



Vehicle operators and maintainers from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 (VMU-1) inspect an RQ-7B Shadow prior to launch at 29 Palms. Read the MCCLL report on [Integrated Operations of Unmanned Aerial Systems \(UAS\) in Regional Command Southwest](#).



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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

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News

Three items are included this month: (1) information on [escalating motorcycle fatalities](#), (2) the Marine Corps responses to [East Coast natural events](#), and (3) [medical and health-related lessons](#) from the Navy.

[Reading Lists and Book Review](#): Three books are featured: (1) *Afghanistan* from the new 2011 Commandant reading list, (2) *Supreme Command*, a carryover from the previous 2009 list, and (3) a new book, *Greeting's from Afghanistan: Send More Ammo!*

[Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts](#): This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. **The observations are not service level decisions.** In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments and [requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list](#) can be directed to: [Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor](#)

Integrated Operations of Unmanned Aerial Systems

Marine Corps' unmanned aerial system (UAS) assets in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations currently perform a variety of missions, including air reconnaissance, target laser spotting and designation, and VHF communications relay. In the future, missions performed by these systems are expected to expand to encompass assault support, increased offensive air support, and electronic warfare. In support of highly kinetic Afghanistan operations, UAS planners from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) (Forward) realized that an appropriate balance needed to be maintained between the requirements of the aviation combat element (ACE) to execute command and control over the airspace and the needs of the ground combat element (GCE) for responsive allocation, tasking and re-tasking of UAS assets. In an effort to ensure that all ACE intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities (including both manned and unmanned assets) were effectively coordinated and employed, 3d MAW (Fwd) conceived and established a staff organization referred to as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination Cell (MARCC). The MARCC was intended to provide a consolidated means of tasking all of the ACE ISR assets in support of the regional command. The MARCC worked to incorporate all ACE ISR capabilities into the wing's overall ISR planning, advise RC (SW) planners and leaders on the assets that could best satisfy requirements, streamline information flow concerning these assets, and facilitate the dynamic re-tasking of the ISR platforms when necessary.



Marines from VMU-3 load an RQ-7B Shadow onto its launcher at Camp Dwyer in preparation for a mission to furnish Marines and coalition partners with aerial information during a combat mission.

In an effort to help document lessons learned as a result of the deployment of the current systems (as well as to help determine where UAS assets should best be located within the MAGTF), a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews with key personnel from RC (SW), 3d MAW (Fwd), Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons (VMUs), and other units in April and May 2011, documenting the results in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled, [UAS Integrated Operations in Support of RC \(SW\)](#). A classified version of the report is also available on the MCCLL SIPR website at: <http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil>. The focus of the report is on UAS command relationships, command and control, planning and operations, training, equipping, and manning.



A UAV technician with VMU-3 works on the rotor of an RQ-7B Shadow at Camp Dwyer in preparation for an upcoming UAS mission.

Complete sets of FOUO and classified comments and observations are included in the two versions of the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Training:** UAS technologies and capabilities continue to be developed and fielded. The training and education of UAS users regarding these new capabilities and how best to employ them is becoming increasingly important. In order to support this requirement, sufficient UAS assets must be made available during pre-deployment training.
- **Command Relationships:** The MARCC helped enable RC (SW) to consider its organic ISR assets in a holistic manner and apportion them more efficiently. This approach to ISR allocation reinforced the concept of end users submitting requests for specific **effects** rather than specific **systems**.
- **Planning and Operations:** UASs were a high-demand, low-density resource, with battlespace commanders consistently requesting a level of UAS coverage that necessitated the establishment of priorities for UAS support. Effective prioritization of sorties proved to be an ongoing challenge.
- As a result, it became incumbent on end users to submit requests with sufficient detail so that they could be prioritized accurately.

⇒ UAS operational doctrine continues to evolve, with a variety of issues to be addressed, including multi-role mission planning and sortie apportionment.

⇒ In addition to intelligence gathering, targeting, and maneuver support, the UAS assets also supported information operations (IO) requirements by providing a visual means of countering enemy propaganda.

⇒ In discussing the advantages provided by the UASs, BGen Osterman, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Forward), noted that *"Not that everybody needs perfect information all the time, but these assets gave the ground commander the ability to fight full throttle without tripping the rules of engagement (ROE). . ."*

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A ScanEagle UAS belonging to VMU-2 awaits its next mission at Forward Operating Base Edinburgh.

OEF After Action Report from Alpha Surgical Company



A medical entomologist with the Public Health and Preventive Medicine Detachment, Alpha Surgical Company, examines mosquitoes and larvae collected aboard Camp Leatherneck to determine whether the genus of mosquitoes that transmit malaria is present.

Alpha Surgical Company, 2d Maintenance Battalion, deployed from February to September 2011 to Helmand and Nimruz Provinces in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations to provide expeditionary medical and surgical care for coalition forces. In addition, the company treated local nationals in cases that involved saving life, limb or eyesight. The company was manned with sufficient personnel to support three shock trauma platoons (STP), four forward resuscitative surgical systems (FRSS), and combat stress, dental and preventative medicine detachments. The company also helped to augment the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Concussion Restoration Care Center. In an effort to inform other surgical companies about its experiences, the company has prepared an end-of-deployment [Surgical Company After Action Report \(AAR\) for OEF 11.1](#) that focuses on administration, doctrine, intelligence, operations, and logistics. In addressing the challenges faced by the company's staff in this type of operational environment, the AAR points out that, although the nursing staff had extensive critical care and emergency medicine experience, they lacked significant operating room experience, which would have been very beneficial at the FRSSs. In addition, many of

the physician assistants, family practice physicians, and independent duty corpsmen did not have extensive trauma care experience. Their attendance at the trauma care course offered at the Naval Trauma Training Center would have been beneficial. The pool of trained laboratory technicians also faced significant challenges due to the considerable amount of blood required at each of the FRSS and STP sites.

Readers may also be interested in two AARs from previous OEF surgical company deployments, [Alpha Surgical Company, Combat Logistics Regiment 15 \(CLR-15\)](#) and [Charlie Surgical Company, CLR-15](#).

From the Alpha Surgical Company AAR:

“Severe environmental conditions in Afghanistan stress equipment . . . A forward biomedical equipment technician (BMET) cannot only provide appropriate preventive maintenance and repair, but is also an in-place expert to articulate problems and expedite repairs for higher echelons of maintenance. . .”

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OEF After Action Report from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

Last month's MCCLL newsletter highlighted the [First 100 Days OEF After Action Report \(AAR\)](#) from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) (prepared as a slide show), as well as a separate [3/9 Battalion Gunner AAR](#) in storyboard format. Since then, the battalion has completed its detailed and comprehensive [Post-Deployment AAR](#) for the entire period of counter-insurgency operations in the Marjeh District of central Helmand Province. This AAR addresses the battalion's missions from December 2010 to July 2011 to protect the local populace, defeat the insurgency and develop the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in preparation for the transition of security responsibilities to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The battalion supported a number of named operations, facilitated the transition of Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) personnel to Afghan local policemen, and distributed Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for development of the infrastructure and to support the agricultural, educational, and economic sectors in the Marjeh District. As a result of these efforts, the security situation improved greatly throughout the battalion's seven-month deployment.

The battalion points out that regular and specific reporting on atmospheric significantly enhanced the companies' understanding of the human terrain. Patrols gauged atmospheric and reported their findings at each debriefing, with the company-level intelligence cells (CLICs) then briefing the atmospheric on a weekly basis for each sector or village. This information was a simple and valuable planning tool, not only for security efforts, but also reconstruction and development.

Of paramount importance is treating all local citizens with decency and respect. The AAR points out that an individual who is selling melons at a market may, in fact, be an important village elder. If you offend this individual, you may potentially end up offending an entire village. The AAR points out that the need for respectful treatment of Afghan citizens also applies to the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers. If they are treated aggressively and angered, it is very difficult to ensure they will accomplish their tasks. Also important is learning as much of the Pashto language as possible and demonstrating the desire to help the local populace by implementing quick impact projects. These actions build credibility and cause the people to be more willing to support the Marines rather than the Taliban.



Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, speaks to Marines and Sailors assigned to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) and 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) deployed to the Marjeh District of central Helmand Province.

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Insights from the Regimental Combat Team 1 Lessons Observed Conference



General David Petraeus (who at the time was Commanding General of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan) observes an Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier being trained during a visit to the RCT-1 Combat Operations Center at Camp Dwyer.

The third in a series of regimental-level lessons observed conferences was held in September 2011 at Camp Pendleton, in this case, to document observations, recommendations, and best practices based on the experiences of Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) as the command element for ground combat operations in central and southern Helmand Province during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.2 and 11.1. This conference, sponsored by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), served as a forum for the operating forces and supporting establishment to conduct a dialog concerning the lessons observed across the warfighting functions and to conduct detailed discussions on topics that might not have been documented in previous data collection efforts. In addition to the Commander and key staff members from RCT-1, participants in the conference included the 1st Marine Division G-3, the Seventh Marine Regiment, various agencies from the Training and Education Command (TECOM), the Training Support Center (TSC) at Camp Pendleton, the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5), the Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11), MCTOG, and MCCLL. A number of the most important observations from the conference have now been documented in a MCTOG re-

port, entitled [RCT-1 OEF 10.2 - 11.1 Lessons Observed Conference](#).

Since many of these observations have also been reported by participants in previous regimental conferences, they are highlighted in the latest report as “systemic trends” that are considered to be noteworthy candidates for focused resolution efforts. As an example, the employment of “money as a weapons system” (MAAWS) in Afghanistan has been highlighted in previous conferences as an important tool during the counterinsurgency fight, but strategies for the administration of funds available to commanders in theater are often not fully understood by units until late in their deployment. MAAWS is a topic that should be considered for more comprehensive training for commanders and their staffs prior to deployment. Another systemic trend involves the need for close partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) at the higher headquarters levels. Marines at these levels should be partnering “should-to-shoulder” with their ANSF counterparts. Partnering at the higher levels will also help ensure that the same approach filters down the chain of command and is uniform across the entire area of operations.

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Training Observations from a Regimental Gunner

Chief Warrant Officer-5 Christopher H. Harris, who has served as the Regimental Gunner for 3d Marine Regiment, since October 2005, was interviewed in September 2011 by Mr. Jim Burke, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) program analyst at Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Base, Hawaii. Based on his 29+ years of service in the Marine Corps, CWO5 Harris commented extensively during the interview on Marine Corps infantry training, with numerous insights that today’s infantry Marines would do well to take to heart: ■ **Never be in a hurry to get yourself shot.** *Develop plans that exercise the ability of Marines to make logical decisions and practice those decisions. Develop an ability to determine situational awareness quickly. Exercise decisions so that everything you do in training is based on a through process and a logical reason for your decisions.* ■ **We’re not organized to train, we’re organized to fight.** *Anytime you train, you have to understand that we’re really built to fight.* ■ **Mistakes are good.** *Mistakes tell me that we’re doing things, that we’re exercising, that we’re trying unique things. An abundance of mistakes doesn’t necessarily mean that you’ve got a bad organization; it means that you are coming out of your comfort zone. Obviously, repeated mistakes show a pattern of poor performance, but a bunch of mistakes, covering a wide range of motions, means that the battalion is active; it is aggressively pursuing training, trying to accomplish things and is a learning organization.* ■ **Good training is always resource intensive.** *I would say that for every one good day of training it takes a minimum of two days to plan for that training.* ■ **I always claim that I can take 13 well-trained individuals and turn them into a squad in about a day.** *The inverse is not true; I can’t take 13 individuals that aren’t well training and ever turn them into a squad. I’ve got to make them very good at their individual tasks first . . . before I could ever think about incorporating them into an organization.* ■ **The end result is we’ve got to train Marines on how to achieve self discipline.** Please refer to the [entire CWO-5 Harris interview](#) for numerous other insights into infantry training.



A squad leader from 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, leads his Marines during Exercise Clear, Hold, Build 2 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), 29 Palms, CA, in preparation for the battalion's upcoming Afghanistan deployment.

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Radiation Contamination During Operation Tomodachi



A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) specialist scans Marines from Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36) for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation upon their arrival in Sendai, Japan.

The damage inflicted to the Fukushima nuclear power plant as a result of the earthquake and tsunami that struck the east coast of mainland Japan in March 2011 produced radiation leaks that resulted in Marine Corps aircraft contamination in the course of providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) support to the Government of Japan during Operation Tomodachi. In an effort to understand the tactical and operational responses of Marine aircraft wing (MAW) units and associated supporting forces to this contamination and also provide insights into potential future combat operations in a contaminated environment, analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) deployed to Japan during Operation Tomodachi to review Marine Corps operations. The analysts were located with Joint Support Force (JSF) headquarters at Yokota Air Base and with the Joint Force Maritime Component Command led by the Commander, 7th Fleet. They reviewed extensive records from 1st MAW and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) concerning the aircraft and equipment contamination that was en-

countered during the operation and efforts made to survey and decontaminate the equipment. The results have been documented in the CNA report, [Radiation Contamination in Operation Tomodachi: Implications for Combat Operations in a Contaminated Environment](#).

Although Marine Corps aircraft accumulated significant levels of persistent radiological contamination from sustained operations, the report makes clear that contamination levels encountered during Operation Tomodachi were well below the levels that pose an immediate threat to health. In addition, operational commanders set exposure limits for personnel participating in the operation that were well below Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. However, the CNA report does point out that decontamination of aircraft required significant time, resources and manpower that should be taken in to account during comparable future operations.

From the *Radiation Contamination* report:

“ . . . Operational forces can be baffled by the complex set of units, measures, and reporting styles used by engineers and scientists who develop agent plume models and analyze releases. At the same time, any system to support operational forces needs to take into account that military systems . . . are usually dated and inadequate to support the large demand for precise data actual operations generate. Operational necessity, and a desire to make informed decisions, demands accurate and precise data that are difficult for operators to understand, while at the same time engineers and scientists have a difficult time understanding the operational reality commanders face. . . ”

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Information Management in Regional Command Southwest

Information management throughout the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces is designed to provide all commanders and their staffs with the right information at the right time in an easily understood format to accomplish mission objectives. Although RC (SW) is comprised largely of Marine Corps units (with the largest military component currently being II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) (Forward) and its major subordinate units), the command is organized under the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) structure, so naturally consists of a significant number of joint and coalition elements. All of the U.S. military services are represented, satisfying many of the RC (SW) requirements for medical and religious services, civil engineering and construction, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) support, intelligence gathering, forensic analysis, logistics support, and many other combat and combat support functions. Foreign military forces in the RC (SW) area of operations (AO) include forces from the United Kingdom, the Republic of Georgia, Denmark, Jordan, and a number of other nations. The presence of these disparate military services and nations, as well as the great distances encompassed in the AO, complicates the information management environment considerably.



Marines from 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB), partnered with soldiers from the Republic of Georgia's 33d Light Infantry Battalion, relax following their clearing of the Ladar Bazaar as part of Operation Black Sand. The presence of foreign military units, such as the Georgians, greatly complicates information management in RC (SW).

In March 2011, at the request of II MEF, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Atlantic (SPAWARSYSCEN-LANT) assigned an information technology specialist with an extensive background in software engineering and project management to serve as the Deputy Information Officer (IMO) for II MEF (Fwd). Following his six-month assignment, he has prepared a comprehensive and detailed [Final Deployment Report](#) that documents the resources and functions of the RC (SW) Information Management Office, the most significant initiatives and issues, and many of the key lessons learned. The need for better ways to communicate with coalition partners drove a number of the critical initiatives identified in the report, many of which will likely apply as well during future joint/combined operations.

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Lessons from 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Operations

In August 2010, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) began a nine-month deployment that eventually involved its support to a number of unplanned real-world operations in addition to planned theater security cooperation (TSC) exercises in Kenya, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. The Marine Corps considers these MEU deployments afloat to be of particular importance in its efforts to return to its amphibious roots after ten years of land warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many Marines (including experienced field grade officers and staff non-commissioned officers) who participate in these MEU deployments are acquainting themselves with the amphibious fleet for the first time in their careers.

Among the 26th MEU's unplanned missions were: ■ humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in Pakistan, ■ the deployment of Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th Marines (BLT 3/8) to Afghanistan (along with selected aviation assets) in support of the surge of Marine Corps forces into Helmand Province, and ■ the tasking of the MEU to support Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) designed to help protect the people of Libya in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution. In addition to these operations and the TSC exercises, the 26th MEU deployment served to stress the capabilities and maintenance of the MV-22B Ospreys to a greater extent than during the first two Osprey MEU deployments and to exercise split operations of the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). The wide variety of missions conducted by the 26th MEU during this deployment have provided the Marine Corps with a wealth of experiences and best practices to apply to subsequent MEU operations and training. In an effort to capture observations and recommendation from the MEU, ARG and subordinate organizations, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) program analysts conducted interviews during June and July 2011 following the MEU's re-deployment. The results have been documented in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) MCCLL report, entitled [Marine Expeditionary Unit \(MEU\) Operations: Lessons and Observations from the 26th MEU Deployment, August 2010 - May 2011](#).



Marines from Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th Marines (BLT 3/8), 26th MEU, offload from an MV-22B Osprey, as the BLT arrived at Camp Price to begin counter-insurgency operations in the Gereshk Valley (UGV) of northern Helmand Province.



Marines from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266 (VMM-266) prepare a GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bomb for mounting on one of the squadron's AV-8B Harriers in preparation for missions in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations is included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP):** The PTP for the 26th MEU and its major subordinate elements (MSE) was considered to be atypical, due in part to the challenges resulting from its early deployment to support the HA/DR mission in Pakistan. However, these challenges were readily overcome, primarily due to the fact that the MEU commanding officer and the majority of the staff were on their second deployment and were well integrated. In addition, BLT 3/8 had retained significant combat experience from its previous Afghanistan deployment.

⇒ As the Marine Corps re-establishes its amphibious roots, training to deploy an entire BLT ashore with air and logistics support in a combat environment will become increasingly important.

- **Operations:** In support of the HA/DR mission in Pakistan, the Marines and their aircraft delivered from 30 to 45 metric tons of supplies a day. Critical to

the success of this mission was the ability to closely track and document these deliveries.

⇒ Once deployed to Afghanistan, the BLT was tasked with such missions as village stability operations (VSO) and support for road improvements along one of the main supply routes. The road improvements not only facilitated combat logistics, but also demonstrated to the villagers along the route that the government was intent on making infrastructure improvements.

⇒ "Operation Odyssey Dawn redefined the MEU/ARG. In the last ten years, we have lost sight of what a MEU can do and the assets it provides the command. There was not another force, whether it is NATO or U.S., that could have done what the 26th MEU accomplished off the coast of Libya."
— LtCol Christopher Boniface, USMC, Commanding Officer, VMM-266

⇒ In commenting on the capabilities of the MV-22B Osprey, Col Mark Desens, USMC, Commanding Officer, 26th MEU, noted that, "MV-22s are a real game changer. . . It is the safest aircraft in our inventory, and, on a MEU, is where it really shines. The MV-22 takes away much of the pain of operating in a disaggregated mode. . ."



LtCol David Sosa, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) discusses an upcoming Operation Odyssey Dawn mission with 1/2 Marines on the flight deck of the USS Kearsarge.

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Status of Security and Stability Progress in Afghanistan

The eighth in a series of reports prepared semi-annually in accordance with the [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008](#) was published the end of September 2011 to provide an up-to-date assessment of the progress being made in Afghanistan in terms of both security and stability. The [Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan](#) highlights the fact that the civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign has been able to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency, limit its operational capacity and undermine its popular support. In developing an overall assessment of progress, the report addresses the growth, development and operations of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the status of transition progress on security, governance and development, and the security situation in each region of the country.



Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers with the 4th Kandak, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, unhook a 122mm howitzer D-31 Artillery cannon during their first live-fire exercise under the supervision of Marines from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12).

From the [Afghanistan Progress Report](#):

“Although security continues to improve, the insurgency’s safe havens in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefitting from safe havens inside Pakistan, with a notable operational capability, as reflected in isolated high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, sustained progress has provided increased security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas, comprising 25 percent of the Afghan population. . .”

In commenting on the situation in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations, the report notes that, “Enemy-initiated attacks in RC-SW during the last three months of the reporting period were 27 percent lower than during the same period last year. In particular, Afghans residing in the population centers of the six key districts of the Central Helmand River Valley are experiencing greater freedom of movement as the Taliban’s influence over these districts continues to wane. [This has] enabled operations in RC-SW to concentrate on expanding key governance and development initiatives, as well as identifying opportunities to transfer security responsibilities to the ANSF. . .” [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Best Practices for Conducting Dismounted Operations



Marines from 2d Reconnaissance Battalion conduct a dismounted patrol through farmlands in northern Helmand Province. Farmers in this particular area have begun replacing poppy fields (to the left of the path) with wheat (to the right).

In many localities in Afghanistan, conducting dismounted patrols provides significant advantages over mounted operations, including the ability to collect valuable intelligence and to interact more fully with the local populace. Dismounted patrols also allow for increased freedom of movement, since the patrol is not restricted as greatly by terrain features and has the ability to avoid danger areas posed by certain roads and even footpaths. The obvious disadvantage is the lack of protection provided by armored vehicles. In an effort to provide guidance on best practices for mitigating the threat to dismounted patrols, particularly the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, the Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has prepared a [Dismounted C-IED Smart Book](#). One of the key points made in the book is the necessity for Marines and Soldiers to “think like an insurgent.” Throughout a patrol, the objective is to make the targeting process a challenge for the insurgent. If performed effectively, dismounted patrols can ensure the enemy remains a “reconnaissance element” rather than an attacking element. Although additional equipment is now being carried on foot patrols due to the IED threat, the smart book points out that the basic principals of patrolling should not change. The integration of additional equipment will

change the load plan and formation of the patrol. However, a firm understanding of the enemy remains the key to early detection of the threat by facilitating the decision-making process.

The smart book includes individual sections on such topics as:

- signs that may point to possible IED emplacements,
- vulnerable areas during the patrol,
- recommended spacing and coverage parameters,
- specific recommended dismounted procedures,
- planning for a dismounted patrol,
- recovery from dismounted operations, and
- specific items of equipment to be employed when conducting dismounted patrols. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

From the [Dismounted C-IED Smartbook](#):

“ . . . Treat every area of your patrol as if it contains possible IED indicators. . . Remember, the enemy is constantly watching your patrol. Try to avoid areas that have been previously used. If you have no other option, ensure dismounts are looking for ground signs. . . Consider anything out of the ordinary to be suspicious until proven otherwise. . .”

Which Nations Are at Greatest Risk for Future Conflicts?

The Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO), a division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), publishes a yearly report that provides an analysis of factors associated with the risk that nations face for future conflicts. The report also includes rankings of those nations that are considered to be at greatest risk for conflict or instability. As has been the case in previous editions, the [2011 Edition of Flashpoints](#) is based on the premise that conflicts are more likely to occur in nations that experience problems in several areas. The ten factors considered by CETO in its analysis of conflict risk are: governance, demographics, religion, water, energy, diseases, gender, education, corruption, and economics. CETO emphasizes that this report is not an effort to predict where future conflicts might occur, but rather to identify those nations and regions that should be closely watched based on these identified trends. The 2011 edition continues to assess that the regions most at risk for conflict are Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa/the Middle East, with the latest analysis indicating that several nations in South and Southeast Asia are at increased levels of risk.

From *Flashpoints 2011*:

On the Nature of Belligerents: *“There have been major changes in recent years in the qualifications and characteristics of the combatants. Civilians are playing an increasingly important and complex role in armed conflicts, both as victims and as perpetrators. . . In the majority of today’s intra-state conflicts, the fighters have little formal military training and are increasingly youthful combatants. This trend . . . has resulted in the increased blurring of who is a non-combatant and who is a legitimate combatant.”*

The nations that are ranked the highest in terms of risk for conflict are: Somalia, Congo, Chad, Afghanistan, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, Liberia, Angola, and Niger. The report points out that the number of states experiencing some form of warfare (often of an internal nature) peaked in 1992 when almost thirty percent of the world’s nations were involved in conflict. As of 2011, only about eight percent were actively involved in some form of conflict.



A Liberian rifle line coach instructs a soldier from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) during rifle qualifications at Edward Beyan Kesselly Barracks. The AFL recently assumed command of daily operations at this range, while U.S. Marines are now in a support role.

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Planning for Drawdown and Retrograde Operations



Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 6 (CLB-6) prepare for a night mission from Camp Leatherneck to the Sangin District of northern Helmand Province, not only to resupply the troops, but also to collect damaged and excess gear in preparation for the future realignment and retrograde of Marines from Afghanistan.

The planned drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan is creating significant interest on the part of military planners in learning as much as possible about the experiences associated with previous retrograde operations and the major lessons learned from these operations. In particular, a number of recent studies and data collection efforts were initiated by the Marine Corps and the other military services during and following the drawdown and retrograde from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Among these were a series of three reports from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) based on an extensive data collection effort to identify lessons learned during the [OIF Drawdown, Retrograde and Redeployment](#). The specific topics addressed in these three reports were: ■ [Command Element Synchronization](#), ■ [Logistics Throughput and Capacity](#), and ■ [Base Re-alignment, Closure and Return](#).

Readers may also be interested in other source documents available in the MCCLL repositories that address previous drawdown and retrograde activities, including:

- ⇒ A comprehensive report from the Marine Corps History Division on [U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970 - 1971](#).
- ⇒ A fascinating article that appeared in the June 2007 edition of the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, entitled [Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan](#).

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From *Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos* :

“ . . . a common perception that the Soviets were defeated and driven from Afghanistan. . . is not true. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a coordinated, deliberate, professional manner, leaving behind a functioning government, an improved military, and an advisory and economic effort to ensure the continued viability of the government. The withdrawal was based on a coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military plan permitting Soviet forces to withdraw in good order and the Afghan government to survive. . . The Soviet effort to withdraw in good order was well executed and can serve as a model for other disengagements from similar nations. . . ”

The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

In addition to the weekly MCCLL roll-ups of new documents entered into our repositories, four of our most recent reports were the most frequently downloaded products in October.

These reports addressed partnering, mentoring and advising in OEF, the Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps (GCSS-MC), integrated operations of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and Marine Corps relief efforts in response to the Japan earthquake and tsunami.

In comparison, the second table highlights documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during October. Two after action report (AAR) briefings from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) and an AAR from the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion were among the most frequently

downloaded, as were five MCCLL reports. These documents were accessed most frequently by officers in grades from O-2 to O-5, NCOs in grades from E-5 to E-8, DoD civilians in grades G-12 and 13, and DoD contractors.

Due, in part, to the ongoing 2d Marine Division's MCCLL website registration drive, the website continues to record a large number of new registrations, with 707 taking place during the month of October. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. thru 4. MCCLL New Data Rollups for October 2011 5. Partnering, Mentoring and Advising in OEF 6. Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps 7. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Integrated Operations 8. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 9. Female Engagement Teams in OEF 10. Infantry Battalion Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) | <p>Top Ten MCCLL Products, October 2011</p> |
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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. After Action Briefing, Battalion Gunner, 3d Battalion 9th Marines 2. Partnering, Mentoring and Advising in OEF (MCCLL) 3. First 100 Days After Action Briefing, 3d Battalion 9th Marines 4. Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps (MCCLL) 5. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Integrated Operations (MCCLL) 6. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (MCCLL) 7. After Action Report, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion 8. Female Engagement Teams in OEF (MCCLL) 9. MCCLL September 2011 Newsletter 10. 2011 Edition of Flashpoints (Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities) | <p>Top Ten Downloads, October 2011</p> |
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Ensuring Unity of Effort Among Military Forces and PRTs



Members of the Helmand Province PRT meet in Marjeh with the Deputy District Governor and the Provincial Director of Education to discuss education issues in the district.

U.S. military forces and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan have overlapping responsibilities for governance, security, development and information lines of effort within their defined geographical areas of responsibility. In practice, ensuring unity of effort among these elements has often proven to be a challenge for the regional commands, the maneuver elements, and the PRTs, as they work to ensure that their actions are carefully planned and executed to provide maximum benefit to the people of Afghanistan. In an effort to provide military commanders, PRT leaders and their staffs with a set of tools, approaches and concepts for properly coordinating, communicating, and planning their activities, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), in cooperation with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), has prepared a reference guide, entitled [BCT-PRT "Unity of Effort"](#). Although this guide is oriented toward the functions and organization of the U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCTs), much of the guidance is equally relevant for Marine Corps commands and units that must coordinate their actions with the PRT in Helmand Province. This PRT is currently under the leadership of the United Kingdom, with representatives from the U.S., Denmark and Estonia. The unity of effort referred to in the guide encompasses not only coordination and cooperation among multiple military services and organizations, but also with participants from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development and

the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In addition, efforts to achieve coordinated actions may be affected by other entities operating in the battlespace, including special operations forces (SOF) or National Guard agribusiness development teams (ADTs). To a large extent, civil-military team building depends on a mutual attitude of openness to different perspectives and a genuine collaborative mindset. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

From Unity of Effort:

"The problem-sets, objectives, and effects of capacity-building, counterinsurgency, and other stability operations are often intertwined. Arriving at a consensus on the complex issues that emerge from these efforts—where multiple equities (military, civilian, and lines of effort-specific) are involved—should not be a product of "strong-arming" . . . nor should it be a product of "group-think" . . . Instead, consensus and a common vision should be reached through cooperative analysis and critical evaluation of the various cross-cutting issues and ideas. . ."

News

Escalating Motorcycle Fatalities in FY 2011

During fiscal year (FY) 2011, the Marine Corps experienced an unacceptable increase in motorcycle fatalities, with the number rising from nine in FY 2010 to sixteen during the current year. In an effort to summarize the causes of these mishaps and identify the lessons that can be learned from them, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division has recently prepared a [Did You Know? Motorcycle FY 2011 Mishap Recap](#).

Several of these fatalities were caused by motorcycle riders losing control of their bike as a result of high speed or inexperience. Other accidents resulted from the actions of privately owned ve-

hicles (PMV). In these latter incidents, defensive driving on the part of both drivers and riders cannot be emphasized more strongly. The paper addresses sharing the road, lessons learned from recent events, the use of required personal protective equipment (PPE), off-duty motorcycle clubs, and the consequences of "stunting/wheelies."

Among the "lessons for motorcycle riders to live by" are: ■ *Although you may be an experienced rider, when you acquire a new bike there is still a learning curve to know the capabilities and limitations of the new equipment.* ■ *You may be able to see, but that does not mean the PMV*

driver can see you. ■ *Fatigue, speed, and complacency kill.* ■ *A common thread on many of the accidents was the rider's decision to ride their motorcycle and not apply good judgment on the road. You should weigh the possible consequences of deciding to ride a bike and your responsibilities to your family, unit, and your future health.*

For leaders, the paper emphasizes that it takes active monitoring and engaged leadership to know your Marines and Sailors and to identify those at high risk.

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Marine Corps' Responses to East Coast Natural Events

Destructive weather events experienced in 2011 along the east coast of the U.S. pale in comparison to the summer's devastating tornadoes in the Southeastern and Midwestern states, not to mention natural disasters in Japan, Turkey, New Zealand, and many other nations. However, Hurricane Irene and other weather events provided Marine Corps units with opportunities to implement emergency response plans and to document how well these plans worked and how well response agencies and units performed. In particular, four after action

reports (AARs) have been provided to MCCLL that furnish many constructive observations and recommendations from Marine Corps bases and commands concerning their efforts to plan for and respond to Hurricane Irene as it battered the coast of North Carolina in August 2011. These AARs have been prepared by:

- ⇒ [II Marine Expeditionary Force](#),
- ⇒ [2d Marine Division](#),
- ⇒ [Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune](#), and

⇒ [Marine Aircraft Group 29](#).

In particular, these AARs offer insights into the prior planning and training that needs to occur and the resources that need to be made available in preparation for a hurricane or other natural event.

Other available 2011 AARs that address the Marine Corps responses to natural events on the east coast include reports on the [Tarawa Terrace Tornado](#) and the [Greater Sandy Run Fire](#).

Medical and Health-Related Lessons Learned

The quarterly lessons learned newsletters from the Naval Operational Medical Lessons Learned Center (NOMLLC) have been highlighted many times in MCCLL newsletters due to the valuable information that they provide on medical and health-related issues. The [October 2011 Newsletter](#) is no exception, providing links to resources that should be of interest not only to medical professionals but also to Marine Corps leaders and individual Marines.

Among the articles included in this edition of the NOMLLC newsletter are:

- ⇒ After action reports (AARs) from a number of Marine Corps and Navy units that contain many medical lessons learned. AARs are highlighted from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7), 2d Marine Division (Fwd), 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, and the USS Enterprise deployment.
- ⇒ Malaria prevention guidance for personnel deploying to Africa.
- ⇒ The role of the Joint Theater Trauma System (JTTS) and the Joint Theater Trauma Registry (JTTR).
- ⇒ The medical training requirements identified in the U.S. Central Com-

mand (USCENTCOM) FY 2012 Non-Standard Forces Training Requirements (NSFTR) document.

- ⇒ The newly published Forward Surgical Team Handbook from the Army Medical Department.
- ⇒ A five part series in the Virginia-Pilot on the care provided by the U.S. Navy-run NATO Role 3 Hospital at Kandahar Air Field.
- ⇒ Training offered by the United Kingdom prior to assignments of medical personnel to the Bastion Role 3 Hospital.

Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The July 2011 revision to the [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#) was produced by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the reading list remains relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives, as well as help ensure that Marines benefit from the experiences of others. The new list continues to highlight *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), as the Commandant's "choice book" to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence) are highlighted on the [Marine Corps University \(MCU\) website](#), along with discussion guides and other resources. This month, we feature: (1) a book that has been added to the new 2011 list, *Afghanistan*, by Stephen Tanner (on the list for Corporals), (2) a book that has been retained from the 2009 list, *Supreme Command*, by Eliot A. Cohen (on the list for Colonels and General Officers), and (3) a more recent book that highlights the experiences of an embedded training team (ETT) tasked with advising and training Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, *Greetings from Afghanistan* by Benjamin Tupper.

Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, by Stephen Tanner (DA CAPO Press, 2002)

Review by Rochelle Caviness, *History in Review*:

"Stephen Tanner's book . . . offers a clear, and eminently readable history of Afghanistan. Covering approximately 2,500 years of Afghan history, this book concentrates on the military history of the country and the nearly uninterrupted conflict that has engulfed the country. The narrative is engrossing and flowing, and the book is informative, intriguing, well researched, and most important, timely.

Tanner's text is unbiased, telling the story of Afghanistan's military history from the viewpoint of the Afghans, and the various combatants that have fought in the country, including Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, the British, the Soviets, and the United States. In chronicling the various invasions, and conquests of the country, Tanner looks at the infighting that has always underlain the fabric of Afghani society, making it difficult for the country to present a unified front to the various forces that have attempted to invade the country. Yet despite this lack of unity, and aided by the rugged terrain of the country, the Afghans were remarkably successful, at times, in repelling some very powerful invaders, such as the British and the Soviets.

Throughout, Tanner expounds upon the geographical aspects of the country that has made it a prominent world battlefield. He also explores why the various forces have invaded the country, and how these invasions have shaped the country - culminating in the rise, and the fall, of the Taliban.

This book is compelling both as an outstanding historical narrative, but also as an essential work in helping Western readers understand the mind set of the Afghan people, and how their history and heritage impacts events currently unfolding throughout the Middle East. This work will also make you conversant with the important elements of Afghan society and Afghan military culture, and will help you to understand the impact that modern tribal loyalties and the ethnic diversity of the country will play in the reconstruction of the nation, and the long term outlook for peace, or lack thereof . . ." Read more of the review from [History in Review Online](#).

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Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime, by Eliot A. Cohen (The Free Press, 2002)

Review by Lawrence D. Freedman, *Foreign Affairs*:

"What qualities should we look for in our political leaders in a time of war? The standard answer these days is that they must be able to set precise objectives for the military to meet and then resist any inclination to meddle as the military meets them. They must also sustain popular support and international understanding without revising war aims or interfering in the conduct of operations, for the only thing worse than mission creep is micromanagement.

It is no surprise to find that military organizations, at least, take this position. The supposed spinelessness and ineptitude of politicians is often one of the few things about which military officers can agree. Coping with a resolute and wily enemy is difficult enough without having to deal with pesky and often amateurish civilians on one's own side, especially now that modern communications have made it possible for politicians to keep in touch with soldiers on the battlefield. Vietnam is usually cited as the prime example of what happens when these rules are disobeyed. In that war, civilians, it is claimed, imposed intrusive restraints on military operations in the name of dubious theories of controlled escalation, and the result was a debacle.

So accepted has this new conventional wisdom become, however, that now even politicians themselves are intimidated by it. Thus President George H.W. Bush, writing after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, noted his determination to give Colin Powell, the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "the freedom of action to do the job once the political decision had been made. I would avoid micromanaging the military." The reason? Bush "did not want to repeat the problems of the Vietnam War (or numerous wars throughout history), where the political leadership meddled with military operations."

The ill-fated interventions in Beirut in 1983-84 and in Somalia a decade later are also often held up as object lessons, with politicians blamed in both cases for becoming too ambitious and carelessly shifting objectives mid-mission, causing the operating environment to change from benign to hostile . . ." Read more of the review [on the next page](#).

Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

Continuation of Review of *Supreme Command*: “. . . and casualties to be taken without any strategic gain. It was after Beirut that then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued his famous guidelines restricting future U.S. military operations to cases involving vital national interests, clearly defined objectives, and the advance support of the American people. After Somalia, clear "exit strategies" joined the list of desiderata.

In his important new book, *Supreme Command*, Eliot Cohen describes all this as the "normal" theory of civil-military relations: the idea that civilian control must be exercised firmly within the political sphere but barely at all within the military sphere. Cohen challenges that theory, however, by arguing that such a model bears scant relationship to what is actually required for success in war.

Cohen has strong things to say about the recent cases that have helped forge the current conventional wisdom. But to make his point he ranges further back in time, assessing the performance of four civilian leaders of democracies who guided their countries to victory in major wars, even after facing serious early setbacks. The first two of his examples, Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill, are well known; less so are Georges Clemenceau, France's leader for the concluding stage of World War I, and David Ben Gurion, Israel's leader during its wars of independence. Cohen's accounts of their wartime experiences are marked by good writing and good sense, and are worth reading on their own terms, regardless of any general lessons they might teach. The book's larger significance, however, lies in its successful attempt to draw such lessons, which show why prevailing views of the subject are misguided.

HOW TO MEDDLE:

The core of Cohen's argument is straightforward and convincing. War is a ruthless and cruel business, not for the squeamish. Successful wartime leaders combine an unfaltering strategic vision with tactical flexibility and understand that wars have to be fought with a view beyond the next battle to the peace that will follow. These leaders communicate their vision not only to the public and their allies, but also to their generals -- and if the latter cannot or will not find an appropriate military route to the goal, the leaders replace them with others who can and will. . .”

Read the entire review in the [Foreign Affairs Online](#).

Greetings from Afghanistan, Send More Ammo! by Benjamin Tupper (NAL Hardcover, 2010):

Review by James R. Hannibal , *New York Journal of Books*

“Army National Guard Captain Benjamin Tupper brings us this important collection of blogs and essays from his year-long tour in Afghanistan. Tupper was part of an Embedded Training Team (ETT), a small unit tasked with training and advising divisions of the Afghan National Army. His observations are frank, insightful, and offer a detailed account of the current situation in a theater where American soldiers are giving their lives right now.

Anyone who wants a better understanding of what is happening in Afghanistan should read this book.

Tupper's position as an ETT soldier is arguably one of the most dangerous jobs in the current War on Terror. ETT members are separated from the main U.S. forces and sent out in groups of two to live and fight amidst Afghan units of approximately 100 men. These warriors experience combat without the protection of well-trained, well-equipped U.S. comrades at their side; in fact, they become the main targets of their adopted units, sticking out like sore thumbs in their American Humvees.

Tupper wrote this book in real time from May 2006 to May 2007 as a blog followed by thousands of readers. His stories range from amusing but frightening tales of Afghan soldiers dutifully laying unexploded mines at his feet to graphic transcripts of combat action pulled from a fellow soldier's home video camera. Readers will marvel at the bravery of ETT soldiers and Afghan regulars facing down the Taliban and then cry as they witness the suffering of Afghan children through Tupper's eyes.

In the final chapters, Tupper recounts his fight in one of the hardest battles faced by American soldiers throughout history: the battle against Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He describes the nightmares, losses, and daily challenges of living with this debilitating disorder. In the end, Tupper leaves the reader with a better understanding of the combat faced by today's soldiers and the burdens they will carry long after the bullets stop flying. Tupper's writing is superb.

Greetings from Afghanistan, Send More Ammo belongs on bookshelves alongside such well-received works as ***Flags of Our Fathers*** and ***Battle Cry of Freedom***. Students of military history or history in general would be remiss if they overlooked this book. That is not to say that this book is for young students. Tupper's work is as graphic as one might expect from uncensored combat reporting, but that is as it should be. This book is pure, powerful, moving history, our current history, and we should strive to understand it.”

Read this review in the [New York Journal of Books Online](#).

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Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Brad Lee will deploy in December as the replacement for Mr. Ken Hurst at RC (SW). His contact information will be provided when it becomes available. Mr. Hurst will then return to his assignment as the program analyst at 4th Marine Division. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact [Mr. Mark Silvia](#), the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgment of experienced analysts assigned to the MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.