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Evacuation of Military Family Members from Japan: This MCCLL report provides observations and recommendations based on Marine Corps’ support for the voluntary evacuation of DoD-eligible family members following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) After Action Reports (AARs) from:
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⇒ Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB-8),
⇒ a Combat Support Advisory Team (CSAT) (sourced from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12)), and
⇒ Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 (MWSS-272).

OEF Force Preservation Council (FPC) Lessons Learned: Task Force Leatherneck has prepared an after action report documenting the results of the 3rd Quarter, CY 2011, FPC meeting, with numerous medical and tactical safety best practices.

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Lessons from the Armies of the ABCA Nations: A report from the latest Coalition Lessons Analysis Workshop (CLAW) compiles observations, insights and lessons from the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies.

Lessons from Other Coalition Partners: Recent quarterly lessons learned reports from the French and German militaries include many relevant observations and recommendations on Afghanistan operations.

Lessons from Mojave Viper Training: An AAR prepared by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) is representative of the utility of Mojave Viper AARs for other units preparing for their next training evolution.

Lessons from Non-Standard Bridging (NSB) Operations: This report from 2d Marine Logistics Group (MLG) (Forward) captures observations and recommendations based on the employment of NSB as an alternative to standard military bridging assets.

The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website: Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find of interest.

The Marine Corps Traveling Theater in Afghanistan: A recent paper from the Small Wars Journal provides examples of the integration of Combat Camera into information operations messages, including the innovative use of a “Traveling Theater.”

News

Three items are included this month: (1) a paper from the American Medical Association on eliminating preventable death on the battlefield, (2) a report from the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) on ensuring realism in culture training, and (3) unclassified IED trends information from the Civil Military Fusion Centre.

Reading Lists and Book Review: Three books are featured: (1) From the Horse’s Mouth listed in the new 2011 Commandant reading list, (2) The Savage Wars of Peace, a carryover from the previous 2009 list, and (3) a new book, Monsoon, on the importance to U.S. strategic interests of nations bordering the Indian Ocean.

Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts: This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides “initial impressions” summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments and requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor Telephone: (703) 432-1279 DSN: 312-378-1279.
The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that struck mainland Japan off the eastern coast of Honshu (followed by the damage to nuclear power plant facilities in the Fukushima prefecture) resulted not only in a massive humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) effort by the U.S. government and many other nations, but also the need for the voluntary evacuation of American citizens and designated foreign nationals from Japan. Both of these operations included major efforts on the part of the Marine Corps. The HA/DR mission was designated as Operation Tomodachi, while the evacuation effort was named Operation Pacific Passage. The Marine Corps’ ability to provide rapid and effective HA/DR support under Operation Tomodachi was addressed in an in-depth Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection effort that was highlighted in the October 2011 MCCLL newsletter. A parallel collection effort was conducted by MCCLL program analysts embedded with III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to capture observations, lessons, best practices and recommendations identified by key staff members associated with the second mission to plan and execute the military-assisted departure of U.S. DoD eligible family members and civilians from Japan.

An alert order issued in mid-March by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) designated the Commanding General, III MEF, as Commander, Joint Task Force 505 (JTF-505), the operational level commander who was tasked to “be prepared to support the Department of State (DoS) . . . with the voluntary or ordered departure of American citizens and designated foreign nationals.” As a result, JTF-505 executed the voluntary authorized departure of eligible DoD family members from mainland Japan to registration sites in CONUS, as well as planning for subsequent phases of a much larger evacuation in the event that it became necessary due to changing circumstances. Although Operation Tomodachi and Operation Pacific Passage were two separate operations, the MEF found that they were “totally interconnected by politics, location, personnel and resources.” It was necessary to conduct frequent video teleconferences among multiple levels of command (including PACOM, U.S. Forces Japan, its other components, and III MEF) in order to command and control the two operations effectively. Operation Pacific Passage eventually resulted in the voluntary authorized departure of 7,859 DoD eligible family members from Honshu. During the course of, and subsequent to the operation, MCCLL program analysts conducted numerous interviews of key personnel concerning the forming, planning, operations, logistics, communications, intelligence and administration of JTF-505. The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, Evacuation Operations by Joint Task Force 505: Operation Pacific Passage, March - May 2011.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Planning:** Operation Pacific Passage made use of established infrastructure and supporting installation commands to coordinate reception and onward movement of the eligible family members, as well as the planning for any subsequent larger evacuations that might have been required.
  ⇒ The evolving and unpredictable radiological releases from the damaged reactors were an operational consideration for those involved in planning and executing the evacuation.

- **Command Relationships and Communications:** A unique aspect of the command and control requirements of the operation was that JTF-505 had no assigned forces. However, there was an exceptional level of cooperation from all of the components that supported the operation.
  ⇒ The ability to share information with the numerous participants and partners was challenging due to the employment of multiple websites, communications means, and collaboration tools. Communications were also required with civilian family members and others who did not have access to military domains. The All Partners Access Network (APAN) was able to provide interoperability and connectivity among the various participants over a common platform.

- **Operations:** Installation commanders provided information to JTF-505 concerning the numbers of volunteer evacuees at their respective bases and stations. The J4 mobility officer, in coordination with the J5 planners, then communicated the aggregated airlift passenger requirements to other organizations, to include U.S. Transportation Command, as well as tracking the number of passengers departing on each flight.
  ⇒ There was a large requirement for interpreters, not only to coordinate with Japanese speakers, but also to read documents in Japanese.
  ⇒ As in other joint, interagency and bilateral operations, the establishment of liaison teams greatly facilitated information flow. The co-location of JTF-505 planners with DoS planners greatly assisted in coordinating the movement of evacuees.
After Action Report from 2d Battalion, 8th Marines

2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8) deployed into the Marjeh District of central Helmand Province in January 2011 to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11.1. The battalion built on the successes of previous infantry battalions that had performed the initial clearing and holding phases of Operation Moshtarak. The terrain in which the battalion operated was very difficult, especially, since the patrols seldom traveled on roads or worn paths due to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. Most of the fields were flooded and very muddy, while the canals were deep with steep embankments. These conditions, together with extremely high summer temperatures, necessitated an exceptional level of physical fitness (including both upper and lower body strength) to maneuver successfully. In addition, the terrain was very difficult for vehicles, with recovery operations a daily occurrence that should be rehearsed under comparable conditions. The battalion has documented this harsh operating environment, along with providing numerous recommendations and best practices for COIN operations, in its comprehensive and detailed After Action Report (AAR) for the OEF 11.1 Deployment from January to August 2011.

The battalion’s discussion of its role in advising and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should be of particular relevance for follow-on units as the Marine Corps shifts its focus to the preparation of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibilities. As noted in the AAR, “[Marine Corps] advisors need to learn the Afghan National Army (ANA) procedures and support them to the fullest extent rather than immediately trying to get the ANA to mimic Marine Corp methods.”

2/8’s comments on required COIN skills:
“Basic combat hunter skills are essential in a COIN environment. The ability to observe, critically analyze, react and report is essential to tactical success and tempo when facing an insurgent enemy. . . . Marines should be prepared to observe and analyze atmospherics of local nationals in their area of operations. Are the local nationals leaving their fields when the Marine patrols approach? . . . Their behavior in response to the patrol can reveal more about the enemy than anything they tell you verbally . . .”

After Action Report from Combat Logistics Battalion 8

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB-8) deployed from February to September 2011 during OEF 11.1 to provide logistics support to Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8) and its subordinate units in northern Helmand Province. As has been the case during many OEF deployments, the battalion found that it would have been desirable to have the same equipment available during the pre-deployment training program (PTP) as the equipment that it ended up employing in theater. As noted by the battalion in its OEF 11.1 Post-Deployment After Action Report, “[W]e should] train like we fight. While we have been at war for over a decade, we still experience significant challenges in providing Marines the same equipment during PTP that they will use in theater. Providing familiarization with rolling stock and command and control software systems . . . will present tremendous systematic improvements during PTP throughout the battalion.” The battalion points out that some equipment for PTP had to be obtained on temporary loan from other commands and organizations, while other equipment was not available in sufficient quantities during training. In addition to many training-related recommendations, the AAR also provides observations on intelligence, operations, logistics, and administration topics, as well as on partnering with the Afghan National Army (ANA). The battalion points out that, “Many of the ANA soldiers possess basic skills, but are not familiar with logistics equipment. The advisor teams became trainers in combat service support (CSS) basics in order to accomplish their mission. CLB-8 did significantly more training than advising . . .”

Overall, the battalion considered its deployment to be a “tremendous success in every functional area . . . The professional growth of our Marines and Sailors was phenomenal.”

From the CLB-8 AAR:
“Tremendous efficiencies can be realized by properly leveraging software and command and control systems. Information management planning and data analysis are key. Battalion and company leaders need to take the time to learn critical software programs, employing a top-down integrated approach. Understanding how to leverage these technologies properly can greatly improve efficiency in planning and allow the commander to make more informed, timely decisions.”
After Action Report from Marine Wing Support Squadron 272

During a seven-month deployment in the southern Helmand River Valley that began in May 2011, a Combat Support Advisory Team (CSAT) attached to 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12), partnered with and provided mentoring support to the 4th Kandak, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps (4/1/215). This battalion-sized combat support kandak consisted of three company-sized tolais that provided engineer, reconnaissance, and artillery capabilities for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The partnered CSAT consisted of Marines and Sailors with supply, logistics, artillery, engineer, reconnaissance, motor transport, and medical military occupational specialties that were sourced by and deployed with 1/12 and then attached initially to Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) and subsequently to RCT-5. The main body of the CSAT was located with the artillery tolai, with smaller contingents deployed with the engineer and reconnaissance elements. Based on the CSAT’s efforts to train and mentor 4/1/215, the team has prepared an OEF 11.1 After Action Report for the Period from May to November 2011 that highlights many issues that the team had to resolve in order to provide effective support.

The CSAT points out that the 4th Kandak has now been conducting operations in Helmand for six months, during which time the advisor team provided supplies and materials only when the ANA supply system did not have supplies available or in order to prevent complete failure of an ANA mission. At all times, the advisor team forced the ANA soldiers to develop their own solutions and (despite resistance) perform their own problem solving. The result of this “tough love” approach was a kandak that was independent of the advisor team and able to conduct daily operations with limited assistance. The advisors quickly assumed their intended role of developing the ANA with minimal coalition support. Although far from being effective without advisor assistance, the team assesses that the kandak has made significant strides in a short period of time.

From the CSAT AAR:

“Marine units often provide assistance to ANA forces as the easy solution to ANA problems, with the ANA capitalizing on their proximity to Marine forces to draw fuel, water, and other supplies . . . The ANA has no initiative to conduct active patrolling, base security, or mission planning when collocated with coalition forces. This over-reliance on Marine support ultimately hinders the development of the ANA. If the ANA is to succeed after coalition forces leave, it must become independent of Marine resources now.”

After Action Report from a Combat Support Advisory Team to an Afghan National Army Kandak

After Action Report from a Marine Wing Support Squadron 272

Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 (MWSS-272) deployed in March 2011 to support sortie generation of aircraft from 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) (Forward) units, as well as from other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units. Based out of Camp Leatherneck, Camp Dwyer and other forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COBs), MWSS-272 was responsible for aircraft refueling at all locations, runway maintenance and crash and rescue capabilities at the larger bases, and flight line security at the smaller locations. In addition to completing multiple vertical and horizontal construction projects directly supporting sortie generation, MWSS-272 engineers maintained and repaired utilities equipment and provided purified water for base personnel. The Motor Transportation Company provided logistical support to convoys moving critical gear in support of operations of the MAW and other commands. The squadron also provided medical services, communications capabilities and messing facilities. Based on its seven-month deployment, the squadron has prepared a wide-ranging OEF 11.1 Lessons Learned After Action Report that provides observations and recommendations that are of particular relevance for follow-on Marine wing support squadrons.

MWSS-272 highlights the fact that, doctrinally, the squadron was designed to support one FOB and two forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). However, during this deployment it was required to support three FOBs and two other sites. This was achieved through careful manpower management and efficient tasking. It is anticipated that follow-on squadrons will continue to be required to “do more with less.” Future MWSSs must “maintain and adjust the troop-to-task analysis and portray a clear picture to MAW and MEF planners concerning the aviation ground support (AGS) capabilities that exist throughout the area of operations and their associated costs in manpower and equipment.”
Tactical Vehicle Mishaps and Billetting Fires Safety Lessons

The quarterly Task Force Leatherneck Force Preservation Council (FPC) meetings were highlighted in the MCCLL July 2011 newsletter in discussing the after-action report and briefings that were produced following the 2nd Quarter, CY 2011 meeting in May. This was the first meeting hosted by 2d Marine Division (MARDIV) (Forward) after its assumption of command as Task Force Leatherneck. The objective of the FPC is to assist commanders in maintaining unit readiness and developing a dynamic feedback process for capturing lessons learned concerning medical and tactical safety best practices.

The latest meeting of the FPC (for 3rd Quarter, CY 2011) took place the end of September with representatives from the two regimental combat teams, all of the in-theater Marine Corps infantry battalions, the artillery battalion, combat engineers, and the reconnaissance and light armored reconnaissance battalions. The results have been documented in an FPC After Action Report and a compilation of briefings presented during the meeting. These two documents provide a wealth of information that can be used by commanders and safety officers during deployments (and preparing for deployments) to help instill the need for continual safety-conscious operations. During the FPC discussions, it became clear that many units face the same issues. The collaborative discussion period provided the attendees with an opportunity to share experiences, combine efforts, and develop innovative solutions to problems.

Among the many topics addressed in the AAR are: ■ blast exposure and concussive incidents, ■ post exposure mandatory rest periods, ■ rabies vaccinations, ■ winter weather injuries, ■ medical treatment of non-military personnel, ■ family readiness and relationship problems, ■ safety officer team assist visits, and ■ the need for a Task Force Leatherneck mishap report newsletter.

Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 was considered to be a “banner year” for the Marine Corps tactical vehicle safety program, since the number of vehicle mishaps declined 60% in comparison to the ten-year average. However, as noted in the November 2011 “Did You Know” from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division, a review of some of the accidents shows that they could have been prevented if Marines had followed the basic rules for wearing seatbelts, driving at appropriate speeds, not over steering, and understanding the vehicle’s center of gravity. The Safety Division points out that overcorrection generally occurs in reaction to an unexpected event when drivers panic and jerk the steering, causing the vehicle to roll over. This was the case in two rollovers highlighted in the report that resulted in fatalities. In discussing proper convoy operations, the report emphasizes the need for maintaining appropriate vehicle intervals, properly tying down and storing gear, and wearing seatbelts. Key elements in the reduction of mishaps continue to be leadership, training, situational awareness, and strict adherence to proven procedures.

Another recent product from the CMC Safety Division (prepared in coordination with the Naval Safety Center) is a report on a serious fire that occurred in a locally fabricated billeting structure in Afghanistan. The November 2011 Mishap Lessons Learned Report points out that the origin of the fire at a remote forward operating base (FOB) was a step-down transformer purchased locally. The report emphasizes the need to conduct building inspections during the relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) period, importance of smoke detectors, identification of primary and alternate exits, need for emergency evacuation plans, and compliance with orders and directives concerning the storage of ammunition.

Readers should also refer to the latest Safety Gram from the CMC Safety Division, which provides a summary of mishaps in October and includes articles on safety during winter activities, aviation restraint systems, FY 12 safety training, and Marine Ground Climate Assessment Survey (GCASS) issue papers.

On the need for post-concussive exposure mandatory rest periods:

“. . . On the surface it seems counter-intuitive that taking concussed warriors out of the fight and/or restricting them to the forward operating bases preserves the fighting force — but it does. Preventing repeat concussions during the brain’s post-concussive “vulnerable” period is imperative. During this period, a Marine or Sailor is more likely to suffer worse brain injury if he or she receives a repeat concussion. . . .”
Lessons from the Armies of the ABCA Nations

The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program (ABCA) was originally established in 1947 to help achieve effective integration of the capabilities of the armies of partnered nations in conducting a full spectrum of coalition land operations successfully in a joint environment. The program originally included the armies of the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada, with Australia joining in 1963 and New Zealand becoming an observer in 1965 and a full member in 2006. The U.S. Marine Corps subsequently became a formal partner in the program in 2004, while the UK has elected to include the Royals Marines as a member of its delegation for a number of years. The most recent ABCA Coalition Lessons Analysis Workshop (CLAW) was hosted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) during the week of 29 August 2011, with the objective of compiling and analyzing observations, insights and lessons (OILs) from recent operations and training in order to provide input to strategic planning and programs.

The Executive Summary from the ABCA CLAW 2011 provides an overview of the key results of the workshop, while the full report addresses each topic in detail. The key themes that emerged from this year’s workshop were: ■ unity of effort, ■ civil-military integration, ■ information sharing, ■ biometrics standards, ■ demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, ■ counter-IED and explosives ordnance disposal (EOD), ■ transition, and ■ host nation development. In discussing this latter topic, which is increasingly important as security responsibilities transition in Afghanistan, the CLAW report points out the necessity of developing the “indigenous logistics capability in parallel with the development of host nation combat and combat support capabilities to produce a balanced force. Host nation security forces require a level of integral logistics support which can be self-sustaining in the long term. . .”

On the topic of “Influence Activities”:
“The significance of influence activities (IA) and its enablers (information operations, psychological operations, civil-military cooperation, and key leader engagements) was again identified this year. The coordination of IA and the appropriate employment of enabling effects within the context of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) operations needs increased emphasis in education, doctrine, training and interoperability. . . Deliberate and proactive engagement of key leaders is critical for building trust, transparency and confidence in conducting partnered operations and activities. . .”

— And from Other Coalition Partners

Lessons learned reports (in English language versions) from two other U.S. coalition partners in Afghanistan have recently been added to the MCCCLL repositories. These reports address many topics that should be of interest to Marines, even though the individual areas of operation (AOs) in Afghanistan often have many dissimilarities. In particular, these lessons learned products contain valuable insights into some of the best practices that have worked for other nations during their OEF counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Three quarterly lessons learned reports from the French Center for Doctrine (for the periods from April to August 2010, August to December 2010, and December 2010 to March 2011) include observations and best practices on such topics as: ■ force protection, ■ intelligence, ■ vehicle movement protection, ■ information operations, ■ land warfare, ■ fire support, ■ relationships with foreign units, ■ engineer counter-IED best practices, ■ intelligence, ■ enemy courses of action (COAs), ■ communications (digitization), ■ combat service support/logistics, and ■ medical support. MCCCLL has also received the latest edition of the French Doctrine Review, prepared by the French Land Forces Doctrine Center, which focuses on “command in operation,” with articles on a former French Army Chief of Staff, the philosophy and doctrine of command in operation,” and testimonies and historical perspectives on the subject.

The German Army also produces quarterly lessons learned reports, two of which are now in the MCCCLL database (3d Quarter and 4th Quarter, CY 2011). Topics in these reports include: support for deployed soldiers and their relatives, counter-IED best practices, preparations for deployment of a mechanized infantry demonstration battalion, selected development projects, operational experiences of other nations (including the U.S. and UK), and two sample scenarios (one addressing an IED attack on a convoy and the other an ambush in urban terrain).
Lessons Learned During Mojave Viper Training

Many of the after actions reports (AARs) that have been featured in the MCCLL newsletters over the past few years have been based on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deployments in an effort to help ensure that follow-on units preparing for deployment into these theaters were aware of the experiences of their predecessors. However, readers should also be aware that the MCCLL repositories include many AARs from training evolutions and exercises. These provide valuable insights that units preparing for deployments for training (DFTs) or exercise participation would be well advised to review. An example of an excellent AAR that was prepared following participation in Mojave Viper training was produced by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) based on its training in October/November 2011 that included both blank and live-fire combined arms training and four clear, hold, and build exercises.

Among the specific topics addressed in the 2/9 AAR are: ■ available communications assets, ■ communications tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), ■ company-level operations cell (CLOC) training, ■ interpreters, ■ raid support/maneuver force, ■ helicopter-borne operations, ■ weapons company participation, ■ observers for initial fires, ■ battle handover of fires, ■ fires clearance in an urban environment, ■ night shooting, ■ airspace deconfliction, ■ fires in support of maneuver, ■ company-level intelligence cell (CLIC) training, ■ scout/snipers, ■ availability of biometric equipment, ■ IED detector dogs (IDDs), and ■ public health concerns. In discussing the interpreters that were assigned during training, 2/9 points out that they “provided key insight on cultural and linguistic challenges the Marines will face on a daily basis. Many of them were fluent in more than just Pashtu, which will drastically aid the companies when deployed. Each interpreter . . . helped close specific gaps between our cultures . . .”

From the 2/9 Mojave Viper AAR:
“Mojave Viper proved to be a useful exercise in preparing the battalion for its upcoming deployment . . . The battalion was able to take advantage of the rare, combined arms training opportunity . . . The resources and training areas afforded to the battalion at the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center cannot be matched at Camp Lejeune, and the battalion took advantage of the opportunity to improve across the board. Standard operating procedures were refined at all levels and across all warfighting functions. Old TTPs were improved upon, and new ones learned . . .”

Lessons Learned from Non-Standard Bridging Operations

Frequent bridging operations have been necessary in many localities in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) in order to support tactical and operational maneuvers in the region’s rugged terrain, which is often intersected by wadis, canals or other terrain features. In an effort to reduce costs, provide a more enduring mobility solution, and have the capability to recover military bridging assets for later use, the Bridge Platoon of the Engineer Support Battalion (ESB), 2d Marine Logistics Group (MLG) (Forward), has begun employing non-standard bridging (NSB) techniques to a much greater extent throughout the AO. Modular components for these bridges can be constructed at forward operating bases and then moved to the site in question for assembly. In an effort to capture the lessons and observations from these frequent NSB operations, the program analyst from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) attached to 2d MLG (Fwd) (in coordination with the 2d MLG (Fwd) G-3 Assessment Cell) conducted interviews with personnel from the MLG, RC (SW), the Marine Corps Engineer Schools (MCES), and the ESBs in theater. Their comments and observations have now been captured in a 2d MLG (Fwd) report, entitled Non-Standard Bridging Lessons Learned. In addition to furnishing many recommendations for subsequent NSB emplacements, the report includes a blueprint for a non-standard bridge, with dimensions that were commonly employed in theater.

One of the main benefits of the use of NSB techniques is to allow for the replenishment of stocks of standard medium girder bridges (MGBs) for future operations. Although the time required to emplace a non-standard bridge is significantly longer than for an MGB, there is not the subsequent need to remove the bridge upon retrograde. In addition, the impact on the local villages, in many instances, may be more positive since the bridges are more or less permanent and often satisfy a local requirement as well as a military need. There may also be an opportunity to involve local nationals in the construction process itself, with the associated potential for increased buy-in by the civilian population.
The Marine Corps’ Traveling Theater in Afghanistan

The products of Combat Camera Marines have long been recognized as valuable assets that can support many different types of information operation campaigns during counter-insurgency (COIN) and stability operations. The impact of a multi-media message on the local populace may often be greater than the sum of its parts. In an effort to emphasize the utility of integrating photographs and videos into information operations messages, LCDR Daniel S. Avondoglio (currently serving with the Marine Corps in Afghanistan) has prepared a paper on this topic for the Small Wars Journal, entitled Integration of Combat Camera and Public Information to Maximize the Affect within the Information Environment. Three examples of the use of Combat Camera products are addressed. In particular, the paper highlights a Traveling Theater that Marines initially developed in conjunction with the opening of an internet café in the Loy Charay Bazaar in the Marjah District of central Helmand Province. During the opening ceremony, the Marines showed the audience of local villagers a video that explained the reasons for the presence of coalition forces in their country. Since its first use, the Traveling Theater has furnished a unique capability to communicate with the local populace whenever the opportunity has presented itself, especially during key leader engagements. The theater consists of a stand-alone computer, one-eye projector, speaker system, extension cord, power strip, hammer and nails, power converter, and a white bed sheet as a backdrop. The theater package can be powered by a mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) tactical vehicle and allows for an appropriate stand-off distance from the vehicle.

Word of Mouth on the Traveling Theater:
“. . . By employing this Traveling Theater during key leader engagement (KLEs), the combined impact of visual information with verbal information produced a lasting affect on the target audience. Of note, the battalion reported that a few days later, when this video was shown again to a different audience of local Afghans in the central Helmand River Valley Marjah District, a number of local men stated they had heard of the video from men in a neighboring village and were interested in seeing it, as well. . . Such feedback is indicative of the speed with which communication by word-of-mouth travels in Afghanistan, particularly amongst the rural villages . . .”
Eliminating Preventable Deaths on the Battlefield

An online paper, prepared by ten medical professionals for the American Medical Association (AMA), examines casualties sustained by the 75th Ranger Regiment from October 2010 through March 2011 during deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to determine whether there were preventable adverse outcomes and opportunities to improve care. The results of the study are available in the paper, Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield. The study determined that pre-hospital advances implemented by Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) have improved the probability that casualties will arrive at a hospital alive so they can benefit from the trauma care system now in place. The TCCC guidelines represent a paradigm shift away from civilian pre-hospital care practices. Since, at present, not all opportunities have been realized, the remaining challenge is to refine performance improvements and best practices through system-wide pre-hospital data collection. Specifically, the paper concludes that “the 75th Ranger Regiment’s implementation of a comprehensive casualty response system sustained by focused training directed by tactical leaders using data from a unit-based pre-hospital trauma registry (PHTR) has resulted in historically low casualty rates for a line unit of its type, to include virtual elimination of preventable combat death. This approach has been recommended by the Defense Health Board for implementation by combatant units throughout the DoD. Performance improvements in pre-hospital care are [also] actively migrating from the current battlefield to civilian practice...”

Ensuring Realism in Culture Training

From the November 2011 Edition of Translational Research produced by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL):

Aligning Culture Training by Kristin Post and Frank Tortorello J., PhD

“... Since Marines value combat realism in training, then CAOCL’s training - and our assessment of it - must reflect the realities of present operating environments in order to be relevant to Marines. Present operating environments, whether a counterinsurgency operation or a bilateral exercise, guarantee Marines will need to build relationships, whether with local populations, partner militaries, or nongovernmental organizations. It is no surprise, therefore, that many Marines tell us that relationship-building is a key component in their mission success. To ensure that CAOCL’s training is well aligned with the operational environment and that it best guides Marines on how to build relationships in the variable contexts of a foreign culture, we have to find out what is really happening, on the ground, in actual training and on actual deployments. To accomplish the task of understanding how well CAOCL’s culture training lines up with the “ground truth” for Marines, we have chosen to employ a strategy of using mixed social scientific methods to follow Marines through a cycle of pre-deployment training, deployment, and post-deployment. ... Accuracy of measurement is not the point in a project like this. Precision of what realities on the ground mean for Marines - and representing those in training - is the point. ... Ultimately, we want to discover and reflect what it is like to build relationships in a complex cultural environment, as viewed by Marines in the field...”

IED Trends and Issues at the Unclassified Level

In an effort to provide as much information as possible on improvised explosive device (IED) incidents and trends at the unclassified level, the Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC) has established a Counter-IED (C-IED) Web Page to provide unclassified IED information to the broader civil-military community. The IED has become a fixture of the modern battlefield and is likely to remain a serious challenge in the future. IEDs are one of the main causes of casualties among military forces and civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other countries. As a result, IED-related information is relevant to a wide range of individuals, including civilian aid workers who travel to, or work in, high threat areas. Although most IED information and trends data tend to be classified, the CFC is attempting to synthesize available unclassified IED-related information and share that information throughout the civil military community. However, CFC emphasizes the fact that military personnel requiring detailed IED data or analysis will need to access other sources as well.

The CFC has also prepared an unclassified, publicly releasable Report on IED Trends and Issues During October 2011 that provides a summary of incidents and trends involving explosive devices as reported in various unclassified sources during the month. The report not only addresses recent events in Afghanistan, but also highlights issues associated with the smuggling of illegal calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Pakistan (which is employed in the majority of the home-made explosives (HME) used in IEDs in Afghanistan) and the employment of IEDs by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The report highlights specific attacks attributed to AQAP that have occurred in Yemen during each year from 2009 through 2011. Return to the Table of Contents!
The July 2011 revision to the Commandant’s Professional Reading List was produced by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the reading list remains relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives, as well as help ensure that Marines benefit from the experiences of others. The new list continues to highlight First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), as the Commandant’s “choice book” to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) and the Director of Intelligence) are highlighted on the Marine Corps University (MCU) website, along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) a book that has been added to the new 2011 list, From the Horse’s Mouth, by Maj Ted McKeldin (on the list for Sergeants), (2) a book that has been retained from the 2009 list, The Savage Wars of Peace, by Max Boot (on the list for Gunny Sergeants, 2nd Lieutenants and Warrant Officers), and (3) a very recent book that highlights the importance of nations bordering the Indian Ocean to future U.S. strategic interests, Monsoon, by Robert D. Kaplan, (whose book Soldiers of God is currently on the Commandant’s List).

From the Horse’s Mouth: Selected Thoughts on Small-Unit Leadership, by Maj Ted McKeldin (Marine Corps Association, 1999)

Review by Capt Robert S. Peterson, USMC, Marine Corps Gazette:

“It has long been recognized that most doctrine, techniques, tactics, and procedures are written in sterile offices by men in starched uniforms who go home at the end of the day. Seldom do we consider that these documents and lessons learned are determined from past battles, commanders who have led those battles, and soldiers or Marines who have fought those battles. Seldom do students of the art of war have an opportunity to listen to the veterans of those battles. When that time arrives and those veterans speak, we should take the time to listen.

Imagine the perfect classroom, roaring fire, flowing beverages. A group of warriors are sitting on the edges of their very comfortable chairs, "leaning into" the knowledge and wisdom of their battle-hardened instructor. Perhaps we would find this classroom in a university of warriors using combat veterans as instructors, veterans of any and all conflicts, and veterans with experience leading men into the face of battle against some unknown enemy. Perhaps we would call these instructors "Greybeards," and our classroom the "University of Greybeards," and we would call the time spent around the fire "A Preparation for Leading Warriors." From the Horse’s Mouth, by Maj Ted McKeldin, would be the primer for just such a class -- a beginner's book on the expectations of the warriors who have been to battle, returned home, and taken the time to remember and pass on what they have learned. These warriors reflect in order to prepare us -- the present-day warriors -- for what battles may come.

Maj McKeldin’s book is divided into three sections: “Wisdom from Every Clime and Place”; “Wisdom from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam”; and “Wisdom-Eight Unique Perspectives." Each chapter in these sections is either the subject of personal interviews with former small unit leaders, or is the reprinted version of past interviews or articles. The men represented within these pages are all veterans of conflict from the rank of corporal through general. . . .” Read more of the review from the Marine Corps Gazette.


Article by Max Boot on the same topic, published in the Hoover Digest, Hoover Institution, 30 July 2002:

“As you read this article, America is at war. On distant battlefields, from Kandahar to the Hindu Kush, American soldiers are risking their lives to defeat a shadowy enemy. But it doesn’t feel like a war does it? Industry hasn’t been mobilized, civilians haven’t been drafted. There have been some added security measures at home, but nothing like the rationing and other disruptions that the United States experienced during World War II. So what kind of war is this anyway?

It’s a small war, a term used during the twentieth century to describe encounters between small numbers of Western soldiers and irregular forces in what is now called the Third World. When we think of war most of us think of the Civil War or World Wars I and II—conflicts fought by millions of citizen soldiers supported by the total mobilization of the American home front. By contrast, U.S. involvement in places like Kosovo, Bosnia, or Afghanistan barely qualifies as a war in the popular imagination. Yet, as I discovered during the course of researching my book, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, such “small wars”—fought by a small number of professional U.S. soldiers—are much more typical of American history than are the handful of “total” wars that receive most of the public attention.

Between 1800 and 1934, U.S. Marines staged 180 landings abroad. And that’s not even counting the Indian wars the army was fighting every year until 1890. Much of this history is forgotten today, which is a shame because it’s full of so many thrilling episodes featuring so many amazing characters. Consider sailors such as Stephen Decatur, one of America’s first military heroes, who battled the Barbary pirates and the British before dying in a duel with a brother officer; soldiers such as “Fighting Fred” Funston, an army officer who helped end the Philippine war by leading a daring commando raid to capture the leader of the insurgents; and Marines such as Smedley Butler, America’s foremost colonial soldier in the early years of the twentieth century, who, on retiring from the Marine Corps, turned into a leading anti-imperialist and pacifist . . .”

Read more of Max Boots’s article on the next page.
Continuation of the article on The Savage Wars of Peace: “. . . The kind of wars we’ve been fighting the past decade, in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, would have been instantly familiar to Decatur, Funston, and Butler. But these conflicts seem disorienting to many in the Pentagon who believe their role is to prepare for big conventional wars—to fight, if not World War III, then a replay of the Gulf War or Korean War. Their ethos is summed up in the Powell Doctrine, which holds that America should only commit its forces to battle if it intends to win a quick, decisive victory and then withdraw immediately.

There was much complaining, at least during the Clinton administration, that U.S. forces were being frittered away on “nation building,” that they were being sent on missions without “exit strategies,” without clearly defined goals, and without mobilizing the American people. During the 2000 presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice complained that U.S. troops shouldn’t be escorting students to kindergarten—a reference to the U.S. peacekeeping role in the Balkans. And, sure enough, though the Bush administration successfully fought an unconventional campaign in Afghanistan, in its wake the president has refused to commit U.S. troops to a long-term peacekeeping presence, which may turn out to be a costly mistake.

The president’s hostility to “peacekeeping” is based on the widespread belief that U.S. troops have not traditionally undertaken this kind of mission and are not particularly good at it. This view, like many other common myths about the “American Way of War,” has little basis in historical fact. For more than 200 years, the U.S. military has routinely violated every tenet of the Powell Doctrine—and done so with great success. To be specific, there is absolutely nothing novel about (1) wars without a “vital national interest,” (2) wars without significant popular support, (3) wars without declarations of war, (4) wars without exit strategies, and (5) wars that force U.S. troops to act as “social workers.” Let me briefly explain what I mean, starting with the lack of vital interests in most of our past small wars. . . .”

Read the entire article from the Hoover Digest.


Review by Aaron L. Friedberg, The New York Times

“Maps often reveal more about those who draw them than they do about the reality they purport to represent. The Mercator projections that typically hang on the walls of classrooms and Pentagon offices place the United States in the middle, separated from Europe to the east by the Atlantic Ocean and from Asia to the west by the vast expanse of the Pacific. Our preference for this perspective no doubt reflects a certain national egocentrism, but for the better part of the last two centuries it has also made a good deal of strategic sense.

Through much of the 19th century these oceanic moats made possible what the historian C. Vann Woodward called an era of “free security.” As it grew stronger and stepped onto the world stage, the United States projected its power toward Europe and East Asia. Over the course of the 20th century, Americans waged wars, hot and cold, to prevent these vital regions from falling under the dominion of hostile forces.

Whatever purpose they may once have served, yesterday’s maps have now outlived their usefulness. Since the end of the cold war, and with increased speed and intensity since 9/11, our focus has shifted toward the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, as well as toward the waters of the western Pacific. In Monsoon, Robert D. Kaplan argues that we need fresh ways of seeing the world, and especially these parts of it that, despite being split in two by the old projections, are actually integral elements in a single coherent whole.

Kaplan’s goal is to provide his countrymen with just such a map, one centered on what he calls “the Greater Indian Ocean.” This is a region that stretches “eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond.” Thanks to monsoon winds that shift direction at regular six-month intervals the waters connecting these far-flung shores have long been readily navigable, even by relatively primitive sailing vessels. Linked first by Muslim merchants, the Greater Indian Ocean was later dominated by Portugal, then by the British and most recently by the United States.

Although it became something of a strategic backwater during the cold war, this maritime domain is emerging as the global system’s center of gravity. Through it pass huge tankers carrying a large fraction of the world’s energy. At its western end, from Somalia to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf to Iran and Pakistan along the shores of the Arabian Sea, lie the main sources of Islamist extremism. Most important of all, it is in the Indian Ocean that the interests and influence of India, China and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here, Kaplan says, that the 21st century’s “global power dynamics will be revealed.”

“Monsoon” is Kaplan’s 13th book, and like much of his earlier work, it contains a special blend of first-person travel writing, brief historical sketches and wide-ranging strategic analysis. . . .”

Read the remainder of the review in The New York Times Online.
### Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Brad Lee has deployed as the replacement for Mr. Ken Hurst at RC (SW). Mr. Hurst has returned to his assignment as the program analyst at 4th Marine Division. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact Mr. Mark Silvia, the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.