police force were a concerning trend for the ANSF in 2010. . . Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police reported an increase in recruits, while discussions continued about the 2014 timeframe for international force withdrawal. . .*"

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Nutrition and Traumatic Brain Injuries

The topic of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) has been an area of concern within the Marine Corps and other military services since the early days of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. As early as June 2006, MCCLL published a **report on the subject**, with a follow-on report in May 2007, addressing **helmet design and testing**. In April 2011, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences published a paper on the results of an analysis of **Nutrition and Traumatic Brain Injury**, prepared in response to a request from the Department of Defense. The study sought to evaluate the potential role of nutrition in the treatment of and resilience against TBI. The Institute of Medicine has extensive experience in this area, having published (in some cases with other units of the National Academies) at least eight reports addressing TBI in both military and civilian contexts over the past decade.

The study concluded that "*although many questions remain, there is enough evidence to suggest that nutritional interventions can help improve the treatment of and resiliency against acute and subacute TBI among military personnel. Some actions, such as adopting new feeding protocols that begin soon after injury, can help immediately; other actions will be dependent upon continued research advances. Also, because of the parallels between some types of TBI found in combat personnel, such as concussions, and sports-related and other civilian brain injuries, the nutritional interventions explored in this report can similarly be considered for other types of injuries. . .*"

Heat Acclimatization Guide

The summer temperatures throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) region, particularly in the desert areas of southern Afghanistan, present difficulties for many military service members who have grown up in more temperate climates. In addition to acclimatizing themselves to these environments, Marines must also prepare themselves for the high temperatures experienced in many training venues. In an effort to provide pointers for acclimatizing oneself to high temperatures in either desert or humid environments, the U.S. Army Public Health Command (USAPHC) has published a **Heat Acclimatization Guide** that provides many tips for military personnel who must perform strenuous activities during training or combat operations in hot weather. The guide points out that "*generally, about two weeks of daily heat exposure is needed to induce heat acclimatization. Heat acclimatization requires a minimum daily heat exposure of about two hours (can be broken into two 1-hour exposures) combined with physical exercise that requires cardiovascular endurance, (for example, marching or jogging) rather than strength training (pushups and resistance training). Gradually increase the exercise intensity or duration each day. Work up to an appropriate physical training schedule adapted to the required physical activity level for the advanced military training and environment. The benefits of heat acclimatization will be retained for about 1 week and then decay with about 75 percent lost by about 3 weeks, once heat exposure ends. A day or two of intervening cool weather will not interfere with acclimatization to hot weather. . .*"

Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The **Commandant's Professional Reading List** was updated over a year ago by a review board to ensure that it remained relevant and provided all Marines with opportunities for professional and career development. A revised list from the Commandant, General James F. Amos, is scheduled to be published shortly and will be featured in an upcoming newsletter. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), provide Marines with a wealth of resources for their own development programs, featuring many books and articles that are as entertaining as they are instructive. These reading lists are highlighted on the **Marine Corps University (MCU) website**, along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) ***Tried by War*** **by James M. McPherson,** featured on the Commandant's list for Colonels and General Officers, (2) a recent book that offers a powerful World War II survival story, ***Unbroken*** **by Laura Hillenbrand**, and (3) another recent book, ***Innovation, Transformation and War*** **by James A. Russell**, that addresses "bottom-up" U.S. military innovations in Iraq.

Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief, by James M. McPherson (Penguin Press, 2008)

Review by Peter Bridges, *California Literary Review"*

" . . . As McPherson tells us at the outset, Lincoln came to the Presidency without any real military experience. He had been an Illinois militia captain in the Black Hawk War of 1832, but as he said in self-deprecation to his fellow members of Congress in 1848, his combat record amounted to "charges upon the wild onions" and "a good many struggles with the musketoes." Lincoln, though, was a man who could learn. His secretary John Hay recalled years later how the President stayed up until late at night reading books on strategy and poring over reports from the field.

Lincoln's adversary, Jefferson Davis, on the other hand, came to the presidency of the Confederate States with deep military experience. As McPherson writes, Davis had graduated from West Point, had commanded a regiment in the Mexican War, and had served as "an excellent [U.S.] secretary of war from 1853 to 1857." (He had also chaired the committee on military affairs in the U.S. Senate.)

There is more to be said about Davis as Confederate commander in chief. If President Lincoln sometimes gave his commanders more leeway than they deserved, President Davis tried too often to manage distant armies from Richmond, without great success. Perhaps in a future work McPherson might usefully contrast the two men's military works and ways. He would certainly do well to borrow from accounts—beginning with William Plum's 1882 work—of the amazing achievements of the United States Military Telegraph service, which made possible the coordination of Union campaigns, and Lincoln's communication with his generals, in ways never possible in earlier wars.

McPherson describes the immense task Lincoln and his team faced, in turning the tiny prewar U.S. Army of 16,000 men into what became a force of 637,000 in just a year. The Union needed not just new privates but new generals, and many of the latter had to come from civilian life. Perhaps the situation was not as bad as some other writers have said; McPherson reports that "Two-thirds of the 583 Union generals commissioned during the war had prewar military training and experience. For some of these "improvised generals" (Henry Adams' phrase), this experience had not amounted to much more than Lincoln's charges upon the wild onions. " . . ." **Read more of the review on the next page.**

Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption, by Laura Hillenbrand (Random House, 2010)

Review by Col Eric L. Chase *Marine Corps Gazette*:

"*For more than two centuries a defining phenomenon of the American military has been the remarkable record of countless citizen soldiers, responding to emergent wartime needs with extraordinary resilience, ingenuity, and heroism. Laura Hillenbrand's* ***Unbroken*** *delivers a powerful World War II saga of one such man—Louis Silvie Zamperini (whom the author calls "Louie" throughout). But Louie's life at war was far from the normative war epic of combat violence depicting exceptional bravery, endurance, and pluck in the face of enemy fire. Rather,* ***Unbroken*** *embraces the courage, stamina, and grace of a young army officer who, for most of his wartime service, was hors de combat—first surviving his plane's plunge into the Pacific, then adrift for over 6 weeks on a raft, then as a prisoner of war (POW) in Japan and, finally, years of post-war trauma and recovery. The ordeals of Louie and many others in Japanese captivity were at least as wrenching as the later experiences of American POWs in Korea and North Vietnam, where captors carried out sadistic, savage practices that flouted both humanity and international law.*

The author has done her homework. She is a gifted, engaging writer whose previous work, ***Seabiscuit: An American Legend****, was a major national bestseller. Hillenbrand's portrayal of Louie's odyssey merits instant classic status. The narrative of* ***Unbroken*** *is so compelling, the story so riveting, and the lessons so insightful and permanent that every American in uniform should read, savor, and learn from this book.*

As a teenager and a young man, Louie's athletic triumphs catapulted him to national stardom. Born in 1917 to Italian immigrants, his talent and grit overcame poverty and his own troubled behavior as he matured into the world's fastest high school miler, ever. He went on to compete as a world-class track athlete at the University of Southern California and in the 5,000-meter run for the United States in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. His horizons seemed limitless as he looked forward to the next Olympics, scheduled in 1940 in Tokyo and then in Finland when Tokyo withdrew. Then, war looming, the Olympics were cancelled, and Louie was inconsolable. . ."

Read more of the review *on the next page*.

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Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

(Review of *Tried by War* continued) *" . . . Sam Ward, king of the lobbyists and an acute observer of the American scene, was distressed to hear that a brigadier general's commission had been given to Daniel Sickles, best known for having shot his wife's lover across the street from the White House. Ward's biographer quotes Ward as saying "Good God! Fancy him caught in a tight place by Davis, Beauregard, Lee, or Whiting!" Indeed, two years later at Gettysburg Sickles got caught by Lee in a very tight place, when he brought his brigade too far forward and endangered the whole left end of the Union line.*

There is so little new factual material to add to our picture of Lincoln that a little more speculation would be welcome. What if Lincoln had not left it to McClellan in July 1861 to provide his plan—breathtaking in its grandeur and wholly unrealistic, McPherson says—for winning the war? . . ."
Read the remainder of the review from the *California Literary Review*.

(Review of *Unbroken* continued) *" . . . In early 1940, he enlisted in the Army Air Corps, but washed out. Rejoining in 1941, he was on duty in Texas when Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor triggered America's entry into World War II. Louie's Olympic disappointment would evaporate in the coming years. By the time Louie Zamperini was 28, he had endured and survived such physical, mental, and emotional torment and deprivation that the story of his cataclysms seem impossible, or at least implausible.*

As a "bombardier" officer assigned to a B–24, Louie saw sporadic action in the Pacific. On 27 May 1943, Louie was aboard a mechanically defective B–24, launched from Oahu to search for a missing plane and its crew, when an engine failure drove his aircraft into the Pacific. Louie was among only three survivors who clung to two small inflatable rafts. Thus began a harrowing survival tale . . ."
Read the remainder of the review from the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005 - 2007, by James A. Russell (Stanford Security Studies, 2011)

Review by Frank G. Hoffman, *Small Wars Journal*:

"*The most respected military historian of our day, Michael Howard, commented years ago that the one aspect of military affairs he believed needed to be studied above all others was "the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown." For a generation we ignored his advice, and instead pursued techno-centric illusions and conceptual dark holes with little payoff.*

Reinforcing that advice, now retired Army General Dave Fastabend once encouraged the U.S. Army to seek one operational advantage in the future--to strive to "be superior in the art of learning and adaptation." The last decade of the Long War has borne out both these arguments and also demonstratively shown how far we still need to go despite the development of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations doctrine in the Army and Marine Corps.

*The prevailing narrative from our two ongoing conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East gives a lot of credit for success to the promulgation of FM 3-24 **Counterinsurgency** in late 2006 and the increased resources commonly called the "surge" in both conflicts. This storyline is an irritation to many commanders who already understood the best practices of successful COIN and applied them successfully in Iraq without benefit of the codified commandments handed down like stone tablets.*

*In **Innovation, Transformation and War**, Dr. James Russell demonstratively undercuts that simplistic top down-driven narrative of American innovation in Iraq. Dr. Russell is a veteran of the policy wars in the Pentagon, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterrey, CA., and a long time expert in Middle East affairs. Russell demonstrates that well before Mr. Bush directed the first surge in Iraq, Army and Marine units had devised and were implementing new COIN competencies and techniques quite successfully at the tactical level. They did so without top down guidance, campaign directives from higher headquarters, or published principles or paradoxes from the past. The author notes "it is somewhat misleading to assert that the new doctrine suddenly and systemically enhanced battlefield performance that had been notably lagging." As Russell shows with convincing evidence, the tide had already been turned in Anbar Province, presumably as a result of this diverse set of bottom up initiatives.*

*Russell seeks to understand the process by which rapid implementation of entirely new solutions and technologies can be forged in the crucible of combat. In contrast, our understanding about military innovation is heavily based upon successful peacetime or interwar innovation. This type of innovation is anticipatory and predicated often by dramatic changes in security threats or new technological breakthroughs such as the combustion engine, aviation, radar, or computers. The literature has focused on such formal systems of deliberate and institutional innovation as reflected in **Military Innovation in the Interwar Period**, a DOD-sponsored research project, which culminated in a volume edited by the noted U.S. historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millet. . ."* **Read the remainder of the review in the *Small Wars Journal*.**

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Roster of MCCLL Liaison Officers

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) liaison officers (LnOs) at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Steve Thompson is currently the only MCCLL LnO deployed in theater. Current plans are for Mr. Thompson to re-deploy in July, with Mr. Ken Hurst to replace him at RC (SW) and Mr. Scott Kemp to replace him at 2d MLG (Fwd). Contact information for the new in-theater LnOs will be provided once it becomes available. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact Mr. Mark Silvia, the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.